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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
RESOURCE NATIONALISM AND ENERGY 
INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA: THE PARADOX OF POPULISM 
by 
Brian Edward Hollingsworth 
Florida International University, 2018 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Eduardo Gamarra, Major Professor 
This dissertation examines the relationship between resource nationalism and energy 
integration, and uses Bolivia and Brazil as a test case.  This study asks if resource 
nationalism affects energy integration.  The findings nest within more expansive 
questions on international political economy and export-driven models of development.  
Why do populist regimes, historically operating under an economic nationalist cum 
protectionist paradigm, simultaneously pursue policies of economic integration?  What is 
the relationship between resource nationalists and open markets, especially in the 
hydrocarbons sector?  What is the relationship between populists, who are typically 
resource nationalists, and their decision to choose policies of energy integration? 
The most common responses to the above are that resource nationalists pursue 
protectionist policies in the hydrocarbon sector.  This dissertation demonstrates that once 
in power, resource nationalists do not always pursue protectionist policies in the 
hydrocarbon sector, but instead rely on market forces.  Another common response is that 
populists pursue policies of resource nationalism in the hydrocarbon sector.  This 
dissertation demonstrates that populists do not always pursue policies of resource 
nationalism in the hydrocarbon sector, but instead choose policies of integration.  Policies 
v 
 
of integration are compelled by market forces, and at times ironically provide the 
foundation for resource nationalism to later flourish. 
This dissertation develops a case-study of Bolivia and Brazil to assess the relationship 
between resource nationalism and energy integration.  The case is selected based on each 
country having energy resources or derivative products for exploitation and use, an 
energy trade relationship between the countries, the presence of government-run natural 
resource firms in each country, and a specific period where resource nationalism is 
present.  Bolivia and Brazil are important for this study because of their proximity, 
particularly where the supply of natural gas is concerned.  Proximity is of great 
importance as natural gas infrastructure is concomitant with energy integration, 
particularly supply. 
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I.  CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction, Research Purpose, and Research Question 
Energy is the single most important factor that enhances quality of life as well as 
economic development.  Life without energy is a miserable existence in many parts of the 
world as simple tasks require a large portion of human labor to gather fuel for heating, 
cooking, or even to provide dim amounts of unstable light.  Gathering naturally available 
resources for conversion into energy can be exhausting as well as dangerous for the over 
one billion people on the planet without regular access to what the industrialized world 
takes for granted.  Reliable access to energy provides the foundation for economic 
development at the most basic level as well as that for industry to develop and thrive.  
Regarding security, energy is as important to the functioning of the global economy as it 
is surrounded by conflict and political unrest.  For these reasons energy and its 
integration require examination.  The literature on energy mostly concerns oil and natural 
gas, but some recent writings have expanded investigations to include other commodified 
natural resources.  Natural gas as an energy source and its role in the integration between 
Bolivia and Brazil are central to this dissertation.  Among available energy sources, 
natural gas is exceptional for all modern economies and offers important benefits when 
compared to reducing pollution associated with the burning of wood, coal, or dung in the 
developing world as well as that associated with processed energy sources derived from 
oil in the industrial world. 
This dissertation concerns resource nationalism, energy integration, and national 
resource companies.  Resource nationalism is a global phenomenon and includes 
developed and emerging economies alike.  This dissertation examines the relationship 
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between resource nationalism and energy integration, and uses Bolivia and Brazil as a 
test case.  Essentially, does resource nationalism affect energy integration? 
Few deep studies into the phenomenon of resource nationalism exist.  This 
dissertation helps fill that gap.  Despite a history of nationalism and state involvement in 
the energy sector, the idea of energy integration has been a globally important and 
potentially transformative objective during at least the last several decades.  This 
objective clearly exists within Latin America as energy resources in this region are not 
uniformly distributed.  At the time of writing, asymmetries loom large as new resource 
deposits are discovered.  Argued benefits of energy integration are significant and have 
potential strategic, economic, and development ramifications.  Latin America will 
continue to play a role in energy policies of nations, both regionally and extra-
hemispherically.  
 
Research Purpose 
Countries with extensive natural resources pursue arrangements with countries 
lacking such endowments, and the search for energy resources drives development 
patterns.  The central thrust of the nationalist argument is that foreign investment in the 
natural resources sector will inevitably affect a country’s national security and its long-
term development goals – namely because profits from sales of such resources 
accumulate abroad.  Resource nationalism has surfaced in several settings but has been 
particularly visible in Latin America since the early part of the twentieth century, 
especially since the discovery of large petroleum deposits in Venezuela.  Populist 
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governments often implement resource nationalist policies in the hydrocarbon sector.  
Why do populist, protectionist governments then seek integration agreements?  In the 
cases of Bolivia and Brazil, populism and resource nationalism figure prominently in 
development patterns surrounding these hydrocarbon-dependent economies. 
Latin America is important for study as the region provides immense energy 
resources for export at a time when the world’s countries increasingly require supplies of 
energy.  Across Latin America from the late-1800s to the 1930s primary commodities 
exports drove development.  After the Great Depression and through the 1960s, Latin 
America underwent Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in attempts to reduce 
foreign dependency.1  From the 1970s through the 1980s the oil and interest rate shocks, 
followed immediately by a debt crisis, curtailed development goals.  During the 1990s, 
the region experienced a neoliberal push via the Washington Consensus.2  The 2000s 
through the present have witnessed a return to a commodity-driven export model fueled 
by oil, natural gas, and mining.  The effectiveness of this development model is frustrated 
by government rent-seeking and weak institutions (Laserna 2010). 
This dissertation explores the above in the context of Bolivia and Brazil and 
examines their development patterns and integration into the world economy, particularly 
                                                          
1 Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) is a development strategy that focuses on promoting or 
replacing previously imported goods with those produced domestically, and mainly pursued from the 1930s 
through the 1960s in several countries in Latin America, as well as some countries in Africa and Asia.  The 
aim of ISI was to substitute imported manufactured goods from Europe and North America by developing a 
domestic manufacturing capability, and was a means for the economies of Latin American countries to 
break out of the international division of labor which relegated them to producers of raw materials. 
2 The Washington Consensus was a body of ideas which were implemented to aid Latin America in its 
economic development and integration into the world economy; these policies were not a prescription, but 
a list that was considered desirable in Latin America at the time.  The Washington Consensus has been 
strongly criticized for its monolithic approach to repairing perceived and dissimilar economic realities 
(Kuczynski and Williamson 2003; Panizza 2009). 
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under nationalist, populist regimes.  After a mostly twentieth-century historical 
discussion of each country, the dissertation centers on development patterns and energy 
market integration from the mid-1980s through 2016.  For both countries, the middle-
1980s is an important time in the periodization of this study.  In 1985, Bolivia 
implemented its New Economic Policy amid increasing democratization, and Brazil 
ended its dictatorship.  These separate issues are inextricably linked and directly relevant 
to this study. 
Conclusions from this dissertation generate and increase attention to energy 
market policies in Latin America and contribute to literature on Bolivia, Brazil, and other 
countries in the region.  Additionally, the study may provide generalizable results for the 
energy sector and for regions outside Latin America, particularly concerning populism 
and economic integration. 
 
Research Question 
This dissertation concerns resource nationalism, energy integration, and national 
resource companies in Latin America.  The literature on energy itself is vast, that of 
resource nationalism is growing, and until recently there was limited writing on energy 
integration in Latin America.  The relationship between resource nationalism and energy 
integration in Latin America drives this dissertation. 
In the past century, nearly every country possessing vast natural resources has 
faced some sort of nationalism aimed at preventing foreign investment or development, 
especially in the hydrocarbons sector.  This economic nationalism is often resource-
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centric in its scope and argues mainly that natural resources represent a strategic security 
sector that should remain in the hands of the state.  Moreover, in twentieth-century Latin 
America, military officers often seized power in their attempts to reform socio-economic 
development through authoritarian rule.  During this same period, numerous countries in 
the region began to reconsider the role between the state and the people, to include the 
responsibility of the former regarding the social condition of the latter.  The idea that the 
state had a social responsibility toward the people regarding capital, workers’ economic 
rights, and the protection of the family differed greatly from the Anglo-American concept 
of state-society relations (Wiarda 2001).  This dissertation investigates resource 
nationalism and energy market integration, and asks why populist regimes, historically 
operating under an economic nationalist cum protectionist paradigm, simultaneously 
pursue policies of economic integration. 
This study will define and compare two concepts, resource nationalism and 
energy integration, and test the hypothesis to determine if there is a relationship between 
each.  In this dissertation resource nationalism (Independent Variable) – defined as the 
notion that control over a nation’s economy should be in the hands of nationals, that 
nationals should have preference over foreigners in reaping the benefits of business and 
economic opportunities in the country, and nationalist resentment of foreign investment – 
arguably has the potential to frustrate the benefits of energy integration.  Energy 
integration (Dependent Variable) forms part of a larger, multidimensional process, which 
includes coordination, cooperation, and convergence among countries and touches 
economic, political, social, and environmental themes.  It is not solely focused on oil, but 
includes resources such as natural gas and secondary products like electricity and 
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gasoline.  In this dissertation, energy integration is defined as exports of natural gas from 
Bolivia to Brazil, whereby an increase of natural gas imports into Brazil is a key indicator 
of integration.  The research question seeks to determine the relationship between 
resource nationalism and energy integration.  Key in this dissertation is to understand and 
explain why populist or economic nationalists pursue such market integration. 
Concerning the concept of integration, unlike oil, natural gas neither exists in an 
internationally integrated market, nor is it fungible across the entire supply chain.  Simply 
put, across the oil market one may convert their position into dollars, then into another 
currency as desired (Downey 2009, 323).  Oil markets are so well developed and liquid 
that there are ample opportunities to buy and sell oil on the spot market.  Natural gas 
markets are less developed than those for oil, and largely dependent on regional pricing.  
Development of gas markets requires long-term planning from upstream research and 
development to downstream marketing and retail. 
Gas market development can take decades of planning, requiring first and 
foremost the presence of natural gas and the concomitant intent to develop the reserves.  
Prior to breaking any ground, there must be a geopolitical arrangement which will 
encourage transactions.  Once geopolitical arrangements are established, there is a need 
to develop a legal framework to support the long-term contract (Take-or-Pay or Ship-or-
Pay contracts are uniquely crafted for each natural gas customer).3  Beyond the contract, 
there is supporting physical infrastructure, hiring of firms and labor to construct the 
pipeline itself, marketing, and the development of the retail market in the country on the 
                                                          
3 Take or Pay (ToP) is defined as a firm commitment to purchase a minimum quantity of gas downstream.  
Ship-or-Pay (SoP) is a firm commitment to provide a minimum quantity downstream.  For a detailed 
description of ToP contracts in the Bolivia-Brazil case, see Medinacelli (2017) 
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receiving end of natural gas exports.  The above are economic multipliers resulting from 
natural gas projects.4  Economies of scale spread the set-up costs over the life of the 
contract.  The natural gas relationship between Bolivia and Brazil offers opportunities for 
both countries to benefit from economies of scale; since 2000, the Bolivia-Brazil pipeline 
at the heart of this dissertation has passed through Corumbá, Brazil.  Corumbá, Brazil is 
located at a junction of air routes, as well as has rail connections leading to Santa Cruz, 
Bolivia and São Paulo, Brazil. 
Bolivia and Brazil, through economic integration in the form of natural gas trade, 
are able to advance mutually beneficial economic goals.  Essentially, as economies 
integrate, barriers decrease.  The fewer trade barriers, the more economic and political 
coordination there is between countries.  Advantages to economic integration include a 
possible reduction in the cost of trade, improved employment opportunities as trade 
liberalization can lead to market expansion, and political cooperation may improve 
because of stronger economic ties.  Disadvantages to economic integration exist, and may 
include potential erosion of national sovereignty, regionalism, or trade diversion.  The 
nature of the relationship between Bolivia and Brazil is likely not one where integration 
will result in a loss of sovereignty for either country. 
Naturally, divergent levels of economic strength, sophistication, or 
competitiveness may cause contention over how an integration project may progress.  
Brazil’s large market provides membership rents to Bolivia by absorbing an increased 
percentage of the latter’s natural gas exports.  The pipeline agreement with Brazil is 
                                                          
4 In economics, a multiplier shows the effect of change in national investment on the amount of national 
income.  For example, an increase in the total amount of investment in an economy will result in 
subsequent increases in expenditures.  The process may continue indefinitely. 
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crucial in the development of Bolivia’s gas reserves; and, Brazil benefits from Bolivian 
gas.  In the case of the Bolivia-Brazil natural gas pipeline, advantages for both countries 
far outweigh their disadvantages. 
Measurement of economic integration often involves a combination of economic 
indicators, to include trade in goods and services, labor migration, and international 
capital flows.  In the case of Bolivia and Brazil, a major step towards integration derives 
from creating a successful agreement despite divergent regulatory frameworks.  
Additionally, the participation of private firms promotes economic development.  For 
example, private business participation comes in the form of niche firms that provide 
pipeline technology and management consulting support in the natural gas sector.  
Perhaps most importantly, the Bolivia-Brazil pipeline provides the foundation for the 
creation of an integrated natural gas market in the Southern Cone, as it has the potential 
to link gas-rich countries such as Argentina and Bolivia to major centers of demand such 
as Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.  In the case of this dissertation, exports of natural gas from 
Bolivia to Brazil are the most reliable and measurable indicator. 
This long-term approach to natural gas development is the crux of market 
integration, particularly between the two countries central to the study: Bolivia and 
Brazil.  In this dissertation, natural gas exports are the only reliable and quantifiable 
indicator for measuring energy market integration between Bolivia and Brazil.  Certainly, 
the larger and multidimensional process of integration touches upon additional themes; 
however, their quantification is elusive.  Moreover, as later demonstrated, natural gas 
exports from Bolivia to Brazil generate the lion’s share of Bolivia’s national income.  It is 
plausible that the loss of such a large percentage of income will damage any economy.  
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For this reason, the pipeline between Bolivia and Brazil presents a unique opportunity to 
measure integration.  Over time, as the adaption of liquefied natural gas (LNG) becomes 
more widespread, the potential for a single integrated market for natural gas may 
develop; however, this is unlikely in the short-term, and outside the scope of this 
dissertation. 
This study asks two questions.  First, what is the relationship between resource 
nationalists and open markets, especially in the hydrocarbons sector?  The most common 
explanation is that resource nationalists pursue protectionist policies in the hydrocarbon 
sector.  However, once in power resource nationalists do not always pursue protectionist 
policies in the hydrocarbon sector, but instead rely on market forces.  Second, what is the 
relationship between populists, who are typically resource nationalists, and their decision 
to choose policies of energy integration?  In this second instance populists pursue policies 
of resource nationalism in the hydrocarbon sector.  The alternate hypothesis here is that 
once in power, populists do not pursue policies of resource nationalism in the 
hydrocarbon sector, but instead choose policies of integration because of market forces.  
The integration of the energy sector, particularly involving natural gas, between Bolivia 
and Brazil is where this dissertation tests these hypotheses. 
The selection of Bolivia and Brazil as a case-study is multi-faceted.  
Conceptually, there is not as much robust energy research involving Latin America 
compared to other regions; and, within academia, Bolivia and Brazil are under-
investigated.  Pragmatically, this research may encourage a better understanding of the 
benefits of market integration with Brazil as some of the assumed detractors implicit in 
resource nationalism are better understood.  Brazil as regional hegemon, its ability to 
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project power, and its proximity to markets in the Americas all offer integration 
prospects. 
Brazil’s need for natural gas may be satisfied through Bolivian imports.  This 
presents the opportunity to determine the effects of Bolivian resource nationalism on 
what would appear to be an ideal economic match concerning energy integration and 
cooperation between the two countries.  The proximity of Bolivia and Brazil is of 
paramount importance as natural gas infrastructure is necessary for energy integration.  
Natural gas is central in the relationship between Brazil and Bolivia, and the fundamental 
economic principles which apply to other natural resource projects also govern natural 
gas.  Aside from the centrality of natural gas to the Bolivia-Brazil relationship, this 
commodity is experiencing a revolution which has implications involving the entire 
production, distribution, and consumption cycle.  Joint technological advances in 
hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling coupled with the emergence of a nascent 
internationally integrated market for natural gas demands attention. 
There are four testable hypotheses for this research.  First, an increase in resource 
nationalism (RN) will result in an increase in energy integration (EI).  Second, a decrease 
in RN will result in a decrease in EI.  Third, an increase in RN will result in a decrease in 
EI.  Last, a decrease in RN will result in an increase in EI.  This dissertation considers 
these hypotheses, and the most likely prediction is that market forces drive integration 
and compel decision-making regardless of nationalist sentiment. 
Historically, many countries in Latin America have placed their natural resources 
under state control and have established both legal and constitutional barriers to foreign 
involvement in domestic energy production.  Such barriers are a potential frustration to 
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the development of energy resources and the idea of integration.  The Bolivia-Brazil case 
is selected based on the following variables: energy resources for exploitation, 
government-run natural resource firms, and energy import/export relations with other 
countries in Latin America. 
The historical record on oil, natural gas, and associated firms, whether 
independent or national, is inconsistent.  The oil and gas industries have a veneer of 
perceived impropriety, government involvement in the economy is often seen with 
suspicion, businesses are not always transparent, and much information that could be of 
benefit to this study remains proprietary.  This study’s conclusions will contribute to the 
energy and academic fields, and will open further avenues of research as new information 
becomes available.  Furthermore, this study will generate or increase attention to regional 
energy integration in Latin America and contribute to the literature on Bolivia, Brazil, 
and possibly other countries in the hemisphere.  Finally, the case study may provide 
generalizable results applicable to other regions, particularly Africa, where many 
countries institutionally lag Latin America. 
 
Literature Review 
 
This literature review explains the context in which natural resources may be 
sources of conflict, the concept of national sovereignty over resources, and the 
explanation of resource nationalism relative to energy integration in Latin America.  The 
literature is broken down by relevant theme.  Within each section the literature is mostly 
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arranged chronologically to demonstrate its evolution across time.  Engagement with the 
literature is intertwined throughout. 
 
Conflicts over Resources and Energy Security at the Geopolitical Level: 
It is presently impossible to restructure our modern and high-energy civilization 
based on non-fossil (renewable) fuels.  The eventual transition from dependence on fossil 
fuels is inevitable, however, and it is important to realize such a transition will be much 
more of a challenge than initially or commonly accepted.  Wealthy countries may be able 
to make the transition more easily than poorer ones, and such a transition is desirable for 
two central reasons.  First, the long-term effects of climate change and related concerns 
over declining availability of low-cost and high-quality fuels.  Second, there are concerns 
over the alleged imminence of global peak-oil extraction, followed by a rapid decline in 
global oil production (Smil 2010).  If the argument of global peak-oil is credible, the 
inevitable end of cheap energy sources and their associated ease of acquisition could lead 
to geopolitical conflict.  However, some consider the “peak-oil” argument a fallacy as it 
faced challenges even before present popular consumption (Adelman 1972, 538). 
Michael Klare has written extensively on increased competition for limited 
natural resources.  Klare’s arguments have been consistent since his 1981 work on how 
the United States of America (U.S.) supplies weapons to the world and to oppressive 
regimes.  After establishing this early framework, Klare’s writing evolves and he couches 
his arguments into the larger literature on conflicts over dwindling resources.  Klare 
maintains the general theme that the U.S. is a key actor in Latin America, and its 
influence in the region cannot be underestimated.  Later writing (2001) argues resource 
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wars will become the distinctive feature of the global security environment for several 
reasons.  These reasons include economic drivers, increased demand for commodities, 
potential shortages of key resources, instability in areas that hold resources, and the 
proliferation of disputes over resource ownership.  Market forces and technological 
progress mitigate some problems, while side-effects of globalization exacerbate others.   
Klare (2004) argues the U.S. is converting into a global oil-protection service.  He 
then juxtaposes the increased U.S. imports of oil and reduced production of oil within the 
U.S. as drivers of future conflict over the resource because of U.S. dependency on oil.  
Written before the recent dual revolution in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, 
Klare should not be considered remiss in his analysis.  Nevertheless, such dependency 
arguably weakens the U.S.  Weaknesses stem from vulnerability to supply disruptions 
(whether accidental or intentional), a transfer of economic resources from the U.S. to 
foreign suppliers, potential for entanglements in overseas wars, and increased likelihood 
for violently hostile political or religious factions to resent a U.S. presence in their region. 
By securitizing oil, the U.S. makes energy a fundamental component of its 
national security.5  This is a premise to which much of U.S. foreign and military policy 
has applied since the Second World War.  Klare concludes four trends will dominate the 
future of U.S. energy behavior.  First, the increasing need for imported oil.  Second, a 
pronounced shift toward unstable or unfriendly suppliers.  Third, a greater risk of anti-
American or civil violence.  Fourth, rising competition for a diminishing supply of oil.  
                                                          
5 Securitization here is defined as making the continued availability of oil a matter of national security, and 
something that may be safeguarded with military force (Stokes and Raphael 2010).  For a traditional 
description of securitization, see Walt 1991. 
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As almost a quarter of U.S. oil imports come from Latin America, the region is one of 
great importance to U.S. national security. 
Klare laments the U.S. is not closer to energy security, and closes with the 
argument for a "paradigm shift" on energy, defined as a need to move to a post-petroleum 
economy.  However, Klare is short on practical ideas.  Klare argues for autonomy and 
integrity, but just as his earlier argument on a paradigm shift, he is short on details.  Klare 
mentions the appeal of independence; however, his argument appears misguided as oil is 
traded on the international market, and no country is ultimately immune to resource 
scarcity or gluts.6 
Klare and Volman (2006) continue with Klare’s earlier themes and focus on 
China.  The authors maintain as world demand for oil increases, the U.S. and China have 
two options: cooperation or competition.  As the U.S. expands its military presence where 
African oil exists, direct competition with China may result.  Competition is natural, as 
China seeks to satisfy its demand for resources.  Regardless of whether U.S. and China 
cooperate or compete, the authors maintain that Africa will increasingly become 
strategically important as the exploitation of presently known oil fields cannot keep up 
with increasing world demand.  The authors were negligent, however, in the additional 
mention that oil revenues may also weaken domestic institutions in African nations, an 
argument known as the resource trap.  Centralized power structures in weak states may 
                                                          
6 Autonomy is defined here as the right to buy oil without promising security guarantees or political favors.  
Integrity is defined here as decisions on energy policy are made in accordance with fundamental American 
values and long-term interests in mind. 
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allow African leaders to reach directly to the people for electoral support, bypassing 
institutions, as is often seen in Latin American radical populism. 
At the theoretical level, Daniel Yergin (2006) argues energy security is a concept 
based on a 1970s model, resulting from oil shocks during that era.  This concept is dated, 
and must change.  Our current system dates to 1973, and Yergin argues for a new 
framework.  Yergin offers some comments about energy "integration," but in the 
economic sense.  Also, his use of the term “collaboration” may be considered an early 
foray into the idea of "energy integration."  Yergin offers a solid definition of "energy 
security," and how the definition is relative to different countries because of the 
individual challenges each faces. 
Yergin’s framework argues that to maintain energy security, countries must abide 
by four principles: diversification of supply; resilience (to provide against shocks); 
recognizing the reality of integration (there is only one global oil market); and, the 
importance of information.  Despite these principles, Yergin argues for a conceptual 
expansion.  First, the energy system is global, and both China and India need to be 
engaged.  Second, we must acknowledge the entire energy supply chain needs protection.  
Supply chain protection is fundamental, as interdependence and the growing scale of the 
energy trade requires collaboration among producers and consumers to ensure its 
security.  Yergin closes with the argument that diversification will be a fundamental 
starting principle of energy security for oil and gas.  Yergin adds this requires the 
development of a new generation of nuclear power and "clean coal" technology, as well 
as investment in new technologies (i.e. conversion of natural gas into a liquid fuel).  
Written before the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan, Yergin should not be 
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criticized for his inability to accurately predict a potential downward trend in use of 
nuclear energy.  Nevertheless, in a world of energy interdependence, energy security will 
depend on how countries manage their relationships with each other, whether bilaterally 
or multilaterally. 
Carlos Pascual and Evie Zambetakis consider several aspects of energy security 
(Pascual and Elkind, 2010).  The authors argue for over a century energy, politics, and 
power have been inextricably linked as a force in international security.  The authors 
continue to explain the complex geopolitics of energy.  Countries can use energy wealth 
as leverage to strengthen regional influence (i.e. Venezuela, Iran, Russia), against their 
more vulnerable neighbors.  Countries with energy wealth could complicate U.S. 
interests, through the use of national oil companies (NOCs) to carry out political goals.7  
Moreover, unlike private firms, NOCs may have a wider set of objectives than 
maximizing profits.  For example, as NOCs increase the political discount premium, this 
encourages greater employment and increased output in the short-term, but results in 
lower employment and lower cash flow in the long-run (Hartley and Medlock III 2008).  
Last, NOCs significantly underperform private firms in efficiency and profitability as 
political preference for state oil often comes at an economic cost (Wolf 2009, 2642). 
Victor, et al. use social science to explain the variation in the strategy and 
performance of NOCs (2012).  NOCs arose sporadically in the twentieth century in states 
with a strong corporatist tradition.  These states justify involvement in the gas and oil 
sector to control the commanding heights of the economy.  Initially, NOCs had little 
                                                          
7 NOCs dominate the world’s oil and gas industry and although the numbers are not exact, what follows is 
very close: regarding oil, NOCs own 73% of the oil and 61% of the production process on the planet; 
regarding gas, the numbers are 68% and 52% respectively (Victor et al 2012). 
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leverage over international trade in oil.  This changed in the 1960s and 1970s when 
developing countries with large gas and oil reserves became more aggressive.  This 
aggression was fueled by resource nationalism.  The associated nationalizations of once 
private oil and gas firms turned the structure of the energy markets on its head (Victor et 
al 2012, 10). 
The decline of oil prices in the 1980s compelled NOCs to pursue different 
strategies to come to terms with falling revenue (i.e. vertical integration; international 
integration; attempts to attract foreign capital).  In the 1990s state control over oil waned, 
and lower oil prices left governments devoid of revenue, again compelling change or 
adaptation.  Soon thereafter, the emergence of the Washington Consensus favored 
economic liberalization and a shrinking of the state, which took a particularly strong hold 
in Latin America.  Prices again rose in the 2000s, which varied government responses.  
Some saw the increase in price as justification for a greater state role in this sector, while 
others added obligations for NOCs such as procurement requirements and domestic 
gasoline subsidies.  Some governments went beyond this and pushed NOCs to take on 
roles historically under the purview of governments. 
Stokes and Raphael (2010) argue the construction of a U.S. global order, the U.S. 
military’s role in sustaining such an order, and the necessity of controlling oil supplies 
are all interrelated.  The authors maintain there is a strong relationship among energy 
security, coercive power, and the wider U.S. grand strategy.  Despite an increasingly 
globalized order, the U.S. pursues a “dual logic,” working to maintain a liberal order, 
providing a safe environment for U.S. national and transnational capital.  This logic 
simultaneously ensures U.S. national interests are pursued concomitantly within a 
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globalized order.  Nowhere is this dual logic more salient than when examining the 
pursuit of energy security via the control of oil.  Because the flow of oil from producers 
to consumers is mediated by an international market, the market ensures U.S. energy 
security cannot be divorced from the energy security of others.  Energy security is part 
and parcel of U.S. foreign policy in the postwar order, and the defense of international 
markets has been a paramount concern for U.S. planners.  Stokes and Raphael 
complement the work of Klare and Volman (2006).  In the context of Latin America, 
Stokes and Raphael provide data in support of their argument using Colombia and 
Mexico as case studies, as well as providing anecdotal mention of other countries in the 
region. 
 
Conflicts over the Spoils of Natural Resources, the Local Level: 
At the domestic level, potential for conflict also exists regarding the discovery 
and exploitation of commodified natural resources.  One type of conflict results from a 
particularly prevalent form of economic corruption, which confounds market efficiency 
and adds cost to a product without increasing its value.  Capturing of rents forms a major 
aspect of state involvement in energy production in Latin America.  The literature on 
rentism dates to the early 1970s, although the concept has a deeper history.8 
Anne O. Krueger (1974) develops a model for competitive rent-seeking.  Krueger 
offers a solid and simple explanation of rent-seeking, and was the first author to coin the 
                                                          
8 Rentism is remuneration for one who possesses a resource instead of pursuing other economic activities, 
and is behavior that seeks payments such as advantages, benefits, or fees for individuals or groups through 
the exercise of political power (Laserna 2006). 
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term; however, Gordon Tullock was the first to write on this topic.  Krueger uses the 
example of licensing as a valuable commodity, and the costs associated with licensing 
often result in resources being devoted for competing for such licenses.  The value of 
rents associated with import licenses can be relatively large, and there are three political 
implications of rent-seeking.  First, the government is caught in a dilemma that by 
restricting entry, it shows favoritism.  If competition for rents is allowed, income 
distribution is less unequal, and has less favoritism, but the costs associated with 
restrictions will be higher.  Second, the existence of rent-seeking affects people's 
perception of the economic system, and the market mechanism may be considered 
suspect.  Third, all market economies have some form of rent-generating restrictions.  A 
continuum exists between having no restrictions whereby entrepreneurs would seek 
windfall gains by adopting new technology and anticipating market shifts correctly.  At 
the other extreme, perfect restrictions exist where regulation is all pervasive, and rent 
seeking is the only way to achieve gain.  In the latter system, entrepreneurs would devote 
all their time and resources to capturing windfall rents.  Additional authors during the 
1970s provide arguments on economic regulation, but most are heavily econometric, not 
helpful for defining rents as an economic reality, and have limited application for policy 
(Stigler 1974; Posner 1974; Posner 1975). 
There are three basic categories of rents: natural resource; contrived (i.e. 
government monopoly); and, geopolitical.  Geopolitical rents reflect revenues the state 
extracts from the global community through strategic alliances, humanitarian concerns, or 
terror threats (Auty 2007).  Rents associated with natural resources are central in this 
dissertation. 
20 
 
Gordon Tullock (1988) distinguishes between “good” and “bad” rents, and argues 
market forces erode inefficient monopolies over time.  Well-organized groups have 
always possessed advantages in preserving wealth.  To become wealthier, we must have 
continuous innovations.  Rent-seeking inhibits innovation as energies are instead spent 
securing rents.  However, rent-seeking is a very important part of the underground 
economy where transactions are not recorded or taxed.  Here, much rent-seeking is 
concealed because it is often illegal.  Because such economic activity goes unrecorded, it 
is difficult to measure its impact on an economy.  Using Mercantilist England as an 
example, Tullock closes with the argument that if a rent-seeking state was dismantled 
once, it can be dismantled again.  Although a form of corruption, rentism may allow 
wealth generation among those historically excluded from a system.  Such wealth 
generation may come in the form of informal economic activities. 
The special privileges that can be obtained through rent-seeking are not secure.  A 
rent-seeker may be replaced in the future by another in government favor.  Furthermore, 
the rent-seeking system treats property as if it were a special privilege.  Thus, it is not 
possible for a person to move outside of a system and engage in business activities 
because they are always dominated by a vast rent-seeking apparatus.  Ultimately, rent-
seeking is a costly phenomenon that severely damages a society; however, measuring that 
cost, or even putting one's finger on it, is difficult (Tullock 1989; Tullock 2005). 
Erich Weede (1993) argues that although Dependency Theory is popular because 
it blames the privileged for making and keeping people poor, a more valid reason is how 
rent-seeking causes price distortion.  Rent-seeking behavior attempts to distort markets 
and incentives, and avoids competition.  Monopolists try to maximize profits by selling at 
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a higher price than what is found in a competitive market.  Governments tolerate these 
distortions because they reap political, economic, and social benefits.  In the struggle for 
distributed benefits, the poor most often lose.  To end rentism quickly, trade restrictions 
must be removed, and the market must be allowed to set prices. 
Marco Cupolo (1988) places the degenerating effects of rentism in the context of 
Venezuela.  Venezuela has vast resources, and developed a peculiar democratic system 
via an oil strategy supported by oil rents.  Rents do not have the multiplying effects of 
capitalist investment.  Instead, rent depends on a primary good, and profitability is 
favored by specific conditions and advantages.  Such profitability does not follow the 
same trends set by capitalist development.  As a result, oil rentism leads to a centralized 
decision-making process because local and state governments are dependent on central 
government allotments.  Public administration is not a neutral apparatus, but used as a 
distribution mechanism.  Rupert Pritzl (2000) continues with this argument and suggests 
how rentism is unproductive for society. 
Jose Ignacio Moreno Leon (2004) provides a similar argument.  Rentism applies 
to those who benefit from rents emanating from the state, and who have not realized any 
productive effort to obtain such a benefit.  Problems of rentism include the monetary 
distortion that affects competitiveness, and is often referred to as the Dutch Disease.9  
Seeking of rents increases costs, absorbs limited capital resources and labor, and 
                                                          
9 Dutch Disease is a term originating in the 1960s to describe the high revenue generated by natural gas 
discoveries in the Netherlands.  This term refers to the consequences resulting from large increases in a 
country’s currency, primarily and historically associated with discoveries of large natural resource deposits; 
however, may result from any large influx of foreign currency into a country (i.e. FDI, foreign aid, increase 
in natural resource prices).  The effects of Dutch Disease decrease the competitiveness for exports of the 
affected country, and increase the quantity of imported goods. 
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consequently disincentivizes other productive activities that cannot compete against 
cheaper imported products. 
Schuldt and Acosta (2006) summarize some of the major consequences of 
rentism: Dutch Disease, dependency arguments, elevated profit rates, how commodity 
prices aggravate development plans, and associated export booms that distort economic 
sectors.  The authors argue for a new energy policy to allow autonomous development 
whereby energy is used to transform an economy and society. 
Rentism is manifested via the acquisition of influence in decision-making through 
the individual or group which obtains control and the resulting product of an existing 
resource.  Essentially, rentism is an attitude, a human behavior that occurs regardless of 
whether there is a resource to exploit (Laserna 2006).  Strong state institutions may keep 
rentism in check.  For example, a state that is politically weak but economically strong, 
offers the most favorable conditions for rent-seeking and related behaviors.  Sam Moyo 
and Paris Yeros (2014) echo Laserna’s early arguments. 
Laserna (2010) takes earlier theories on rentism and applies them to Bolivia and 
its natural gas resources.  In the case of Bolivia, protest action increases with the 
anticipation of rents to exploit.  The rentism trap allows producers access to resources 
whose utilization allows them to multiply their wealth.  The search for rents is not always 
a problem, but becomes one when the seeking of rents absorbs much of the creative 
energy of the people. 
Paul Collier (2007) discusses rentism in the context of development.  He explains 
national resource booms, and their associated exports, cause the currency of the exporting 
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country to rise in value against currencies of other countries.  The exporting country's 
other activities become uncompetitive despite these other activities possibly being the 
best vehicles for technological progress.  Without aid or natural resources to export, the 
only way a country can pay for imports is through exports, as exports generate foreign 
exchange.  Collier explains that resource rents make democracy malfunction as resource-
rich democracies essentially underinvest resource export wealth.  When they do invest, 
they do so poorly through grandiose white elephant projects.  Echoing to the argument of 
weak state institutions, resource-rich countries without associated checks and balances 
are likely to misuse opportunities in ways that limit growth.  Limited economic growth 
closes the path toward democracy. 
 
Oil and Natural Gas Writings, the Early Years and in the Context of Latin America: 
Many early energy writings focused on the oil industry as well as the world 
energy market in a very general sense.  These works are required reading to grasp the 
complexities of the oil business and industry, and often provide clear definitions, general 
explanations, and models of the oil market (Hartshorn 1962; Frankel 1969; Kennedy 
1974).  Later works were often technical and centered on the risks inherent in the oil 
business.  For example, M.A. Adelman (1972) offers a clear example of a work 
concerning risk.  Adelman offers several theses, of which there are four of relevance 
here.  First, the crude oil industry is inherently self-adjusting.  Second, the adjustment 
mechanism is always under strain.  Third, the discovery of new oil-in-place is 
unpredictable, and it is nearly impossible to calculate the odds of finding a reservoir in a 
particular place.  Fourth, the more intense the development, the higher costs and greater 
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incentive to seek oil-in-place.  Later, Stephen Kobrin (1979) defines "political risk" as 
falling into two areas.  First, the phrase concerns unwanted consequences of political 
activity (i.e. host government interference with business operations).  Second, political 
risk is defined in terms of events (i.e. political acts, constraints, or both) imposed on the 
firm.  In his work, Kobrin also laments the lack of an analytical framework for assessing 
political risk.  
After the initial oil crisis of 1973 and the later manifestation of 1979, much of the 
energy literature centered on nationalizations and the relationships between energy firms 
and the countries in which they operated.  Literature on nationalization and nationalism 
will be addressed below in a separate section. 
A seminal work in the post oil-crisis environment is Louis Turner (1978), who 
takes a critical look at the political relationships of major oil companies with the 
countries in which they operate.  The relationship between national governments and 
large oil companies is one impossible to ignore, and Turner’s work falls into the category 
of those that consider the actions of non-governmental actors and subsequent 
implications on transnational relations.  Similar to Adelman (1972) and Kobrin (1979), 
Ernest J. Wilson (1987) argues for the need to reintroduce the market into political 
analysis, and offers the Petro Political Cycle (PPC) as a framework for such analysis.  
Wilson argues energy work is largely descriptive, noncumulative, and lacks theory; he 
challenges political scientists to familiarize themselves with social behavior and 
institutions across various levels of analysis.  Wilson breaks down the field into three 
theoretical approaches (neoclassical economics; regime paradigm; the petro-political 
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cycle, PPC).  Per Wilson’s PPC model, petro-politics at market peak will differ 
substantially from that at the bottom. 
Recent literature on oil markets supports Wilson’s 1987 argument regarding the 
lack of theory in energy writings.  Morgan Downey (2009) offers an excellent overview 
of the oil industry from upstream (research and development) through downstream 
(retail).  Downey provides a basic understanding of the history of the oil industry, oil 
chemistry, drilling processes, refining, storage, oil’s seasonality, and emerging 
technologies in the sector.  Downey delivers a separate section on the basics of the oil 
markets, which explains oil prices, trades, and risks.  Downey provides a good foundation 
to understand aspects of the market and investment areas of the oil business.  Giana Bern 
(2011) also contributes to the energy literature with the basics of energy investing.  Bern 
provides basic definitions and offers suggestions on energy investing.  Bern’s definitions 
are specific to the energy industry, and she offers examples of how to look at the energy 
market from a financial perspective. 
Daniel Yergin (1991; 2011) provides seminal works that examine the history of 
oil, and its inextricable links to security in the modern world.  Recent publications 
complement Yergin and place energy, particularly oil, in its historical context regarding 
nationalization, politics, security, and power (Graetz 2011; Painter 2012). 
The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) special report on the outlook of world 
energy investment (2014) complements the works of both Downey and Bern.  Of note in 
this report is how decisions to commit capital to the energy sector are increasingly shaped 
by government policy measures and incentives, rather than competitive market signals.  
In many countries, governments have direct influence over energy sector investment via 
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state-owned companies.  Private sector participation is essential to meet energy 
investment needs in full. 
Mobilizing private investors and capital requires a focused effort to reduce both 
political and regulatory uncertainties, and the absolute need for new technology creates 
space for greater private participation and involvement.  The report maintains there is an 
expectation that the surge in new liquefied natural gas (LNG) that is transforming 
markets will need to be tempered by the reality of the associated high cost of LNG 
infrastructure and transportation over long distances (IEA 2014).  This is an important 
perspective, as for many emerging economies, keeping up with electricity demand is a 
major investment challenge. 
Although models offer an ideal-typical explanation of markets, realities differ 
across regions and political systems.  Models often do not consider local concerns such as 
nationalism, government intervention in markets, corruption, or geopolitical responses to 
regional events.  Variations in the local context are clearly manifested in Latin America, 
the focus of this dissertation. 
 
The Latin America Context 
Literature on energy in Latin America is often limited to vague ideas, notions, and 
suggestions about the sector.  A common theme to writings on Latin America include 
generalities concerning the regional challenges in the development of oil and gas fields, 
and subsequent exports.  Kang Wu and John McMahon (1995) provide a good history of 
Latin America and its hydrocarbon sector, as well as demonstrate pitfalls and 
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opportunities amid regional stability and instability.  Paul Wagner (1998) provides a 
discussion of the legal aspects to consider in Latin America.  Fernando Sanchez Albavera 
(2006) argues Latin America can advance toward a new energy order if new sources are 
explored, and if they use current sources more efficiently. 
Carlos Battle, et al. (2010) assess the evolution of the regulatory framework of 
electric power market reform in Latin America, and conclude that investment in energy 
generation is shown to be a key driving force behind major changes in energy policy.  
This source provides a good summary of the early 20th century Latin American energy 
sector and associated state influence. 
Some writings on Latin America are driven by issues other than those with an 
integration rationale, or that center on the relationship between the state and energy firms.  
Mariana Zilio and Marina Recalde (2011) express interest in global warming (climate 
change).  The authors analyze the relationship between economic growth and energy 
consumption in Latin America and the Caribbean.  They maintain energy consumption at 
the aggregate level is an indicator of economic activity.  Continuing with environmental 
literature on energy in Latin America, Claudia Pardo and Belizza Ruiz (2011) discuss 
sustainability and environmental issues relative to energy production and consumption in 
Latin America and the Caribbean.  The authors argue the importance of understanding 
energy trends in the region with a view towards low-carbon opportunities while meeting 
energy needs for poverty reduction. 
Recent articles explain the potential and opportunities in Latin America energy 
markets.  As early as 2011, a shift in the gas industry was detected whereby the “capital” 
of energy was believed to be returning to the Western Hemisphere (Jaffe 2011).  An 
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energy boom in the Americas may cause producers in the Middle-east to think about their 
positions and power relative to energy.  Regarding the practical reality of energy 
production, development, and integration, there is great potential in Latin American 
energy markets.  Nevertheless, challenges remain regarding struggles with decreased 
production and weak prices, which are impediments to development, to include the 
funding of social programs which are often heavily dependent on oil revenues. 
 
Types of Nationalism, to Include Resource Nationalism: 
The most common driver of resource nationalism in oil exporting countries is the 
failure of export revenue to be converted into modern social services, employment, and 
an improved standard of living for citizens outside of the energy sector.  Despite attempts 
to alleviate economic disparities and build infrastructure such as schools or clinics in the 
host country, the independent oil company (IOC) cannot completely offset local 
government failure. 
Nationalism is an oft-distorted term, and there is more than one aspect to the 
concept.  Breton (1964) argues where societies invest in nationality, the rate of return on 
this investment is the redistribution of income in favor of some or all the middle class, 
not in the creation of the maximum amount of wealth.  Similarly, Johnson (1967) argues 
that the economist considers nationalism a driving force to accelerate developing 
economies on the one hand, and on the other is a major political influence.  Johnson 
defines the term as a state of social psychology or political sentiment that attaches value 
to the national group.  Johnson next explains the methods available to satisfy the taste for 
nationalism.  First, confiscation which includes the forced transfer of property, and 
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conversion of private into national employment.  Second, there is an investment of 
resources favoring the national group.  Such behavior, per Johnson’s analysis, tends to 
direct economic development along specific lines (i.e. symbolic value; jobs for middle or 
educated classes; state control over enterprise).  Nationalism arguably directs economic 
policy towards the production of psychic income in the form of nationalist sentiment, but 
does so at the expense of material income.  Breton and Johnson offer a good starting 
point for a discussion of nationalism. 
George M. Ingram (1974) explains some divergences in the meaning of 
nationalism; however, most relevant to this dissertation is that of economic nationalism.  
Economic nationalism is defined as the force that aims to maximize and develop the 
commodity and potential of a nation and the well-being of its people.  Economic 
nationalism asserts that control over a nation’s economy should be in the hands of 
nationals and nationals should have preference over foreigners in reaping the benefits of 
business and economic opportunities in the country.  Under economic nationalism, 
several factors give rise to a nationalist resentment of foreign investment regarding the 
general investment climate in a country: ideology; political situation; economic situation; 
relationship with the host or mother country; and, bargaining power.  Much of the 
literature from 1973 through the early 1980s centers great attention on the “oil crisis” 
resulting from the nationalization of oil resources and the formation of the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel. 
The concept of sovereignty over natural resources originates in United Nations 
(U.N.) discussions and subsequent resolutions dating to the early 1950s (United Nations 
1962, 1), and was based on the principles set forth in United Nations General Assembly 
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(U.N.G.A.) Resolution 1803.  The U.N.G.A. reiterated the “…the inalienable right of 
each State to the full exercise of national sovereignty over its natural resources…” and 
that such a right has been recognized by the international community.  Moreover, 
according to the U.N., each state is entitled to determine the amount of possible 
compensation for its resources and any disputes should be settled in accordance with the 
laws of the state (1974, 238).  This concept has parallels with that that of the Calvo 
Doctrine, with its roots in 19th century Argentina.10 
Nationalism does not exist in a vacuum, however.  Peter Katzenstein (1978) 
analyzes how the domestic structures of advanced industrial states shape political 
strategies in the international political economy, whereby the management of 
interdependence is a key problem that all advanced industrial states confront in the post-
war period.  Despite the growth of different kinds of international interdependencies, the 
nation-state remains able to shape strategies of foreign economic policy.  Katzenstein’s 
research echoes to developing countries. 
Abdulhady Hassan Taher (1982) argues that change in the international oil 
industry would have happened without OPEC as market forces were the driver; however, 
it was OPEC that accelerated this change.  Exponential rates of demand growth pressed 
on a finite reserve of a unique and non-renewable resource - oil.  Differences in logics 
between private and national oil companies exist.  IOCs operate according to private 
                                                          
10 Many contracts executed in Latin America contain stipulations for legal redress with their roots in the 
Calvo Doctrine.  Under this doctrine sovereign states enjoy freedom from interference by other states, that 
aliens are not entitled to privileges not afforded to nationals, and that aliens should seek redress for 
grievances only from local authorities (Martin 1968). 
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business incentives.  NOCs operate according to government objectives and incentives 
that caused their initial creation. 
George Phillip (1982) provides an historical work on the oil industry in the 
region, and maintains the state apparatus, compared to other regions of the world, is more 
or less developed.  During the 1920s, international corporate capitalism was at its peak, 
and at that time the balance of international power favored firms as it would likely never 
do again.  However, once oil was discovered in the Middle-east, Latin America began to 
be seen as a backwater.  Late twentieth-century technological advances in oil and natural 
gas recovery may once again create an energy hub in Latin America. 
Phillip (1982) argues state oil companies in Latin America have been rational in 
that they followed an easily understood logic.  In the Latin American context, gas prices 
are a major focal point for political unrest.  However, conflict need not always result.  In 
the right circumstances, a state oil company will prove a valuable instrument in the hands 
of a government that has a clear and realistic idea of its strategic objectives.  Phillip 
maintains there would be a likely trend of increased state control over the commodity. 
Jack K. Edwards (1992) examines privatization trends in Latin America and looks 
at the positives and negatives, the state’s role in the economy, the extent to open the 
economies in the region, and related implications for growth.  Edwards argues for a more 
active role for the state in development, and suggests the region faces similar challenges 
to that of the late-nineteenth century.  These challenges were also difficult to resolve.  
The region appears to have come full circle, as the 1990s experienced a neoliberal push 
via the Washington Consensus, and the 2000s have seen a return to export-led growth 
fueled by oil, gas, and mining. 
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After a lull in writings on energy nationalizations in Latin America, there was a 
resurgence in the 2000s that continues today.  Alexia Brunet and Juan Augustin Lentini 
(2007) define resource nationalism as something exemplified by the global trend of 
placing the world's oil reserves under the control of national oil companies and out of 
reach of IOCs, except on a low-margin, service contract basis, which prompts some Latin 
American countries to place limits on foreign investment in their energy sector.  Kristina 
McQuaid and Steven Otillar (2008) look at the Brazilian energy market, and imply the 
government is often the problem as there are multiple layers of taxation, permitting, and 
customs through which solutions must wander. 
Paul Stevens (2008) defines resource nationalism as something assumed to have 
two components: limiting the operations of IOCs and asserting a greater national control 
over natural resource development.  This idea has a long history, and not only in the 
context of oil and minerals.  Drivers of resource nationalism are many, and are a function 
of history as much as of a country’s current context.  There is an ideological component 
to resource nationalism strongly linked to the perceived role of the state in the operation 
of the national economy.  Stevens concludes resource nationalism is a cyclical 
phenomenon. 
Resource nationalism cannot be discussed without consideration of the resource 
curse.11  According to Townsend (2008), resource nationalism exists when a country 
seeks greater shares of the returns from natural resources for the country's people, 
possibly by nationalization of resource-based industries like mining, oil, or natural gas 
                                                          
11 The resource curse concerns countries rich in natural resources that have been unable to use that wealth 
to boost their economies or reduce poverty (Frankel 2010). 
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extraction.  Countries suffering from such a curse have had lower economic growth and 
less poverty reduction than countries poor in natural resources.  Often, countries whose 
economies are dominated by resource-extraction industries tend to be more repressive, 
corrupt, and badly managed partly because there is more wealth to fight over.  Despite 
the ubiquity of this concept in academic literature, this curse is not always a foregone 
conclusion in countries that commodify their natural resources. 
Contrary to the resource curse argument, Heilbrunn (2014) argues oil production 
leads to an expansion of a country's economy and resource revenues increase society's 
wealth.  Increases are evident in the organization of service industries, banking, housing, 
security, and consumer goods networks.  Non-oil producers move into niches as 
middlemen or distributors of consumer goods; however, this process takes time.  
Heilbrunn finds oil sector expansion has a ripple effect throughout the economy evident 
in health care, education, and urban living conditions. 
Vlado Vivoda (2009) argues increased commodity prices result in governments 
rethinking contract terms, and seeking higher taxes and royalties.  It is during times of 
high commodity prices when resource nationalism surfaces, as it is a by-product of higher 
prices, which often translates into "anti-Western" IOC campaigns.  Conflicts between 
host governments and multi-national corporations (MNCs) usually center on the issue of 
divisions of rents.  Vivoda argues there are no "silver bullets" for IOCs, and we are likely 
to witness the demise of major IOCs, once dominant players in the international oil 
industry.  What Vivoda overlooks is the ability of NOCs to form partnerships with IOCs 
as needed and with mutual benefits.  As the NOC benefits from IOC advances in 
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technology, so does the IOC benefit from access to host country upstream markets.  
Vivoda is correct as the heyday of IOCs is gone. 
Berrios et al (2010) explain that neither populism nor ideology are responsible for 
hydrocarbon policy choices in Latin America.  Timing and the starting point are 
examined regarding influence in nationalization policy choices.  The timing hypothesis 
asks whether ideology is subsumed by regional trends (i.e. nationalizations of 1970s, and 
privatizations of 1980s).  The starting point hypothesis argues that economic 
considerations, not ideology, determine the policy countries pursue.  Politics is not 
completely subsumed by economics, but clearly condition political responses.  
Essentially, nationalizations are not one-off events, but represent a long-term conflict 
between states and foreign companies. 
David Mares (2010) defines resource nationalism as the notion that natural 
resources are a national patrimony to be used for the benefit of the nation, rather than for 
private gain.  Moreover, under resource nationalism, the commodity itself is believed to 
have intrinsic value not determined by the market.  Energy security and resource 
nationalism are not inherently at odds with one another, but a balance must consider both 
domestic and international interests in the hydrocarbon sector.  Mares argues 
inclusiveness, competitiveness, and leadership (defined here as innovation and risk 
acceptance) all interact to determine the choice of an energy policy that emphasizes 
resource nationalism and energy security. 
Victor, et al. (2012) explains most oil was controlled by the “Seven Sisters” until 
the 1960s and 1970s.  During this period, exporting countries became more assertive as 
the creation of NOCs, fueled by resource nationalism, included then-popular state-led 
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economic theory.  The formation of NOCs radically changed the market structure, as 
NOCs now control most natural resources on the planet. 
Derrick Hindery (2013) places resource nationalization in the context of Latin 
America, with a focused examination of the concept at work in Evo Morales’ Bolivia.  
Hindery argues the profits from extraction are increasingly aimed at industrialization, 
while social spending, as well as the often-damaging effects on communities and 
environments, largely parallel those that emerged under neoliberalism.  The government's 
economic vision entails modernization and industrialization which is guided by a strong 
state, and uses profits from natural resources in conjunction with its transnational 
partners. 
Bebbington and Bury (2013) and Perreault (2013) advance the indigenous and 
subsoil argument, and focus on how natural resources relate to the construction of 
nationalism and the relationship between nature and nation.  Perreault asks how this 
relationship hinges on and informs understandings of identity, citizenship, and national 
space.  Bolivia is the case study for this dissertation, and these questions are placed in the 
context of the politics of natural gas.  Natural resources and associated extraction are 
integral to the production of a nationalist ideology. 
 
Populism in Latin America 
Nationalism is a potent force which cannot be suppressed eternally, and resurfaces 
throughout contemporary Latin America, particularly in the cases of Bolivia and Brazil.  
Nationalism, economic or otherwise, flirts heavily with populism.  That nationalism is 
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often associated with populism makes for interesting domestic and international 
relationships.  Weak state capacity in Latin America preceded, although was not entirely 
responsible for, the rise of populism and the leftward shift in the region since the 1980s.  
Other antecedent variables certainly contributing to populism’s rise are historically high 
rates of poverty, unchecked and endemic crime, high levels of illiteracy, corruption, and 
lack of economic opportunity in various countries in Latin America.  Moreover, as 
populations tire of ineffective political parties and the inability of elites to create 
economic opportunities, the appearance of historical outsiders onto the political stage is 
indicative of populism’s recent development of an ethnic component. 
Ethnic based populist movements challenge traditional elites as was the case with 
classical populism; however, they are particularly influential among historically 
marginalized populations in their respective countries.  Ethnic-based populism opens a 
new chapter in democratic rule, possibly weakening liberal democratic institutions, in 
Latin America.  Below is a brief and mostly chronological review of pertinent literature 
on Latin American populism. 
Robert Kaufman and Barbara Stallings (1984) claim populist cycles came about 
in Latin America because of the 1980s economic and political crises.  Michael L. Conniff 
(1982) argues urban populism was a new or relatively unstudied political topic that has 
appeared throughout the Western world.  Populist movements were multi-class, contained 
expansive electoral coalitions, and, in the Latin American context, were mostly urban.  
These movements were led by charismatic personalities who promised to redress popular 
grievances as well as build social solidarity.  The enduring legacies of Victor Paz 
Estenssoro of Bolivia and Getúlio Vargas of Brazil loom large. 
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Torcuato S. Di Tella (1997) refers to the idea of caudillismo in Latin America and 
similar traits relative to populism.12  Populism gives precedence to representing the 
interests of the masses with the “establishment” as their main antagonist.  Arguing what 
most later scholars presently maintain, Di Tella claims populism is the enemy of liberal 
democracy. 
René Antonio Mayorga (2002) argues Andean democracy is regressing, and 
representative democracy is leading towards authoritarian regimes or semi-democracies.  
Mayorga considers the emergence of neo-populist and anti-political outsiders as 
troubling.  Their rise to power exists amid party system collapse and destruction of liberal 
democratic institutions. 
Kenneth Roberts (1995; 2006) claims populism is driven from the top downward 
to politically mobilize people against elites through a dominant personality.  The 
resurgence in populism is attributable to neoliberal and democratic transitions occurring 
in during the late 20th century.  Of note, populist waves coincide with “critical junctures” 
marking the transition from one development era to another (i.e. post-1930 through ISI; 
the post-1982 Debt Crisis; after the Washington Consensus began to wither). 
Demmers, et al. (2000, xii) argue during the last two decades of the twentieth 
century, populism in Latin America experienced an economic, social, and political 
transformation, the severity and depth of which may only be compared to the impact of 
the Great Depression on the region during the 1930s’ international crisis.  However, 
                                                          
12 Caudillismo is defined as a system of political and social control based on the leadership, usually 
irregular and military-centric, of a strongman, or caudillo. 
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during the 1980s-2000s populist parties in Latin America became unrecognizable from 
earlier manifestations. 
James Petras (2008) predicts as U.S. hegemony decreases its reach, Latin 
America’s “brand” of neoliberalism will expand globally.  Petras claims despite the 
recent U.S. recession, Latin America will not slow down its growth, thus demonstrating a 
“de-coupling” of the two regions’ economies.  However, the article lacks adequate 
supporting data.  Petras’ prediction regarding the Bolivian right is misguided, and the 
Bolivian people have reelected Morales as well as created and implemented a new 
“plurinational” constitution which includes some granting of regional and indigenous 
autonomy.  Essentially a “resurgent right,” in the case of Bolivia at least, appears to 
dither and is incapable of mounting an effective counter-strategy. 
Along the lines of Torres and Roberts, Ignacio Walker (2008) maintains both old 
populism (more autocratic than democratic) and new populism reflect internal 
contradictions regarding representative democracy and its associated institutions.  
Walker’s neo-populism, differs from its traditional roots because of its democratic nature 
during the “third wave” of Latin American democratization. 
Paul Cooney (2006) attempts to examine how the accumulation crisis of the 
1970s, the debt crisis of the 1980s, and the influence of both the International Monetary 
Fund and the Washington Consensus facilitated neoliberalism as an ideology.  Ironically, 
despite Latin American rejection of neoliberal policies, popularly elected leaders 
maintain such policy implementation and accommodate national elites and Washington 
rather than those who brought them to power. 
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Mitchell Seligson (2007) attempts to answer several questions with aggregated 
empirical and survey data from across Latin America.  Seligson asks whether leftist 
sympathies predominate in Latin America, if Latin Americans support populism by 
concentrating power into the hands of the chief executive, and whether those favoring 
leftist orientation are less supportive of democracy.  Seligson finds that despite more 
leftists being in power in Latin America, the median voter remains slightly to the right of 
world opinion.  Additionally, despite a rightist orientation, there was a shift to the left 
between the 2004–2006 period, and ideology varies sharply from one country to another 
in the region. 
 
Energy Integration in Latin America: 
Historically the political economy of oil in Latin America has two basic 
groupings: exporting and importing nations.  Separately, the legitimacy of public 
enterprise found in Latin America derives from the colonial Hispanic idea of the 
sovereign's right to regulate, control, and own national wealth.  It is in this sense that the 
Latin American state enterprise includes a mix of political and economic goals.  In 
addition to its basic inputs, the state enterprise is expected to support the overall national 
planning process, provide employment, afford other social benefits, and turn a profit.  
These functions are enveloped in a country’s national sovereignty, and ultimately the 
state’s relationship to its public enterprise is central to understanding Latin American 
energy policy.  The magnitude of NOCs pushes them to assume roles in the international 
political economy likely beyond what their founders intended.  All integration projects in 
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Latin America must carefully consider national sovereignty in a region known for 
fragmentation and division. 
John Wirth (1985) looks at the blends between nationalist and free-market 
approaches appropriate for each nation in Latin America, an old debate in the region.  
Wirth finds there was less emphasis on the risks of cooperation at a time when high oil 
prices challenged the region’s economies.  It is here that early mention of energy 
integration surfaces in the literature. 
Wirth explains regional integration was the theme of early Latin American 
nationalists, and one not yet developed beyond the setting up of organizations.  Market 
forces and the lack of capital propelled such arguments for integration.  Petrolatín was to 
pool together the resources of Brazil’s Petrobras, Venezuela’s PDVSA, and Mexico’s 
PEMEX.  This idea was dead on arrival because of the joint challenges of the debt and 
interest rate crises facing the region during the early 1980s.  Additionally, Kang Wu 
(1995) argues that in all but a few countries in the region natural gas is an underutilized 
resource, and regional integration has been a great challenge to countries in Latin 
America. 
John Wirth (2001) presents the hypothesis that Latin American public petroleum 
enterprises face problems that are not inherent in government ownership, but derive from 
the nature of the government-imposed environment in which they operate.  Alfred H. 
Saulniers (2001) adds that many of the current adversities of Latin American public 
petroleum producers are rooted in their past, as instability plagued their early years and 
recurred throughout their history.  Incompetent management is also a factor. 
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Marco Aurelio Tavares (2005) argues of the problems and potential solutions for 
the development of an integrated natural gas industry in the Southern Cone of Latin 
America whereby nothing in the region follows a rational model, logic, or even market 
signals.  There are even challenges inherent in regional affinities and binational 
agreements.  Tavares’ work aligns with that of Gerardo Honty (2006), who argues it is 
difficult to find the required harmony in Latin America to increase energy integration.  
Despite physical connections, there is little energy integration in the region. 
Rolf Linkhor (2006) argues that in Latin America, like everywhere else, energy is 
inseparable from politics.  There are positive and negative aspects to energy 
nationalization, but Linkhor advocates for energy integration in the region.  Continuing in 
this vein, Porta (2008) argues there is no easy path to energy cooperation, or eventual 
integration, in Latin America for myriad reasons including conflicts over national 
autonomy, the lack of confidence in the region, and the resurgence of energy nationalism. 
In a 2006 publication, the Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe 
(CEPAL) argues it is necessary to strengthen sub-regional integration agreements as well 
as to solidify bilateral electric and gas initiatives.13  At the time, there were discussions 
regarding how to develop policies for energy development, the challenges of petro-
nationalism, the financing of energy integration, and international experiences related to 
energy integration in petroleum, gas, and electricity.  Weintraub (2007) explains the 
benefits of energy integration among many countries in the Western Hemisphere, to 
                                                          
13 CEPAL is one of five regional commissions of the United Nations, and was founded to encourage the 
economic development of Latin America. 
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include Bolivia and Brazil, and includes a brief history of why American countries are 
the way they are concerning energy integration and cooperation. 
Chris Webb (2008) summarizes the arguments of energy practitioners and 
academics alike.  Cooperation in Latin America faltered during the 1990s, and could 
emerge as a driver of integration in the region.  Ideas of pipelines matching Latin 
American producers of gas to respective consumers exist, but grandiose projects that will 
connect the region are fraught with logistic and bureaucratic challenges.  In 2008, an 
integrated liquefied natural gas (LNG) market was incipient in nature, and Webb likely 
could not foresee the emergence of one international in scope resulting from the 
subsequent natural gas and shale oil boom. 
Baritaud and Volk (IEA 2014) remind us that government priority is not 
integration, but in “keeping the lights on.”  The authors identify ways to integrate markets 
over a wider geography, which involve consolidation and coordination.  However, there 
are various barriers to integration including the physical (lack of transmission lines), the 
institutional (conflicting security and regulatory actions between local and national 
government), and distributive (where impacts of market integration must be addressed).  
Addressing these barriers requires action at the intersection of policy, regulation, and 
markets, which demands a stronger government commitment.  Energy integration is not 
always a government priority or goal, and oftentimes NOCs are politicized entities and 
unresponsive to the needs or wants of the citizenry. 
Li, et al. (2014) look at energy relationships among North American, European, 
and Asian natural gas markets and seek evidence of convergence and integration for the 
period 1997-2011.  The authors conclude there is not a fully integrated natural gas 
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market.  The authors remain interested in whether natural gas markets have become more 
integrated with the expansion of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade and shale 
developments in the U.S. 
 
Methodology 
We should not devote our careers to learning more about Latin America for the sole 
purpose of learning more about Latin America.  Science seeks to generalize, and the 
more we can apply to other areas what we learn in Latin America, the greater the 
likely contribution to comparative politics and to political science as a whole 
(Blanksten 1959, 126). 
 
Latin America provides immense energy resources for export at a time when the 
region and larger world increasingly require supplies of energy.  Historically, many 
countries in Latin America placed their natural resources under state control and have 
established both legal and constitutional barriers to foreign involvement in domestic 
energy production.  These barriers are a potential frustration to development of energy 
and the idea of integration.  The case study for this dissertation is selected based on the 
following variables: energy resources for exploitation, government-run natural resource 
firms, and energy import/export relations with countries near one another within Latin 
America. 
Howard Wiarda (2001) writes of a shared Latin American culture and Iberian 
history.  This experience refers to a hierarchical and centralized structure in state-society 
relationships.  Within this same vein, there is also a banding together of countries in Latin 
America, stressing nationalism and corporatism.  The intertwined histories of Latin 
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American countries offer regional NOCs the ability to share a pan-Latin vocabulary, 
useful when called upon to fulfill their policy roles (Wirth 1985). 
This dissertation develops a case-study of Bolivia and Brazil to assess the 
relationship between resource nationalism and energy integration.  The case is selected 
based on each country having energy resources or derivative products for exploitation 
and use, an energy trade relationship between the countries, the presence of government-
run natural resource firms in each country, and a specific period when resource 
nationalism is present.  Bolivia and Brazil are important for this study because of their 
proximity, particularly where the supply of natural gas is concerned.  Proximity is of 
great importance as natural gas infrastructure is concomitant with energy integration, 
particularly supply. 
Selection on the dependent variable must be taken in the context that regarding 
natural resource exploitation in Latin America, one is unable to locate resource firms that 
operate without host-government influence.  Energy integration is related to regional 
import/export relationships, and proximity is required in natural gas and electricity 
infrastructure.  Arguments may be leveled that the conclusions of such a study will result 
in the wrong answer; however, there are limited numbers of cases to examine.  Selecting 
on the dependent variable may justify learning how phenomena develop, and may 
provide insights for future study (Geddes 1990, 149). 
This dissertation will help determine if there is a relationship between resource 
nationalism and energy integration in Latin America.  The argument is whether resource 
nationalism affects a country’s ability to integrate.  The ability to integrate with other 
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countries in the energy sector is a strong precursor to economic integration.  Economic 
integration provides development benefits. 
Bolivia and Brazil are like each other in that they are in the same geographic 
region, have state-run energy firms, trade energy with one another, and have explored the 
idea of integrating their energy networks.  Limiting the research to Latin America results 
from similar levels of institutional development, shared historical experiences, cultural 
affinity, a pan-Latin vocabulary regarding government policy, and similar levels of 
government influence in their economies.  A comparative study is suitable for this 
dissertation despite the concern that it centers on the discovery of uniformities.  
Uniformities arguably inquire how like to one another ought each system be if we are to 
adequately compare institutions and processes (Macridis and Cox 1953, 642). 
The Western experience is often anathema in its application to the non-Western 
world; however, to claim Latin America is non-Western is misguided.  A comparison of 
countries in Latin America is required for this study as the region does not fit in the 
Western/non-Western frame of reference.  Attempts to create such a simple 
categorization is a major problem (Martz 1966, 57).  As a counter-argument to the 
comparative method, major insights into modernization and related social processes did 
not originate in area studies departments, but in those with an international focus (Rustow 
1968, 46).  That these scholars took lessons from one region to another is solid 
justification for applying a comparative approach to Latin America.  The Bolivia-Brazil 
case study is a step in this direction. 
In the late-1960s, there was a revolution in comparative politics, which began 
with several principles (Verba 1967).  This revolution looked beyond description, single 
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cases, formal institutions and government, and beyond Western Europe to Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America.  Still, the standard model at that time remained the single-country 
case.  Verba argued cultural and structural context was increasingly important.  This 
argument holds true today.  Following Verba, but applied across nationalized oil firms, 
Victor, et al. (2011, 908) argue very few governments have typical Western liberal 
systems regarding policy, but could create stable environments for NOCs. 
The comparative method is defined as one of the basic methods in establishing 
general empirical propositions, and is used in this dissertation to discover relationships 
among variables, not as a method of measurement (Lijphart 1971, 683).  Based on the 
energy relationship between Bolivia and Brazil, the best approach is the case study.  The 
phenomena under examination are anathema to either experimentation or large-N studies.  
The comparative approach is preferred in this dissertation as no opportunity exists that 
affords systematic control via correlations as is the case in the statistical approach; the 
number of cases is limited (Lijphart 1971, 684; George 1979, 46).  The comparative 
rationale is used to determine commonalities among the selected countries as well as any 
relationship between resource nationalism and energy integration.  Limiting the focus to 
Bolivia and Brazil adds greatly to such reasoning. 
Essentially, “…the general problem of comparison is extraordinarily difficult for 
political science, since it is unlikely that we will ever find a true ‘experimental’ situation, 
that is, two or more societies which are identical in all respects except for a single, 
variable factor” (Macridis and Cox 1953, 643).  The comparative approach is suitable as 
this dissertation compares a single issue: the relationship between resource nationalism 
and energy integration.  This relationship is limited to adequately homogenous political 
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systems, such as is the case in the aforementioned intra-area countries.  An area includes 
several operational criteria, the most important for this dissertation includes cultural 
interaction, physical proximity, economic relations, and strategic considerations 
(Macridis and Cox 1953, 655). 
The selection of Bolivia and Brazil requires the flexibility the comparative 
method affords where explanations of phenomena are examined.  In the areas of the 
natural sciences, and some of the social sciences, the comparative method has been 
praised as central to the quest for knowledge (Segal 2001, 339).  Critics argue the 
comparative method seeks similarities and ignores differences, confuses similarity with 
identity, and generalizes prematurely as well as too broadly (Segal 2001, 348).  Some 
interpretations of the comparative approach consider these criticisms as misconceived.  
The comparative method is one in a suite of methodological tools, and such criticism is 
misguided. 
Furthermore, although numerous commonalities exist among NOCs, each 
individual parastatal operates according to its own logic.  During the oil price decline in 
the 1980s, NOCs pursued different strategies to confront falling revenue.  Organizations 
like Venezuela’s PDVSA became vertically integrated and made inroads into 
international markets.  Others NOCs focused their energies domestically while trying to 
attract foreign capital.  During the 1990s, amid the waning of state control over oil, 
associated low prices stripped governments of revenues and compelled change.  With the 
rebound of prices in the 2000s, some governments sought greater roles for state 
ownership, pushing NOCs to absorb government responsibilities to include new social 
obligations (Victor et al 2012).  The increased use of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal 
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drilling in the first decade of the twenty-first century has again altered the role of the 
parastatal; however, how much so is yet to be determined. 
Previous research concerning NOCs relies mostly on case studies, and falls into 
two general bodies: those looking at NOCs in isolation, and others offering structured 
comparisons across a small group of companies.  NOCs are inherently challenging to 
study, and previous research fell into one of two general camps.  On one hand, studies 
looking at the entire industry offer thin insights applicable to any NOC.  On the other, 
such industry-wide studies offer little on their own as the thickness of regional and 
individual factors are too complex to comprehend.  The in-depth case study, although 
detailed, weakens the ability for a systematic comparison across cases (Victor et al 2012, 
14).  This dissertation takes a hybrid approach that looks at the importance of 
international market integration and nationalism cum populism, then incorporates the 
case study into the larger, international, context. 
Understanding the relationship between resource nationalism and energy 
integration is challenging as they are connected issues with links to other variables.  
Common themes will assist in understanding how countries in this study relate to one 
another in the energy sector.  Additionally, this study considers the power and influence 
resource nationalism has on energy imports and exports, and how to ensure security of 
supply in a region replete with political, regional, and cultural differences amid its deep 
and shared history. 
The comparative analysis in this dissertation examines the energy relationship 
between Brazil and Bolivia.  This dissertation examines energy relationships in which 
incidents of resource nationalism are discovered, then draws out generalizations (George 
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1979, 43).  The case study centers on indicators of resource nationalism in energy 
exporting countries in their relationship with importing countries.  The case study carries 
out this task through the incorporation of examples of populist regimes in the region 
relative to resource nationalism and development, then compares fluctuations in levels of 
imports and exports of natural gas with effects on the presence or absence of the 
phenomenon of resource nationalism. 
Data for this dissertation derives from interviews with energy practitioners in both 
Brazil and Bolivia, and subject matter experts with each country’s parastatal, and 
secondary sources.  All key informants have regional expertise in South America or the 
energy sector.14  Key informants’ positions and qualifications include academia, 
economics, strategic planning, energy sector analysis, risk analysis, and consultancy in 
both the public and private sectors across varied geographies with expertise in South 
America.  Interviews and discussions with key informants took place between September 
and December 2017.  Secondary sources entail publicly available information (i.e. news 
reports, ministries’ published data for each country, statistical databases, and published 
interviews).  Consumption, production, and proven reserves statistics from energy firms, 
as well as official government documents also form part of the data.   
This dissertation examines the literature pertaining to transactions among the two 
countries, their respective energy policies, energy firms, and various business and 
financial databases relative to the industry.  Unlike governments which are required to 
maintain records, private firms are often not.  Whereas governments may alter data for 
                                                          
14 Petrobras in Brazil, and Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) in Bolivia. 
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political expediency, firms may simply destroy or elect to not record it.  Such realities 
limit the reliability of data in any study, and is something that may only be addressed 
over time through continued research as more information becomes available. 
 
Evaluation of Potential Data Sources: 
Several sources for energy data exist and are evaluated.  The databases of the 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and United Nations provide baseline data 
across economic and social topics relative to Bolivia and Brazil.15 
The Organización Latinoamericana de Energía, OLADE, produces publications 
on energy and related topics with a focus on Latin America and the Caribbean.  There are 
twenty-seven member countries, including Bolivia and Brazil.  This site holds some price 
data from 1970 to the present. 
The Energy Information Administration (EIA), created by the U.S. Department of 
Energy (DOE) in 1977, has reliable statistics on the global oil industry.16  The 
International Energy Agency (IEA) derives from the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) as a forum for 30 of the world's most 
industrialized nations to discuss/agree on policy recommendations.17 
                                                          
15 The Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, CEPAL (The Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean) is a United Nations publication. 
 
16 EIA data is designed to ensure the U.S. Executive Branch cannot alter data for political favorability. 
 
17 The OECD emerged in 1974 in the wake of the Arab oil embargo to coordinate energy policies to 
prevent economic shocks from oil supply disruption.  The IEA collects data on global oil inventories, and 
publishes them in its Monthly Oil Market Report (OMR). 
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British Petroleum (BP) Statistical Review of World Energy is an industry 
standard.  Gas Daily is a leading trade publication and provides a survey of companies 
that trade in natural gas to obtain a representative number of deals at each pricing point.18 
Bolivia’s Ministerio Hidrocarburos y Energia holds data on natural gas specific 
to Bolivia.  Brazil’s National Petroleum Agency (ANP) manages the auctioning of blocks 
for exploration, contract exploration licenses, and regulates upstream and downstream 
activities across the oil sector.  The Boletim Mensal de Acompanhamento da Industria de 
Gas Natural provides Brazilian natural gas data from 2007-2016. 
 
Chapter Outline 
I. Introduction, Literature Review, and Methodology 
a. Is there a relationship between resource nationalism and energy 
integration in Bolivia and Brazil; if so, how do these countries experience 
the phenomenon?  Each country has a history of economic nationalism 
and dictatorship; both experienced development differently while sharing 
some commonalities during their transitions to formal democracy.  The 
central question of the dissertation can be answered by looking at how 
each country views its resources and its associated energy trade 
relationship with the other.  Brazil, a major natural gas consumer, and one 
heavily reliant on gas exports from Bolivia, likely has a different 
perception of its resources than does Bolivia, which has a less diversified 
                                                          
18 Henry Hub price data, the benchmark price for North American natural gas, may be found here. 
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economy than Brazil; Bolivia relies heavily on natural gas exports as a 
major source of revenue. 
II. Bolivia 
a. This chapter begins with a contextual explanation of Bolivia’s current 
economic situation to provide the necessary background to ask the central 
research question concerning how resource nationalism affects energy 
integration.  Next, this chapter explains Bolivia’s history during the 
twentieth century, emphasizing when necessary, central issues of the overall 
dissertation: economic nationalism (to include nationalizations), populism, 
natural resources, and neoliberal policies.  Statistical indicators paint a 
picture of Bolivia’s economic evolution across time.   The final section of 
this chapter provides rudimentary commentary and background concerning 
integration of Bolivian natural gas markets with neighboring Brazil, setting 
the stage for the case study. 
III. Brazil 
a. This chapter begins with a contextual explanation of Brazil’s twentieth 
century economic experience to provide the necessary background to ask 
the central research question concerning how resource nationalism affects 
energy integration.  Next, this chapter explains Brazil’s history during the 
same period, emphasizing when necessary central issues of the overall 
dissertation: economic nationalism (to include nationalizations), populism, 
natural resources, neoliberal policies, the historical election of Luiz Inácio 
“Lula” da Silva, and beyond.  Statistical indicators paint a picture of 
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Brazil’s economic evolution across time.  The final section provides 
rudimentary commentary and background concerning integration of 
Bolivian natural gas into Brazil, setting the stage for development of the 
case study. 
IV. Resource Nationalism and Energy Integration in Brazil and Bolivia 
a. Using quantitative and qualitative data, this chapter explores the 
relationship between Bolivia and Brazil in the context of energy 
relationships and agreements, economic nationalism, and the political 
systems in each country. 
V. Findings and Conclusions of Dissertation 
a. This chapter explores how the dissertation answers the initial research 
question.  The findings fit into the overall context of twentieth century 
Latin America economics and politics, as well as nest within more 
expansive questions on international political economy and export-driven 
models of development.  Why do populist regimes, historically operating 
under an economic nationalist cum protectionist paradigm, simultaneously 
pursue policies of economic integration?  What is the relationship between 
resource nationalists and open markets, especially in the hydrocarbons 
sector?  What is the relationship between populists, who are typically 
resource nationalists, and their decision to choose policies of energy 
integration?  In the case of Bolivia, if the natural gas relationship with 
Brazil declines or is phased-out completely the country will need to 
develop new markets or refocus on internal development.  In Brazil, the 
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concomitant discoveries of major petroleum resources off its south-east 
coast and an ongoing corruption scandal loom large regarding national 
development.  Despite periods of populist governments in both countries, 
economic liberalism remains entrenched amid nationalist echoes. 
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Appendix 
The below table provides economic indicators, definitions, and rationale behind their 
inclusion in the dissertation.  Although these indicators are considered across both 
countries in the case study, some are more salient than others because of each countries’ 
different stage of development.  Subsequent to the table, timeline, measurements, and 
conversions provides additional context. 
 
 
 
Energy Timeline:19 
1. Coal overtakes biofuel during first decade of nineteenth century 
2. Oil overtakes biofuels in the 1950s 
3. Oil overtakes coal in the 1960s 
4. Gas overtakes biofuels in the 1960s 
                                                          
19 For a detailed work on natural gas and its place in the historical energy timeline, please see Kolb (2013). 
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5. Biofuels now account for less than 10% of world energy usage 
6. Nuclear and hydropower are together even less important than biofuels, and are 
just over 8% of total world energy usage 
7. Solar and wind power are too slight to be a factor 
8. 80% of energy used today is hydrocarbons, and this 80% breaks down into: coal, 
35%; oil, 37%; natural gas, 28%. 
Measurements: 
1. Btu20: British Thermal Unit 
2. Ccf: The volume of 100 cubic feet (cf) 
3. M: One thousand 
4. MM: One million 
5. Mcf: The volume of 1000 cubic feet 
6. MMBtu: One million Btu 
7. Natural gas is measured by volume (cubic feet), but sold based on heating content 
(Btu). 
Conversions:21 
1. 1 food calorie = 4 Btu 
2. 1 gallon of gasoline = 120,476 Btu 
a. 120,476 Btu = 116.2 cubic feet (3.29 cubic meters) of natural gas 
b. ∴ 1 gallon of gasoline = 116.2 cubic feet (3.29 cubic meters) of natural gas 
3. 1 barrel of crude oil = 42 gallons = 5,717,000 btu 
4. 1,000 cubic feet of natural gas = 1,037,000 btu = 8.61 gallons of gasoline 
5. On average, the U.S. uses just over one gallon of gasoline per person per day 
  
                                                          
20 One British Thermal Unit is the energy required to raise one pound of water by one-degree Fahrenheit. 
 
21 Conversions derived from the U.S. Energy Information Administration website calculator. 
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II.  CHAPTER TWO 
 
Bolivia: Chapter Abstract 
This chapter begins with a contextual explanation of Bolivia’s current economic 
situation to provide the necessary background to ask the central research question 
concerning how resource nationalism affects energy integration.  Next, this chapter 
explains Bolivia’s history during the twentieth century, emphasizing when necessary, 
central issues of the overall dissertation: economic nationalism (to include 
nationalizations), populism, natural resources, and neoliberal policies.  Statistical 
indicators paint a picture of Bolivia’s economic evolution across time.  The final section 
of this chapter provides rudimentary commentary and background concerning integration 
of Bolivian natural gas markets with neighboring Brazil, setting the stage for the case study. 
 
Bolivia: Current Scenario 
In 2018 Bolivia faces a severe decline in revenues attributed to the international 
decline in the price of oil and other commodities, particularly natural gas.  In a country 
where natural gas comprises roughly 50% of total exports, such dependency on 
commodities takes its toll on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as well as Bolivia’s internal 
and external balances.  In 2015, Bolivia’s hydrocarbon exports declined to $4 Billion, and 
then again to $1.6 Billion during the January to August 2016 time frame.  Compared to 
the same time frame in 2015, this is more than a fifty percent reduction.  During 2015, 
Bolivia experienced a trade deficit, which was the first such deficit in a decade (see 
Graph 1 below). 
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In early 2016, the Spanish firm Repsol discovered four trillion cubic feet (tcf) of 
possible natural gas reserves, which could potentially offer Bolivia a forty percent 
increase in reserves (Ramos 2016).  Assuming Repsol begins to exploit these reserves in 
2019 as anticipated, the central issue for Bolivia will not be its lack of natural gas for 
exportation, but where to export if a glut develops.  Looming uncertainties relative to the 
potential drop in the price of natural gas and Bolivia’s export relationships create an air 
of hesitation in the landlocked country. 
Over the last decade, Bolivia accumulated its reserves as well as generated a fiscal 
surplus, at one point reaching $15 billion.  This accumulation allows Bolivia to weather 
the current economic slowdown in the country (see Graphs 2, 3, and 4 below).  Amid this 
scenario, Bolivia has experienced substantial economic and social progress because of its 
export revenue.  Since 2006, growth has averaged five percent, and poverty has fallen by 
                                                          
22 The Global Economy. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/.  Accessed 14 January 2018. 
Graph 1: Bolivia Trade Balance (% GDP) 
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a third.  However, if Bolivia exhausts its savings at the national and local levels, the 
government will be compelled to cut spending, which can curtail economic growth. 
23 
 
      24 
 
 
                                                          
23 The Global Economy. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/.  Accessed 26 May 2018. 
 
24 The Global Economy. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/.  Accessed 14 January 2018. 
Graph 2: Bolivia Foreign Exchange and GDP 
Graph 3: Bolivia External Debt (% GNI) 
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Bolivia’s state oil company, Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos 
(YPFB), has an agreement with Brazilian parastatal Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras) 
to deliver 30 million cubic meters of natural gas per day.  This contract is set to expire in 
2019, and Petrobras recently stated it will reduce the volume of contracted gas.  If such a 
reduction transpires, Bolivia will suffer economically unless it replaces Brazil’s Petrobras 
with another consumer (Petronoticias 2017; Viga 2017).  Bolivia appears to have 
previously considered this scenario in late-2016, when it took mitigating steps in its 
regional energy integration strategy and pursued new links with Argentina, Paraguay, and 
Peru.  According to Luiz Alberto Sanchez, Bolivia’s Minister of Hydrocarbons and 
Energy, electrical connections, bilateral hydroelectric projects, and increased electricity 
exports are to be further consolidated in 2017 (Paredes).  Such connections are hoped to 
be a new source of income for Bolivia. 
                                                          
25 The Global Economy. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/.  Accessed 14 January 2018. 
Graph 4: Bolivia Economic Growth 
(Rate Change as % Real GDP) 
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Bolivia: Markets, Boom-Bust Cycle, and Populism 
 
Bolivia’s Historical Experience: 
The Bolivian disposition towards its natural resources has been forged in a 
centuries-long crucible of exploitation dating to the Spanish conquest.  Resource 
exploitation in Bolivia dates to the 16th century when the Spanish began mining Potosí 
for silver (Gamarra 2017).  Little of this treasure remained on the continent, and likely 
even less in Bolivia, as much of this silver wealth accumulated abroad.  In the late-19th 
century, the production of tin had become profitable, and the associated wealth made its 
way into Bolivian politics; over time, the state became a central source of employment, 
particularly for the urban middle-class (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 6).  Even prior to the 
twentieth century, resource wealth and accompanying attempts at resource control were 
inextricably linked to Bolivian political culture (Gamarra 2017). 
The stability of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Bolivia was 
predicated on the passivity or non-involvement of most of the population.  This period 
was one of general economic and political stability because of the social mobility 
afforded to the citizens who were not excluded from the system.  Simply put, the 
Bolivian system was an elitist one in which the base of political power was under the 
monopoly of the monied and educated, all of which centered on the middle and upper 
classes (Malloy 1970, 34). 
The silver magnates from the latter half of the nineteenth century used their 
financial power to enter politics.  Contrarily, the tin magnates emerging in the late 1800s 
were largely foreign; this group sought to influence public policy without direct entry 
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into political life.  The “Big Three” tin tycoons, consolidated power and incorporated 
their firms outside of Bolivia.  Carlos Aramayo, Simon Patiño, and Mauricio Hochschild 
formed part of the national bourgeoisie known as “La Rosca” (translated in this context 
as “The Screw”).  They operated as pure capitalist entrepreneurs who were interested in 
private political power instead of its public form.  Their interests in Bolivia centered 
around what would further their own interests.  From roughly the 1880s through the late-
1920s, Bolivians interested in public office would only rise if they were of use to one of 
the private tin firms (Malloy 1970, 36). 
The consolidation of the tin industry essentially controlled the productive base of 
the Bolivian economy as well as its monetary wealth.  When foreign loans were 
unobtainable, the government turned to the magnates, thus further increasing the reliance 
of the former on the latter.  However, during the 1920s, an incipient labor movement 
began to push for labor, wage, and other benefits, which resulted in an increasingly 
unstable political environment (Malloy 1970, 43). 
From the late 1920s onward, there was increasing contact between labor and 
leftist intellectuals, which increasingly pressed demands against a national elite unwilling 
to cede changes to the economic or political order.  This combined with other problems in 
Bolivia (skewed development; exhaustion of the tin industry; abated development drive), 
which called into question the ability of the system to adapt (Malloy 1970, 57). 
What is important to understand during this turbulent period is that Bolivia’s 
economic expansions and contractions closely shadow the movements in world market 
prices of silver, tin, and later petroleum (Sachs and Morales 1990, 161).  Essentially, 
during boom times Bolivia had access to foreign loans, which disappeared during 
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economic busts.  As Bolivian tin lodes were increasingly exhausted in the 1920s, Bolivia 
began to lose competitiveness with other countries, and the subsequent worldwide 
economic depression caused Bolivia to default on its sovereign foreign debt (Sachs and 
Morales 1990, 163).  The collapse of tin undermined the economy, as well as the political 
system, and ultimately ushered in the 1952 Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) 
Revolution. 
The 1952 MNR revolution in Bolivia was one where the U.S. provided early and 
continuous support.  The MNR revolution in Bolivia was not communist, which factored 
greatly in U.S. backing.  Instead, the MNR revolution was nationalist and anti-
imperialist, and its energy focused against the tin barons that controlled Bolivia’s chief 
industry, its major source of foreign exchange.  The MNR held the barons responsible for 
the malaise of the entire society.  It was La Rosca that was held in contempt as this group 
controlled both the cities and the government.  (Blasier 1972, 55). 
The aim of the MNR was to bring down La Rosca by gaining control of the 
government and its tin mines.  The MNR did not aim at the U.S. or European 
corporations, but Bolivia’s exploitative, corrupt, and outdated social system.  That 
Bolivia’s tin ore exports were so scattered also did not help the MNR to target one central 
market.  It was the system that felt the brunt of national resentment against ruling groups 
in Bolivia who were blamed for the disastrous Chaco War discussed later in this chapter 
(Blasier 1972, 56). 
The U.S. ultimately recognized the 1952 MNR government and proposed a long-
term plan to collaborate with Bolivia.  The U.S. Department of State was confident the 
MNR was neither communist, nor pro-Soviet.  This confidence prepared the countries for 
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a close and friendly relationship.  The resultant U.S. funding was to develop Bolivia’s 
economy and its natural resources, as well as to expand tin output (Blasier 1971, 73). 
The Bolivian case is one requiring closer investigation, and one carried out in the 
context of regional power relationships.  It is unfruitful to look at Bolivia in a vacuum.  
The U.S. and its foreign policy, to include its development policy, had a palpable impact 
on 20th century Bolivia.  Arguably, the whims of international commodities markets 
pervade this relationship, and no country can completely ignore these currents; however, 
countries vary in their ability to withstand or influence these same markets.  To impress 
upon the reader the focus of this study, some historical context is required in both the 
Bolivia and Brazil chapters.  Although both countries engage with the U.S., the nature of 
each engagement is unique. 
Bolivia could be considered a test case in nation-building for the U.S., and the 
former’s relationship with the latter is imperative to examine for any student of the 
developing world.  In the case of Bolivia after the 1952 Revolution, instead of using 
direct physical force the U.S. increasingly leveraged its economic weight to influence the 
region.  Potential economic stagnation in Bolivia and concomitant political chaos were 
the deciding factors in the U.S. decision to attempt to influence Bolivia.  To understand 
the U.S.-Bolivia relationship during this period is at the heart of this dissertation, namely 
through the lens of economic nationalism which requires some inclusion of U.S. 
responses to such policies. 
In the middle-1950s, Bolivia faced what it would again face during the 1980’s 
neoliberal period.  That situation included economic stabilization programs (i.e. inflation 
control, cutting wages, reducing public sector employment), which the Bolivian public 
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would find painful.  These initial actions were a reaction to the sudden drop in the price 
of tin, which left Bolivia unable to cope with the bust in its recurring boom-bust cycle.  
Ultimately, U.S. economic influence in the region, particularly in Bolivia, would have a 
major impact on the latter as well as the relationship between the two countries, from 
1952 until the 1990s.  The price of commodities, an export-led development model, 
economic austerity packages, strong nationalism and regionalism, and political instability 
pervaded Bolivia from before the 1952 Revolution and continue to present day.  Because 
of these overlapping drivers of economic and political action, the Bolivia case is 
unavoidable in discussions of development, policy, and market integration. 
 
Economic Nationalism in Bolivia: from Standard Oil to Evo Morales: 
Few deep studies into the phenomenon of resource nationalism exist.  This 
dissertation fills gaps in the literature, using Latin America as a test case.  This chapter 
explores some of the drivers behind the creation of Bolivia’s state oil firm (YPFB), 
experiences with Standard Oil (1937), the 1952 Revolution and its aftermath, the 
nationalization of Gulf Oil (1969), capitalization and Petrobras (1990s), the recurring 
nationalist experience, and the presidency of Evo Morales (2005 - present).  Bolivia has 
repeatedly been shoved to the political left and right as a result of exploitation by 
international energy firms, the creation of YPFB, the New Economic Policy (modeled on 
the Washington Consensus), and a recurring resource nationalism.  This chapter proceeds 
mostly chronologically and explains the evolution of writing on Bolivia to include natural 
resources, nationalism, democratic and military governance, and energy integration in the 
twentieth century. 
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Bolivian politics developed an intimate experience with a boom-bust economic 
cycle, wholly dependent on international commodities markets.  This cycle perpetuated 
throughout the last two centuries, and was felt again during the early-to-mid twentieth 
century regarding tin mining.  During the period following the Second World War, a 
worldwide drop in tin prices and associated deterioration of the Bolivian economy 
resulted in domestic instability, and was a catalyst for the 1952 Revolution. 
Economic nationalism in Bolivia is not a recent phenomenon, but has deeper roots 
dating to the early twentieth century.  During this period, Bolivian policies and attempts 
at pushing economic nationalist actions have come up against some resistance from the 
U.S.  The driving logic of the U.S. at that time believed the only way for Latin America 
to grow economically, and later politically, was to participate in an economic system in 
which countries in the region would sell raw materials to the U.S. and use subsequent 
foreign exchange earnings to industrialize (Siekmeier 2011, 19).  However, assuming the 
potential for economic nationalism to harm U.S. economic interests in the region, 
unmistakably based on access to natural resources, it is probable the U.S. opposes 
nationalizations in the region for this very reason.  Bolivia formed part and parcel of this 
overarching U.S. paradigm, but mitigated U.S. policy, on at least one occasion by 
nationalizing Gulf Oil in 1969. 
Economic nationalism was more the rule than the exception in Bolivia in the 
twentieth century.  Prime examples of nationalizations in Bolivia took place in 1937, 
1952, and 1969.  In 1937 Bolivia nationalized Standard Oil (arguably a consequence of 
the disastrous Chaco War).  The 1952 Revolution resulted in the nationalization of the tin 
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mines through the creation of the Mining Corporation of Bolivia (COMIBOL), and later, 
as aforementioned, the Gulf Oil nationalization in 1969 (Wanderley 2008, 196). 
 
Colonel David Toro, Lieutenant Colonel Germán Busch, and Constitutional Shift: 
After the First World War (WWI), Latin American countries began to break with 
the liberal-constitutionalism of the 19th century.  Countries in the region began to adopt a 
socialist constitutional position and altered the role of the state regarding the welfare of 
the citizens, which reflected the decline of liberalism concomitantly alongside the growth 
of socialist ideas.  In Bolivia, a catalyst for action during this period was the Chaco War 
and its aftermath.26  In the case of Bolivia, Lieutenant Colonel Germán Busch made such 
an attempt (1937-1939) after following in the footsteps of Colonel David Toro (1936-
1937).  Busch attempted to create a dictatorship without a political party, but his goals 
were ultimately frustrated despite his actions leading to the later rise of revolutionary 
parties (Klein 1967, 171). 
The traditional order which the Chaco Generation would destroy had been in 
place since Bolivia’s War of the Pacific with Chile (1879-1884), in which the military 
was relegated to a professional role, and did not participate in the political life of the 
country.  Debates of that period centered on the nuances of liberal-democratic 
philosophies, where Bolivia changed its development model, but not its pattern 
                                                          
26 According to Klein (1967), the Chaco War (1932-1935) was a major turning point in the political history 
of Bolivia.  The humiliating defeat by the Paraguayan military during these three years left Bolivians bitter, 
disillusioned, and looking for answers.  Those seeking clarity in this post-war haze would be named the 
Chaco Generation, who would soon rebel against the traditional political order which had so egregiously 
failed them and Bolivia. 
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(Wanderley 2008, 195).  Social and economic elites ran the government despite their 
ideological differences.  All of this changed after the reform-bent Chaco veterans allied 
themselves with the moderate left, and took over the government with the expressed 
intent to implement what would later be called “military socialism” (Klein 1965, 26).  
This would result in a shift in the relationship between the state and the people, with the 
former taking a more positive role in the welfare of the latter.  These veterans essentially 
laid waste to the traditional and inter-class political system of the late-19th and early-20th 
centuries. 
The aim of Colonel David Toro was to destroy what he considered the self-
serving capitalism rampant in Bolivia, and to restore economic sovereignty.  Toro took 
advantage of a long-standing dispute with Standard Oil and nationalized the U.S. firm in 
1937, to include the company’s holdings and equipment.  Toro’s program additionally 
included social reform at home, an increased state responsibility for the welfare of 
Bolivian citizens, the reduction of power and monopoly of the mining oligarchy, and a 
path of economic development and attracting “good” foreign capital (Klein 1965, 36).  
Despite his failings in the curtailment of the mining interests, Toro successfully called a 
Constitutional Convention.  The convention resulted in a major shift in the relationship 
between the state and the people, a legacy present in Bolivia today.  However, Toro’s 
plan was not enough for Busch.  Busch desired a new Bolivia, compelled Toro to resign, 
and took over as president in July 1937 (Klein 1967, 169). 
Busch entered office with little understanding of the military socialist concept, 
which would never truly crystallize into a workable political plan.  Moreover, Busch was 
quite naïve in the political realm despite being an excellent military officer.  Amid this 
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confusion, Busch still maintained Toro’s idea and continued with the plan for a 
constitutional convention.  This convention would result in the first truly revolutionary 
constitution since the republican government, and brought together a wild amalgam of 
Bolivia’s political universe comprised of conservatives, the oligarchy, veterans, 
communists, and the politically inexperienced (Klein 1966, 263). 
The Constitutional Convention was heavily influenced by socialism, and central 
to the resulting 1938 Constitution was the concept of nationalism.  During the debates, 
two major groupings emerged.  The Right included some liberals, some clerics, and was 
heavily based on eastern lowland groups which included some conservatives and anti-
indigenous regionalists.  The Left contained small parties of various orientations, and the 
Independent Socialist Party (a direct precursor to the MNR).27  The new constitution set 
the tone for future generations and destroyed the classic constitutional and economically 
liberal charter in Bolivia.  A major figure in twentieth century Bolivian politics, Victor 
Paz Estenssoro argued the only way for Bolivia to operate a radical revolution in the 
socio-economic sphere was to have a state monopoly over mineral exports.  Even Paz 
Estenssoro understood the left was too weak to take on the strong mining interests, which 
he considered a superestado, or super-state (Klein 1966, 271). 
                                                          
27 According to Klein, within the Left was a radical majority, which heavily influenced the 1930 
Constitution.  This group adopted “social constitutionalism” and eliminated the safeguards which limited 
the government to a passive role (i.e. protecting property rights; protect individual liberties).  The framers 
altered the nature of the constitution to create a more positive role for the state as well as included new 
social concepts (i.e. State provisions for social and economic welfare; considered property a derivative 
right granted by the state if it fulfilled a social function; declared rights of labor; and, attempted but failed 
to achieve full-scale land reform). 
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Towards the end, Busch began to lose his grip on power as well as reality, as there 
was a major disconnect between his proclamations and the political situation on the 
ground.  His suicide in August 1939 brought an end to the army’s involvement in 
political reform, but the period of military socialism had lasting effects as it provided 
inspiration for future regimes.  More dangerously, the Toro and Busch period forced 
traditional parties to renounce compromise while the extreme left gained support among 
students and workers.  This end of national consensus set the stage for the 1952 Bolivian 
National Revolution. 
 
The 1952 Revolution: 
The 1952 Bolivian Revolution marked an important turning point in Bolivia’s 
history, and is considered one of the great twentieth century revolutions in Latin 
America, along with Mexico (1910), Cuba (1959), and Nicaragua (1979).  This 
revolution deepened Bolivian democracy, made the society more inclusive, and clearly 
demonstrated the power of popular action (Whitehead 2008, 269).  In this context, it is 
also important to note Bolivia’s role as a pioneer within Latin America: nationalization in 
the 1930s, accepting a U.S. economic aid program in the 1950s, and undergoing 
economic “shock treatment” programs of the 1980s. 
A completed revolution is one which moves from one political order to another.  
During this transition, the old order is in question until a new one is established (Malloy 
1970).  Malloy conceives a revolution as comprised of four dimensions, the most 
important of which is the redistribution of the capacity of groups to influence a society’s 
authoritative mechanisms.  Prior to such a revolutionary situation, there are preconditions 
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that include dysfunction, an elite that is either unable or unwilling to enact a solution, as 
well as the presence of accelerators.  Again, referencing Malloy, without accelerators, 
such as an economic depression or war (particularly losing a war as was the case in 
Bolivia’s Chaco War), revolutionary preconditions may create a revolutionary situation, 
but are not enough to result in an actual revolution (Malloy 1970, 8).  Bolivia entered the 
twentieth century amid skewed development that centered in one economic sphere, 
namely mining. 
Burke and Malloy (1974) explain that during the post-1929 worldwide depression 
many reformist movements emerged across Latin America.  These movements 
considered themselves unique in the Latin American experience with the aspirations of 
solving problems of economic development and social justice in the region in a way that 
was neither capitalist nor socialist.  Bolivia’s MNR is one such example of a party that 
had its roots in the early 1930s.  The aims of the MNR at that time were the dual goals of 
breaking dependence of the Bolivian economy away from the industrial centers of the 
U.S. and Europe (Burke and Malloy 1974, 49).  Such a break would ideally destroy the 
semi-feudal structure then in place, thereby freeing human and material resources for 
state-led development.  These were the central thrusts of the national populist ideology in 
Bolivia.  The goal was to create state-led development through a national party that 
transcended elites, foreign interests, and the local oligarchy, that such “anti-nationalists” 
were believed to serve.  To clarify, the difference between Anglo-American development 
models and those of Latin American countries involve the latter being rooted in 
traditional Hispanic concepts of fusing state controlled development with modern 
corporate organization (Wiarda 2001).  Here, corporatism is the operating model. 
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Christopher Mitchell (1977) partly disagrees with Burke and Malloy’s “national 
corporatist” argument.  Mitchell is quite critical of the MNR and the party’s internal 
divisions.  Bolivia was left internationally vulnerable.  The root of this vulnerability was 
the MNR’s identification with the middle-class, which converted into a conservative 
group after the initial revolutionary objectives were met.  The 1964 revolution, in 
Mitchell’s opinion, may have been even more middle-class dominant than in 1952.  
Important here is how the MNR, a progressive and civilian movement, helped form the 
foundation of a military dictatorship.  Ironically, the MNR was born out of earlier 
disillusionment with the devastating results of Bolivia’s involvement in the Chaco War, 
then evolved into a party that later relied on military force to control an awakened 
populace to compel change within Bolivia. 
The national corporatist argument is exemplified by the creation of the Mining 
Corporation of Bolivia (COMIBOL), the state-owned mining company.28  Miners’ power 
ebbed and flowed relative to the price of commodities.  With any drop in tin prices, so 
would fall the collective bargaining power of organized labor.  It is important to note that 
despite the importance of tin on the world market, prior to the revolutionary period, 
mining in Bolivia was a nominal source of labor and the country remained 
overwhelmingly agricultural in its focus. 
Malloy and Gamarra (1988) explain Bolivia’s revolution during its later years.  
Because of the extreme conditions in Bolivia, the country and its associated revolutionary 
experiences make an excellent case that helps elucidate major dynamics across Latin 
                                                          
28 COMIBOL was formed in 1952 as a direct result of the revolution.  Prior to the creation of COMIBOL, 
the tin mining industry was controlled by a group of tin barons, known as “The Rosca.”   
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America.  The military action of 1964 was not counterrevolutionary, but was a period of 
transition to reorganize the foundational structure of the economy with its roots in the 
1952 revolution (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 202).  Ultimately, as the military moved 
against Victor Paz Estenssoro in 1964, they did so to reclaim the revolution which by 
then had degenerated into a personalistic and non-ideological amalgam of patronage 
politics.  The military takeover was carried out with support from outside the MNR, 
demonstrating how far the MNR shifted from its initial stated goals during its collapse.  
After Paz Estenssoro, General René Barrientos Ortuño took power and the military 
pushed onto Bolivia a state-capitalist model without the inclusion of a large component 
of the MNR. 
 
The Era of State Capitalism (1964-1969): 
The Barrientos period was a clear and direct result of the evident failure of the 
MNR to resolve the inherent contradictions in the 1952 Revolution.  The Barrientos 
regime emerged to reverse the populist capitalist model unleashed by the revolution, and 
used force to impose the costs of accumulation onto the once-powerful working class.  
This force was backed by U.S. and international financial actors.  The scope of the 
Barrientos regime demonstrated an increased opening of Bolivia to the international 
financial system, and concomitantly an increased dependency of the former on the latter 
(see Graphs 5 and 6, below).  During Bolivia’s period of state capitalism (1964-1969), tin 
was the predominant commodity, rarely dropping below 50% of exports. 
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29 The Global Economy. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/.  Accessed 14 January 2018. 
 
30 The Global Economy. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/.  Accessed 14 January 2018. 
Graph 5: Bolivia Capital Investment (% GDP) 
Graph 6: Bolivia Economic Growth 
(Rate Change as % Real GDP) 
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To boot, the Barrientos regime was devoid of ideology and vision, mostly defined 
by the tense relationship between the state and organized labor.  This relationship was 
unnerving and violent as the government attempted to assert its control over labor and to 
impose a state-centric capitalist development model, with a major shift from a populist to 
an authoritarian approach (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 14).  This development model was 
what the MNR and its international backers desired.  The MNR’s failure to actualize this 
model brought the military into power. 
The case throughout the entire Bolivian experience before and since the 1952 
Revolution was the brutal reality of economic scarcity and external economic pressure.  
These dual forces would tear apart the MNR populist coalition.  Under Barrientos, the 
Bolivian middle-class was largely dependent upon the state for employment and was a 
product of the country’s outward-oriented export model of capitalist dependent 
development (see Graphs 7, 8, and 9 below). 
84 
 
31 
 
32 
                                                          
31 The Global Economy. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/.  Accessed 14 January 2018. 
 
32 MIT.  The Observatory of Economic Complexity.  http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/.  Accessed 14 January 
2018. 
 
Graph 7: Bolivia Exports (% GDP) 
Graph 8: Bolivia Commodities as % of Exports (1962-1969) 
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The Barrientos regime rested upon the strength of the peasants and military.  
However, under the formal alliance (pacto military-campesino), the peasants played an 
inferior role.  This pact had informal roots dating to the 1950s, and was an anti-Left and 
anti-labor alliance, maintaining the idea that an alliance between the middle-class and 
peasants was more practical than the one between peasants and the working class that the 
Left touted.  The extent the military was involved in politics gave the appearance, if not 
already an assumed reality, that it was an armed political party.  This argument is based 
on the numbers of military officers in government posts and in parastatals.  However, 
military involvement in governance also contributed greatly to its undoing as the 
institution disintegrated and absorbed many of the factional conflicts manifested in 
Bolivian society at large. 
                                                          
33 The Global Economy. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/.  Accessed 14 January 2018. 
Graph 9: Bolivia GDP Per Capita (Constant $) 
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As the military broke down as an institution, it was no longer able to perform as a 
coherent force capable of implementing the will of the government.  Government policy 
was equally incoherent.  Military factionalization demonstrated that Barrientos was not 
supported by the military as a whole, but by groups within the organization.  Moreover, 
Barrientos held on to power under a clientelistic distribution of jobs and patronage amid 
legendary levels of corruption.  That corruption in Bolivia existed was not a new 
phenomenon; however, under Barrientos its scale was enormous, was the primary mode 
of governing, and flowed directly from the president unmediated by political parties 
(Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 28).  That political parties were almost irrelevant under this 
system of patronage demonstrates the acute crisis of governance Bolivia faced during this 
and subsequent periods. 
During this period and into the early-1970s the critical area of economic growth 
was petroleum (see below graph).  Barrientos kept this sector open to foreign private 
investment, and by the middle-1960s, the U.S. corporation Gulf Oil monopolized private 
petroleum production in Bolivia.  Nevertheless, despite Barrientos’ investment-favorable 
policies, little foreign investment ended up in Bolivia between the years 1964-1969, and 
the regime remained heavily dependent on foreign aid to finance its budget (Malloy and 
Gamarra 1988, 17).  The sudden death of Barrientos in a plane crash in 1969 resulted in 
yet another rocky political transition as the military High Command stepped in to 
determine who would enter the presidency. 
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After Barrientos died, there was an immediate need to fill the resultant power 
vacuum.  General Ovando took the helm of government in September 1969, and one 
month later nationalized Gulf Oil Corporation.  Despite his nationalist efforts and appeals 
to the populace, Ovando was unable to organize a coherent political party and the 
military replaced him with General Torres in October 1970.  Torres, a radical leftist was 
equally unable to organize the splintered left (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 214). 
The Bolivian military High Command determined Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas, a 
social democrat, would enter the presidency and many saw Salinas as an interim leader.  
General Alfredo Ovando Candía, co-president with Barrientos until the latter’s death, 
openly campaigned for the presidency and in a bloodless coup deposed Salinas in 
September 1969.  Ovando was non-ideological like Barrientos before him, as well as a 
                                                          
34 MIT.  The Observatory of Economic Complexity.  http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/.  Accessed 14 January 
2018. 
Graph 10: Bolivia Commodities as % of Exports 
(1969-1979) 
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nationalist, and considered the military a necessary tool in national development.  
Ovando revived the original state capitalist approach of the 1952 Revolution and placed a 
renewed emphasis on nationalism, an activist state, as well as populist mobilization.  In 
fact, almost immediately upon entering office, Ovando nationalized Gulf Oil 
Corporation.  That oil, and later gas, were central to the strategic question of Bolivia, as is 
the case in most states, these “commanding heights” of the economy were naturally of 
interest to the military (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 49). 
Despite Ovando’s populist overtures, by the late-1970s he was clinging to power 
and relying on the military as the government began to lose its control over Bolivian 
society.  Ovando’s top-down approach to populism was ineffective as he lacked authentic 
ties to the groups he was trying to maneuver.  As seen repeatedly since the 1952 
Revolution, the lack of authentic links between the government and the governed results 
in a popular disconnect, thus leading to renewed political instability, usually manifested 
in public demonstrations, protests, or in historical cases where organized labor was 
strong, work stoppages and strikes. 
General Rogelio Miranda led a coup in October 1970 and negotiated Ovando’s 
resignation.  As the country slid towards a civil war, the military once again stepped in 
and placed General Juan José Torres González, a leftist, in office.  Torres’ tenure was 
short-lived as he was never an effective president.  His administration lacked central 
authority and was built on a tenuous alliance between the military and the labor left 
(Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 54). 
Shortly after taking office, anti-Torres demonstrations originated in Santa Cruz de 
la Sierra and were taken over by General Hugo Banzer Suárez.  General Banzer 
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attempted a coup in January 1971, and failed, only to lead a successful one in August of 
that same year.  Banzer then ushered in what would become a decade of authoritarian 
military rule.  The ensuing rebellion is of note as it was the first to originate outside of La 
Paz, and demonstrated the burgeoning importance of Santa Cruz as a power base unto 
itself, attributable to the associated natural resource wealth in this region.  Once in power 
in August 1971, Banzer moved to crush the labor left and to intimidate the opposition 
(Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 67). 
By early-1971 the power in Bolivia was in the hands of the military (Dunkerley 
2017, 295).  As a result, social groups sought alliances with the military to press their 
demands, and the ideologically-divided military began to fracture under the intense 
pressure of competing interest groups.  Military ideological divisions were numerous, but 
mostly centered on the populist versus anti-populist models of state capitalism.  After 
almost twenty years, Bolivia was still dealing with the fallout from the 1952 Revolution: 
state-capitalism versus state-socialism, with the former subdivided into populist/anti-
populist variants (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 66).  From this point until the end of 
Banzer’s dictatorship, amid economic crises, a divided military, and equally fractious 
social pressures on the government, the central driver behind the presidency had nothing 
to do with governance, but simply attempts to access power. 
Bolivia during the 1970s experienced a string of repressive governments that 
came into power and promoted free-market policies that threatened the initiatives of 
Bolivia’s earlier revolution (Dunkerley 2017, 296).  During the 1970s, the petrodollar 
boom, a rise in interest rates, and corruption within the military governments all 
adversely affected Bolivia’s ability to navigate this fiscal storm.  With Bolivia serving as 
90 
 
a regional example, at its core the causes of Latin America’s “lost decade” of the 1980s 
had its roots in economic decisions of the 1970s. 
 
Banzer, State Capitalism, and Dictatorship: 
From the 1952 MNR Revolution to 1970, just prior to the dictatorship under 
Banzer, all social groups across Bolivia attempted to influence the struggle.  The 
competition among each social group (military, peasants, organized labor, traditional 
political parties, emerging parties, etc.) created ideological chaos in the country, 
particularly within the military.  The situation in Bolivia contrasted greatly with the 
traditional and stable hierarchy in neighboring militaries such as Argentina, Brazil, and 
Chile.  However, despite the personal, political, and factionalized ideological chaos, the 
Bolivian military never failed to accept the basic tenets of the 1952 Revolution in the 
economic or political sense, and remained committed to agrarian reform and the 
mobilization of the peasantry (Klein 1992, 247; Whitehead 2008, 262). 
In short, a heavily polarized Bolivia under General Hugo Banzer Suárez 
witnessed firm rule alongside initial economic growth and aggregate prosperity (see 
graphs 11-14, below).  However, in hindsight, all was not as stable as the macroeconomic 
indicators appeared. 
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36 The Global Economy. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/.  Accessed 14 January 2018. 
Graph 11: Bolivia Economic Growth 
(Rate Change as % Real  GDP) 
Graph 12: Bolivia GDP Per Capita (Constant $) 
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Graph 13: Bolivia Inflation (% Change in CPI) 
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Amid economic progress there was concomitant political decline and institutional 
erosion.  Banzer faced constant threats from his own coalition (military; political; private 
sector independents) and expended much of his energy holding onto power rather than 
governing (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 74).  Banzer’s program was designed to curb 
popular consumption and generate investment capital, but his actions resulted in a strong 
negative reaction from the peasants.  In turn, there was stronger government repression.  
This action-reaction cycle became increasingly dangerous. 
The result was the disintegration of the historical pacto militar-campesino.  In 
November 1974, the military assumed full political and administrative control over the 
state and government with the expressed intention of creating a “New Bolivia” (Plan 
Nuevo Bolivia) based on a centralized and authoritarian concept of state-society relations.  
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Graph 14: Bolivia Foreign Direct Investment (% GDP) 
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Plan Nuevo Bolivia was essentially a form of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (B.A.) that 
was to usher in and enforce a period of state capitalism: higher government positions 
were filled by those with experience in large bureaucracies (military; public civil service; 
large corporations).39  B.A. regimes entailed popular political exclusion, popular 
economic exclusion, and depoliticization (top-down decisions lacking popular sector 
consultation).  In Bolivia, this form of B.A. regime manifested itself through the banning 
of political parties, the suppression of organized labor, and the reorganization of the civil 
service (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 91). 
From the beginning, Banzer wanted Bolivia back on a state capitalist development 
strategy whereby there would be capital accumulation and a shift of resources to modern 
components of the private and public sectors (i.e. popular economic exclusion).  This 
move was like other countries across Latin America, where the state capitalist model 
placed the state at the forefront and accompanied the open disciplining of labor.  The role 
of the state became that of primary generator of capital and would mediate the flow of 
capital (see graph 15, below).  The state became the largest source of investment (i.e. 
infrastructure projects, public corporations, credit policy), as well as entrepreneur and 
employer (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 96). 
                                                          
39 Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (B.A.) regimes, as defined by O’Donnell (1978), were a Latin American 
product of the 1960s (Brazil, then Argentina) which came about because of extended political activation of 
the popular sector; popular sectors were deemed a threat to other classes and their international links. 
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This plan was an initial success for Banzer, but short-lived as the boom was a 
direct result of the worldwide increase in commodity prices, particularly in hydrocarbon 
and mineral export revenues.  Again, such an export-led model relied on the whims of 
international market forces, which were entirely out of Bolivia’s control (see Graph 16, 
below).  
Despite the increase in commodity prices, and associated revenue for the 
government, the clear winners under Banzer were the civilian and military leaders who 
controlled the dominant organizations of the economy.  The big losers during this same 
period were mostly organized labor (mining, manufacturing, and construction), and 
agriculture (Dunkerley 2017, 305). 
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Graph 15: Bolivia Capital Investment (% GDP) 
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In Banzer’s mind, democratic rule led to chaos.  Only by depoliticizing and 
reeducating the population, could a stronger government emerge.  Banzer believed 
popular political participation threatened economic growth in a capitalist economy 
(Dunkerley 2017, 296).  Moreover, only through calculated political participation could 
the goal of rapid modernization take place.  Such logic compelled Banzer to argue that 
military rule was not a short-term option, but a long-term solution to the crisis in Bolivia. 
Banzer, supported by the center and right of Bolivian politics, to include Santa 
Cruz elites, represented a major turning point in national development.  It was at this time 
that some of the actions of previous administrations fed into trends that came to some 
fruition during Banzer’s rule.  For example, Bolivia experienced improved economic 
performance, continued as a major exporter of agricultural products, and there was 
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Graph 16: Bolivia Exports (% GDP) 
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development in the manufacturing sector amid a construction boom (see Graphs 17 and 
18, below). 
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Graph 17: Bolivia GDP (% Share Agriculture) 
Graph 18: Bolivia Manufacturing Value Added ($ Billions) 
98 
 
Years of education funding also reached maturity as Bolivia produced many 
technical experts that would go on to fill private sector positions across the country.  
Many of these changes in Bolivia formed part of a larger trend in South America’s 
political development. 
Banzer’s model did not differ much from that of Barrientos.  To implement the 
model more efficiently, Banzer carried out a self-coup to justify the creation of a non-
party military government.  Banzer’s actions were not out of the ordinary for the region at 
that time in that non-democratic authoritarian regimes were then becoming the norm 
(Dunkerley 2017, 296).  Ultimately, Banzer’s regime was not to last.  Social forces 
released by the economic boom at the time were not to be controlled.  Moreover, the 
military remained fractured under Banzer’s leadership. 
The Bolivian economy ultimately declined as the Banzer government never 
effectively confronted the root structural problems within the economy.  The subsequent 
worldwide drop in commodity prices in the early-1980s resulted in Bolivia entering one 
of the longest economic depressions in its history, which would last into the 1990s (Klein 
1992, 268).  Faced with this crisis, the military dictatorship was something Bolivia could 
ill afford.  Bolivia’s dictatorship was anachronistic.  Its violent, oppressive, and 
exploitative nature was clearly unable to harness, let alone control, such a highly 
mobilized society.  The forced resignation of Bolivia’s last military junta in 1982 ended 
authoritarian regimes in the country. 
Banzer concluded that regional atmospherics were changing, and his call for 
elections reflected the trend away from authoritarianism to formal democracy.  The 
central issue in Bolivian politics remained economics and its ties to world commodity 
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prices, which often undermined the state’s ability to finance itself (Wanderley 2007, 
203).  Banzer began to lose control after his November 1978 announcement to move 
toward formal democracy.  The left was split into two fronts, and the right was more 
nationalist.  All concluded there was an economic crisis at the door.  The economic 
situation compelled all parties to accept the necessity of imposing an austerity program 
(Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 139).  Hernan Siles Zuazo of the left won the election.  After 
a rocky period of short-term presidents, General Luis Garcia Meza Tejada took charge of 
a military junta and led a ruthless and effective coup, which arguably was accomplished 
with outside, particularly Argentine, support (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 144). 
The Garcia Meza government was short-lived, had no coherent plan or goals for 
Bolivia, and its brutality terrified civil-society (Dunkerley 2017, 401).  Additionally, the 
government had connections to neo-fascists as well as the cocaine trade.  Garcia Meza 
was removed in August 1981 by the officer corps, but the system which surrounded 
Garcia Meza remained solidly in place. 
After Garcia Meza was removed, General Celso Torrelio Villa kept the system in 
place for roughly a year with the goal to end Bolivia’s international isolation.  Under U.S. 
pressure, Torrelio moved to redemocratize the country over a period of three years.  A 
leading force of this effort was the Confederation of Bolivian Private Entrepreneurs 
(CEPB).44  In September 1982, the military high command accepted a civilian-designed 
exit, removed Torrelio, and handed over power under the condition that Siles Zuazo, 
                                                          
44 The CEPB goal to democratize, as was the goal of many, was not because of a pure commitment to 
democracy, but years of disillusionment with authoritarianism; essentially, Bolivia turned to democracy as 
a second-best choice (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 119, 150). 
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winner of the 1980 election, would enter the presidency.  A reconstituted Congress 
elected Siles Zuazo, thus resurrecting the old political system (Klein 1992, 269).  Siles 
Zuazo inherited an economic disaster, which would worsen amid a decline in the tin 
mining industry. 
Siles Zuazo’s presidency was formed around a coalition that included some 
elements of the MNR, personalities from the MIR, and the Bolivian Communist Party.45  
The military was finally neutralized in the political sense.  The thrust of Siles Zuazo’s 
policies was a series of economic packages to rescue Bolivia from its economic turmoil.  
No matter what package Siles proffered, it would ultimately not please the main power 
bases in Bolivia (neither the CEPB nor the COB would be satisfied).  After several years 
of dissatisfaction from both the right and left, power was handed over through elections 
in 1985 (see Table One, below). 
Bolivian Parties Competing during 1985 Elections 46 
Left Center Right 
Siles Zuazo (progressive 
wing of MNR) 
Paz Estenssoro (historic 
MNR) 
Banzer’s ADN (included 
the old Falange, a 
reconstituted PIR, and 
some new economic 
elites) 
Traditional labor allies, 
emerging peasant leaders, 
and radical intellectuals of 
MIR 
Incorporated the old center 
and right wing of MNR 
Some parties of the 1970s 
and 1980s, but more 
developed 
 
                                                          
45 The MIR was a 1970s leftist revolutionary movement, inspired by Che Guevara, and emerged among 
young middle-class Bolivians. 
46 For a thorough discussion of Bolivian political parties during this period, see Malloy and Gamarra 
(1988). 
Table One: Bolivian Political Parties (1985 Elections) 
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The outcome of the 1985 election placed Victor Paz Estenssoro in the presidency 
once again.  Upon entering office, he would tackle the economic crisis by enacting strong 
austerity measures, first decentralizing the two main state enterprises COMIBOL and 
YPFB.  Paz Estenssoro’s New Economic Policy (NEP) reflected four important shifts.  
First, he implemented severe austerity.  Second, he revised the role of the state in society.  
Third, the primacy of the state in development retreated.  Fourth, Paz Estenssoro opened 
the economy to the international system and began negotiations with international 
creditors (see Graphs 19 and 20, below). 
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Graph 19: Bolivia Economic Growth (Rate Change as % Real GDP) 
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The Neoliberal Era: 
As evidenced by the series of military leaders during the 1970s and 1980s, the 
question germane to this dissertation is why Bolivia pursued neoliberal policies during its 
military dictatorships.  In the 1980s, Bolivia surfaced from twenty years of military 
repression and was soon thereafter thrust into an environment of simultaneous neoliberal 
economic reform amid transition to a nascent formal democracy. 
The two historic boogeymen of Latin American economies have been inflation 
and balance of payments, and the 1980s’ drop in the price of tin and natural gas resulted 
in an excess of currency (see Graph 21, below).  Amid an excess of currency and a 
downturn in commodity prices, Bolivia degenerated into deep economic depression and 
hyperinflation.  The Bolivian peso collapsed in 1982 (renamed the Boliviano in 1986), 
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Graph 20: Bolivia Foreign Direct Investment (% GDP) 
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and one of the country’s most powerful unions called hundreds of strikes.  This 
simultaneous economic onslaught delivered a severe political crisis to Bolivia.  Paz 
Estenssoro placed into practice the idea that fiscal restraint would stabilize or revive the 
economy enough to attract foreign capital.  Bolivia’s emergence from roughly twenty 
years of military repression began its attempts at joint economic and political reform by 
accepting an economic model that would become widely known as the Washington 
Consensus (Sachs and Morales 1990, 188). 
49 
 
The NEP under Paz Estenssoro stopped hyperinflation in its tracks and restored 
economic growth and increased GDP per capita (see Graph 22, below).  Paz Estenssoro 
was able to push through these reforms as power was increasingly concentrated into the 
presidency. 
 
                                                          
49 The Global Economy. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/.  Accessed 14 January 2018. 
Graph 21: Bolivia Exports (% GDP) 
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As Bolivia again faced a joint economic and political crisis, so again did Victor 
Paz Estenssoro enter politics, returning as president in 1985.  Upon Paz Estenssoro’s 
return to the presidency, he crippled the powerful COMIBOL and operated under the 
logic that fiscal restraint would ultimately create a safe place for businesses to invest 
capital, thus resulting in economic development.51 
Paz Estenssoro’s New Economic Plan (NEP) put forth in August 1985 embraced 
many of the proposals in Banzer’s National Democratic Action Party’s (ADN) economic 
plan.  Co-opting Banzer’s plan compelled him to accept Paz Estenssoro’s economic 
vision for Bolivia.  Essentially, the NEP (Decree #21060) was an orthodox shock 
treatment for Bolivia, which included measures such as currency devaluation, floating 
                                                          
50 The Global Economy. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/.  Accessed 14 January 2018. 
 
51 It is important here to note the rise (and return) of politicians throughout twentieth century Bolivia 
centers around the recurring theme whereby candidates enter office on a platform promising rapid 
development and change across social, political, and economic realms.  The latest manifestation of this 
phenomenon was the election of Evo Morales, who at the time of writing remains president of Bolivia.  For 
a discussion of Bolivia’s “refoundation” and “constrained originality,” see Whitehead 2008. 
Graph 22: Bolivia GDP Per Capita (Constant $) 
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exchange rates, new taxes, improved collection of taxes, and a cutback in government 
spending (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 196).  Out of control inflation plummeted after the 
implementation of the NEP (Sachs and Morales 1990, 241).  Economic growth soon 
returned. 
During the first half of the 1980s, Bolivia faced an astonishing crisis.  Major 
external shocks such as the rise in interest rates and a cutoff from foreign lending came at 
the same time as the world price decline in Bolivia’s commodity exports.  The resulting 
hyperinflation was one of the wildest in world history.  Even more remarkable was 
Bolivia’s recovery after the implementation of the stabilization plan under Paz Estenssoro 
(Sachs and Morales 1990, 159). 
The stabilization plan under Paz Estenssoro eliminated hyperinflation despite 
additional subsequent shocks coming about after its implementation (see Graphs 23, 24, 
and 25 below).  At the time, terms of trade suffocated real income and exacerbated the 
already bitter political conflicts in the country at the time.  Moreover, there was a 
reduction in government revenue that threatened the stabilization plan (Sachs and 
Morales 1990, 160). 
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Graph 23: Bolivia Inflation (% Change in CPI) 
Graph 24: Bolivia Inflation (% Change in CPI) 
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Paz Estenssoro, the former populist and economic nationalist, reinvented himself 
and fully embraced economic liberalism.  Economic nationalism and state capitalism 
were the very ideas he pushed when in office decades prior.  The calamitous economic 
reality in Bolivia permitted Paz Estenssoro to carry out such drastic measures.  The 
gutting of COMIBOL from 30,000 to 7,000 employees and the reduction of YPFB by 
4,000 workers were inconceivable only a few years prior (Klein 1992, 276).  As a clear 
result, organized labor was politically weakened (see Graph 26, below). 
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Graph 25: Bolivia Inflation (% Change in CPI) 
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55 
After Paz Estenssoro implemented the NEP, no subsequent politicians challenged 
the plan’s logic.  Jaíme Paz Zamora of the center-left MIR (1989-1993) maintained the 
open market policies of Paz Estenssoro despite the opposition from his own party as well 
as that of organized labor.  Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada of the MNR (1993-1997) 
continued the policies of Paz Zamora, and is seen by many as the architect of free market 
reforms in Bolivia. 
As Sanchez de Lozada prepared for the 1993 elections, he faced popular pressure 
for faster results after the implementation of earlier the stabilization program juxtaposed 
against popular anxiety over the effectiveness of those solutions.  Because of his actions 
as Minister of Planning during the mid-1980s stabilization program, Sanchez de Lozada 
                                                          
55 MIT.  The Observatory of Economic Complexity.  http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/.  Accessed 14 January 
2018. 
Graph 26: Bolivia Commodities as Percentage of Exports 
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ran for office in 1993 amid a stable economy, but with little growth (see Graph 27).  
Capitalization was floated as a possible solution (Ewing and Goldmark 1994, 1).56 
At the time, the state remained the central player in Bolivia’s important sectors 
(mining, hydrocarbons, and public utilities).  Bolivians were suspicious of privatization 
and feared a loss of jobs as well as the nation’s patrimony.  The privatization taking place 
under Sanchez de Lozada was unique in that it combined an appeal to popular 
participation with that of retaining the buyers’ payment in the business.  The “Plan de 
Todos” was a uniquely Bolivian model of capitalization, and was essentially a simple 
privatization model for six large state enterprises.  Under this plan, the buyers would pay 
into the company itself instead of the government, thereby doubling the firms’ net worth.  
The resultant cash injection would be used to invest in the sectors to stimulate their 
expansion, improve efficiency, and create jobs (Ewing and Goldmark 1994, 2).  Thinking 
at the time was that the funds would better serve ordinary Bolivians if they remained 
under the control of private owners rather than the government.  The fear was that 
government control of the money would open it to corruption and inefficiency.   Private 
retention of the funds would encourage additional investment. 
                                                          
56 Capitalization is privatization with the difference being that sale proceeds remain with the company to 
finance future investment.  Such an approach is relevant when assets for sale are of interest to a strategic 
investor, a government can afford to relinquish direct proceeds of the sale, or the sector requires major 
investment.  In the case of countries where nationalism is a powerful force, capitalization is often 
preferable to avoid popular political backlash.  For a discussion of capitalization and Bolivia’s YPFB, see 
Dunkerley 2007. 
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Germane to this turbulent period is YPFB and its relationship with Petrobras.  In 
1999 the YPFB ended over sixty years of control as the state oil firm.  After Banzer’s 
health-related resignation, Jorge Quiroga Ramirez (2001-2002) briefly took the reins of 
government, and was followed by Sanchez de Lozada (2002-2003) who ultimately 
succumbed to a series of political protests in 2003 (he was caught in a downward 
commodity cycle), and resigned in October of that year.  Of note, what would later be 
referred to as the Gas War in Bolivia took place under the Sanchez de Lozada 
administration as violent protests resulted from the government’s plan to export Bolivian 
natural gas to the U.S. through Chile.58  The plan was rescinded; however, the damage 
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58 The invocation of Bolivia’s littoral access argument is an example of a populist approach to governance.  
Since the end of the War of the Pacific against Chile (1879-1884), when Bolivia lost its access to the 
Pacific Ocean, Bolivian leaders have used the argument that sea access is vital for the country.  Of note, 
this argument is made when Bolivia is in an economic or political crisis and may be considered as an 
approach to galvanize the people towards one policy or another (i.e. 1930s Military Socialists; 1950s 
revolutionaries; military dictatorships of the 1970s; Sanchez de Lozada, then Gisbert).  Morales has not 
shied away from similar rhetoric. 
Graph 27: Bolivia Economic Growth (Rate Change as % Real GDP) 
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was done and Sanchez de Lozada left office.  The presidency of Carlos Mesa Gisbert 
(2003-2005) ends this period of executive branch instability in Bolivia. 
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The series of presidents from 1989 to 2005 maintained the open market approach 
initially put in place under Paz Estenssoro in 1985, and continued to implement policies 
that ensured the Bolivian economy would continually grow and integrate itself into the 
world economy (see Graph 28, above).  Evo Morales of the Movement Towards 
Socialism (MAS) party took advantage of the downward commodity cycle, erroneously 
blamed neoliberal policies for Bolivia’s predicament, emerged as a serious political force, 
assumed the presidency in 2005, and remains in power today. 
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Graph 28: Bolivia GDP Per Capita (Constant $) 
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Evo Morales’ Bolivia (Populism and Economic Nationalism, Again?): 
To understand Bolivia and the election of the historical outsider, anti-elite, 
Morales, one must understand the events leading up to his presidency.  Morales was 
influential in the fall of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada of the MNR in 2003 (October Gas 
War) and the independent candidate Mesa Gisbert in 2005.  The rise of Morales must be 
seen in the context of a globalizing economy combined with two decades of neoliberal 
reform and simultaneous experimentation in deepening democracy. 
In May 2006 President Morales ordered the military to occupy energy fields 
around the country and to nationalize the country’s oil and gas reserves.  The U.S. 
historically lacked large hydrocarbon investments in the country; however, Brazil’s 
Petrobras and Spain’s Repsol, firms with larger amounts of investment in Bolivia, 
certainly felt the sting of Morales’ move.  In hindsight, Morales’ nationalization of 
Bolivian natural gas was not as effective as Venezuela’s nationalization of oil; gas is a 
regional, not international, market (Weintraub 2006, 2).  Moreover, Bolivia’s reserves 
pale in comparison to those of Venezuela.  These two points are further developed in the 
case study. 
Morales’ first major action was to use the military to seize energy fields 
throughout Bolivia and subsequently placed these under state control.  Foreign producers 
were required to funnel future sales of hydrocarbons, particularly natural gas, through the 
YPFB.  Drawing on a history of foreign sacking of its wealth, Morales resurrected 
Bolivian nationalism as policy.  Under the Heroes of the Chaco Declaration (Supreme 
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Decree No. 28701), Morales upended the historically disadvantageous relationship 
between Bolivia and foreign firms (Miranda 2008, 193).60 
The new economic relationship between Bolivia and international firms provided 
the former with greater natural resource wealth to spend and invest domestically (see 
Graph 29, below).  It is important to note here that the capitalization reforms of the 1990s 
were crucial in Morales’ success.  During the 1990s, natural gas became the largest 
commodity export, and provided the most revenue relative to other exports (see Graph 
30, below).  Ironically, Morales’ resource nationalism was made possible because of the 
NEP enacted under Paz Estenssoro, not despite it. 
61 
 
                                                          
60 The Heroes of the Chaco Declaration was the document that nationalized hydrocarbons in Bolivia.  In 
this declaration, President Morales stated that hydrocarbon activities were not carried out in line with 
constitutional requirements, and that the privatization and capitalization of YPFB was injurious to the state.  
Of the nine, the most central Articles are #2 (nationalization) and #4 (distribution of natural gas revenues 
from the largest fields: 82% for the government; 18% for the companies) (Morales 2006, 1021). 
 
61 The Global Economy. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/.  Accessed 14 January 2018. 
Graph 29: Bolivia Capital Investment (% GDP) 
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In the minds of the historically marginalized populations, as well as in those of 
careful outside observers, it would appear the legacy of the plundering of Potosí was 
finally avenged.  Nevertheless, foreign interests continued to invest in Bolivia.  After a 
brief hiccup in 2005, FDI was on the rise again.  Exports increased greatly after Morales 
took office, almost tripling in some years, since the Sanchez de Lozada era.  However, 
both exports and FDI are in decline since 2013 (see Graphs 31 and 32, below). 
                                                          
62 MIT.  The Observatory of Economic Complexity.  http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/.  Accessed 14 January 
2018. 
Graph 30: Bolivia Commodities as Percentage of Exports 
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Morales’ political platform centered on promising to deliver social, political, 
economic, and cultural change.  Contrary to the opinions of many policymakers and 
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64 The Global Economy. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/.  Accessed 14 January 2018. 
Graph 31: Bolivia Exports (% GDP) 
Graph 32: Bolivia Foreign Direct Investment (% GDP) 
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pundits, Morales’ rise is not the first time in Bolivian history where a candidate entered 
office based on a platform of rapid change (Whitehead 2008, 269).  Morales brought back 
to Bolivia a sense of national populism not seen for decades.  The 2006 petroleum 
nationalization under Morales, clearly economically nationalist, was not unprecedented. 
 
Bolivia’s Natural Gas Relationship with Brazil: A Synopsis 
This section centers on the natural gas relationship between Bolivia and Brazil, 
and provides a brief historical and contextual foundation on which later chapters depend.  
Principally, the natural gas trade relationship between Bolivia and Brazil did not develop 
overnight.  Instead, the relationship was built on decades of groundwork dating to the 
1950s within the Southern Cone of South America, with the first gas pipeline built in 
1972 between Bolivia and Argentina (Mares 2004, 1).  Over time, new discoveries of 
natural gas in Argentina decreased the need for Bolivian product.  With 80% of Bolivia’s 
total gas production being sold to Argentina at that time, Bolivia needed to secure a new 
export market. 
In 1991, the governments of Bolivia and Brazil revisited a gas export project that 
had been a pipe dream for decades.  Ultimately, Bolivian natural gas trade with Brazil 
triumphed over that of Argentina, led mostly by the GASBOL project (a natural gas 
pipeline from Bolivia to Brazil) which dovetailed with World Bank interest in the 
economic development of Bolivia (Mares 2004, 16).  An initial twenty-year agreement 
between Bolivia’s YPFB and Brazil’s Petrobras was signed in 1993. 
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Natural gas is Bolivia’s main export and is ~50% of the country’s GNP.  Bolivia 
and Brazil epitomize an ideal market relationship for natural gas in the region.  However, 
Bolivia runs the risk of losing out on this deal if Brazil develops its own natural gas or 
finds another supplier.  As the largest regional economy, Brazil will remain a key player 
in any Latin American energy integration scenario. 
Pertinent to Bolivia and central to natural resource exploitation are the associated 
rents a government receives through the sale of commodities.  It is evident that 
consecutive Bolivian administrations have harnessed natural gas rents.  However, the 
government has been limited in its ability to use these rents to adjust economic course.  
Bolivia remains an export-dependent country.  The twentieth century has simply seen a 
shift from tin and other mined resources to hydrocarbons (Wanderley 2008, 194). 
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III.  CHAPTER THREE 
 
Brazil: Chapter Abstract 
This chapter begins with a contextual explanation of Brazil’s twentieth century 
economic experience to provide the necessary background to ask the central research 
question concerning how resource nationalism affects energy integration.  Next, this 
chapter explains Brazil’s history during the same period, emphasizing when necessary 
central issues of the overall dissertation: economic nationalism (to include 
nationalizations), populism, natural resources, neoliberal policies, the historical election of 
Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, and beyond.  Statistical indicators paint a picture of Brazil’s 
economic evolution across time.  The final section provides rudimentary commentary and 
background concerning integration of Bolivian natural gas into Brazil, setting the stage for 
development of the case study. 
  
Brazil: Current Scenario 
In academia, there is not as much robust energy research involving Latin America 
compared to other regions.  Within Latin America, Brazil is under-investigated.  Brazil as 
regional hegemon, its ability to project power, its proximity to markets in the Americas, 
and its links outside of the hemisphere, particularly Lusophone Africa, all offer 
integration prospects.  Brazil’s need for natural gas is presently satisfied through imports.  
This presents the opportunity to determine the effects of Bolivian resource nationalism on 
what appears to be an ideal economic match concerning energy integration and 
cooperation between the two countries. 
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Brazil and Bolivia nationalized their energy firms resulting from each country’s 
unique historical experience.  Often, nationalized oil companies (NOC) are anathema to 
strict reliance on a liberal global market, which differs from the Anglo-American 
economic model.  Moreover, parastatals often function at the behest of the president in 
power and additionally take on social roles not initially envisioned when created (Victor 
et al 2012, 8). 
This chapter is arranged mostly by electoral events and respective policy changes 
in Brazil.  The first period centers on O Estado Novo (The New State) in Brazil during 
the long Getúlio Vargas era (1937-1954), includes historical precursors, the brief 
interregnum, Vargas’ reelection in 1951, and the creation of Petrobras in 1953.  The 
second period concerns military rule and dictatorship (1964-1985), as well as some of the 
debates concerning the role of Petrobras and surrounding political conflicts.  Next is the 
bumpy post-dictatorship transition to formal democracy and economic restructuring 
under Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), which includes discussions on economic 
imbalances, attempted solutions, subsequent democratic elections, and financial 
restructuring under the Cardoso Plan.  The fourth period presents a discussion of the 
historical election of Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva (2002-2010), his handpicked successor, 
Dilma Rousseff (2010-2016), and the economic policies in effect during this period.  
Last, this chapter discusses the importance of regional energy integration with Brazil 
relative to deepened economic ties.65 
                                                          
65 Deepened economic ties among countries in Latin America may preclude the need to sell to China, 
Russia, or other extra-hemispheric actors.  Endearing Bolivian natural gas to Brazilian markets will benefit 
Bolivia, Brazil, and Western/U.S. interests in the region.  However, as Brazil develops its own offshore 
resources, Bolivia may lose opportunities to reap associated economic benefits. 
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By 2015 Brazil was the seventh largest economy in the world, deployed troops in 
support of peacekeeping operations, and was a player of note on global debates 
concerning climate change and nuclear proliferation.  Additionally, Brazil’s domestic 
institutions are strengthening alongside an expanded middle-class and the eradication of 
critical hunger and poverty. 
Every president in twentieth-century Brazil, particularly since Vargas, faced 
domestic and international constraints relative to global competition and internal order.  
Within the global order, the ability of Brazil to maneuver within or influence these 
constraints differs greatly when juxtaposed against other countries in the region and 
internationally. 
 
Brazil: Populism, Petroleum, and Neoliberalism 
Economic Nationalism and Brazil 
Economic nationalism is not a new phenomenon, but is present in both old and 
new states.  Additionally, states with a strong corporatist tradition are more likely to 
experience forms of economic nationalism.  Harry Johnson (1967) provides a theoretical 
model explaining economic nationalism in new and developing states.  Johnson’s 
intention is to explain nationalist policies as rational and economic responses to specific 
situations.  Nationalism is necessary to understand the ideological role of colonialism and 
imperialism in formerly colonial states. 
Nationalism as an economic program often results in expropriation, the forced 
transfer of property from foreigners to nationals (i.e. nationalization of the civil service), 
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or investment in the purchase of job opportunities for nationals.  Nationalist economic 
policy fosters activities based on symbolic value, prestigious jobs for the middle classes, 
favors extensive state control (and public ownership) over economic enterprises, and 
social control over allocation of jobs for nationals.  Under economic nationalism, lower 
economic classes are unlikely to gain. 
Johnson (1967) asks why developing countries place great emphasis on 
substituting domestic production for imports despite indicators that economic efficiency 
is best served by the reliance on the principle of comparative advantage.  Johnson next 
suggests there is a strong opposition to foreign capital investment and the employment of 
foreign scientific, technical, and managerial personnel – an attitude derived from 
nationalism.  Johnson is correct in this last assertion.  In the case of both Bolivia and 
Brazil, the governments responsible for the creation of their respective NOC were keenly 
aware of the need for technology and investment from independent oil companies (IOC). 
Complementing Johnson, Thomas E. Skidmore (1967) argues no account of 
modern Brazilian politics can ignore how economic pressure has restricted the options 
available to the political elite.  Choices presented to the elites are as delicate as they are 
unavoidable: agriculture/industrialization; foreign/private capital; regional 
imbalance/income distribution; and, accomplishing goals while managing inflation. 
Peter Smith (1969) based his research into nationalism and the Brazilian 
petroleum industry on public opinion and national assumptions.  Smith’s definition of 
economic nationalism is like others’ during related publications of that era and falls 
within the parameters of the definition used in Chapter One of this dissertation.  Smith 
argues economic nationalism stresses the creation of an independent economy, citing the 
124 
 
prime example as the 1938 expropriation of foreign companies’ holdings by the Mexican 
government (Smith 1969, 2).  Oil nationalism in Brazil began at the end of the First 
World War.  Prior to 1918, oil exploration in Brazil was carried out unsuccessfully by 
private citizens. 
Smith maintains economic nationalism is often considered the driving force 
behind less developed countries to accelerate their development through economic 
planning.  In this context, Brazil pursued a policy of economic nationalism fearing threats 
to its independence and sovereignty posed by foreign capital exploitation.  Among the 
wide range of economic nationalist variants, Brazil chose outright nationalization of its 
oil industry despite this choice being burdensome.  Smith considered Brazil’s choice 
foolish, and argues proponents of economic nationalism believed capitalism was not up 
to the task of industrializing Brazil. 
Once placed into historical perspective, however, Brazil’s choice to nationalize 
instead of relying on IOCs to develop and likely control the petroleum industry, was a 
necessary decision at the time.  This decision was particularly essential in the context of 
the period.  Because investment capital needed to come from Brazil, and such capital was 
scarce, it is not difficult to appreciate Brazil’s complicated situation.  Petrobras should be 
appreciated as both a product of and influence upon economic nationalism in Brazil. 
 
The Getúlio Vargas Era: 
To the economist, nationalism appears to be a driving force responsible for the 
acceleration of economic development.  Nationalism is also responsible for economic 
policies not making much sense.  As a direct example of applied nationalism, Getúlio 
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Vargas (1930-1945, 1951-1954), the most substantial figure of twentieth century 
Brazilian politics, made the political-emotional choice to nationalize Brazil’s petroleum 
industry, and defeated the strictly economic arguments that it would be cheaper to have 
IOCs explore for petroleum and pay royalties to Brazil.  Vargas was compelled to choose 
between industrialization and doing without manufactured goods.  The worldwide 
economic depression greatly influenced this decision. 
The worldwide depression that preceded Vargas is not the only factor at work 
during this period.  From 1889-1930 (Brazil’s First Republic), the concept of governance 
was that the republic should be orderly and bring with it progress (positivism).66  
According to this interpretation, the republic should modernize, broaden its technical 
knowledge, and expand its communications.  The only way for this to occur was to create 
a strong executive.  Consequently, in the early 1900s, Brazil shifted its diplomatic 
attention from London to the U.S. in efforts to make Brazil the most important country in 
South America.  The trigger for this political change was the price of coffee and related 
international markets (Fausto and Fausto 2014, 153). 
The spread of coffee plantations in Brazil produced enormous harvests in the late 
19th century, the increased amount of coffee on the market led to a decreased price, and 
there was an associated drop in foreign exchange entering Brazil.  Brazil then became 
unable to service its debts, and needed to renegotiate terms.  Alongside domestic 
economic troubles, there was an emergence of worker social movements that appeared in 
                                                          
66 Positivism was an ideology popular in Latin America from the 1870s through WWI.  Largely drawing 
from the philosopher Comte, positivism was attractive for Latin America as it attacked the liberalism of 
John Locke and the U.S. as well as provided a basis for group rights, which were long a part of Latin 
American tradition (Wiarda 2001).  The concept spread throughout the Army and linked many officers to 
Brazilian politicians. 
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both rural and urban areas (Fausto and Fausto 2014, 159).67  These groups appeared and 
disappeared quickly.  Ruling elites at the time rarely concerned themselves with such 
activity as political rights gained through activism were quickly rescinded once the 
pressure was off.  Shortly thereafter, the combination of WWI revolutionary ardor in 
Europe and associated wartime inflation reached Brazil and ruptured the earlier social 
framework.  Major cities faced large-scale worker strikes between 1917-1920.  After the 
end of WWI, the urban middle-class became more publicly visible, and there was some 
support for liberalism among this group. 
The breakdown of the coffee economy during the 1930s was the result of the 
ongoing world market crisis coupled with internal overproduction.  The 1930 breakdown 
created favorable conditions for investment linked to internal markets, reducing Brazil’s 
dependence solely on external markets, a development conundrum that exists today. 
Brazil’s economic breakdown and subsequent 1930 Revolution resulted from a 
confluence of events. The economic crash of October 1929 arrived amid heavily 
leveraged Brazilian loans alongside a drop in coffee prices.  Expectations of guaranteed 
coffee profits did not appear as they were undermined by an associated decline in coffee 
consumption resulting from a lull in international trade.  Brazil’s experience was part of 
the worldwide framework of general economic and political instability (Fausto and 
Fausto 2014, 190). 
                                                          
67 These social movements were categorized into three main groups that made attempts to organize and 
mobilize workers.  The first group centered on religion and social needs; the second, religion and social 
justice; the third focused on social justice only (Fausto and Fausto 2014, 174). 
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The oligarchic regime at that time was based on the axis between São Paulo and 
Minas Gerais states.  Once this equilibrium was broken, there was a need for a new 
configuration of power.  The old structure was based on coffee interests and could not 
survive.  The 1930 Revolution resulted from a tacit agreement between the middle classes 
(lacking in political autonomy) and the traditional sectors (less linked to exportation); 
however, the bases of the new power structure could not be firmly established.  The 
political representation of coffee interests was upset, but coffee remained the decisive 
basis of the economy (Weffort 1966, 187).  Coffee maintained a prominent place among 
Brazilian exports until its steep and steady decline in the middle-1960s (see Graph 33, 
below). 
68 
 
                                                          
68 MIT.  The Observatory of Economic Complexity.  http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/.  Accessed 14 January 
2018. 
Graph 33: Brazil Exports (Commodities and Products) 
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A heterogeneous group produced the 1930 Revolution as traditional oligarchies 
fell from power and were replaced by military men, technocrats, young politicians, and 
industrialists.  A new kind of state emerged, which was increasingly centralized and with 
greater autonomy.  Getúlio Vargas promoted national capitalism from a combination of 
the state apparatus itself and the industrial bourgeoisie alliance with the urban working 
class (Fausto & Fausto 2014, 191). 
The appearance of Getúlio Vargas as a political force was a consequence of the 
collapse of the political arrangement that had lasted to 1930.  Brazil’s 1930 Revolution 
had two central characteristics.  First, there was the weakening of the oligarchic state, 
which was agricultural and export oriented.  Second, there was the formation of a 
democratic state based on the urban masses and industrial social sectors.  It was during 
this period that Brazil initiated its transition from a limited to a wide participation 
democracy (Weffort 1966, 187). 
The urban middle classes were the most important pressure groups for 
overthrowing the oligarchy, and included public officials, military men, and liberal 
professionals.  1930 was the climax of the political pressure extended by the urban 
middle-class.  During the ensuing post-oligarchic crisis, the middle-class was unable to 
establish a democratic regime based on their liberal aspirations.  Despite dominance in 
opinion and action, the middle classes lacked the social and economic means to reject the 
institutional framework (Weffort 1966, 187).  This was not a situation unique to Brazil.69 
                                                          
69 In most Latin American countries, the traditional middle class did not satisfy social and economic 
conditions that allowed for political autonomy away from the interests of the large agricultural estates 
(Weffort 1966, 188). 
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Upon ascension to power, Getúlio Vargas approached short-term problems of the 
economy with a mixed policy.  Vargas was required to manage the external balance of 
payments against internal inflation with the orthodox adherence to the traditional rules of 
the international economic system.  Internally, however, Vargas developed a system of 
government-coordinated investment.  The creation of the National Bank for Economic 
Development (BNDE; later renamed by inclusion of a “social” element, BNDES) was 
intended to help develop the Brazilian economy soften the orthodox approach with a 
strategy of economic nationalism.  Vargas deeply distrusted foreign capital, and his anti-
imperialist message offered him a link to left-wing intellectuals and notions.  Vargas’ 
version of economic nationalism was aggressive. 
Such aggressive nationalism fit well with Vargas’ development plans, and in 1951 
he submitted a bill for the creation of Petrobras, over a decade after oil was discovered in 
Brazil.  The concept of the parastatal stressed the need for state corporations as an 
instrument of policy.  Moreover, public opinion at the time favored a nationalist solution 
to the oil question, and moderates supported the idea as oil arguably required a separate 
policy.  Carefully balancing the above with the external exigencies of the market, the 
Petrobras proposal attempted to ease the pain of Brazil’s balance of payments (Weffort 
1966, 194).  Imports consumed foreign exchange, and to substitute imported for domestic 
oil would benefit Brazil in the long-term. 
Turning briefly away from the Vargas era specifically, we find Petrobras is a 
particularly successful NOC.  Today Petrobras is a leader in deep-water oil exploration 
and production, dominant in the Brazilian oil and gas market, and has an albeit small but 
growing presence abroad.  Petrobras began with no meaningful reserves or expertise in 
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the oil business, and unlike other NOCs, Petrobras was not initially created by the 
government to be a revenue source or jobs program.  Initial scarcity of revenue forced 
Petrobras to select projects rationally to guarantee positive cash flow.  The government 
goal was to save scarce currency, and to provide a competitive and secure fuel supply to 
industrialize Brazil.  Petrobras accomplished this through vertical integration and 
exploiting economies of scale, and by 2008 Brazil emerged as a net exporter of oil 
(Victor et al 2012, 540).  As demonstrated by Graph 34 below, crude oil became a greater 
percentage of Brazil’s exports than its once main product, coffee. 
70 
 
 
 
As Brazil moved towards nationalism and its associated greater economic 
autonomy, social tensions surfaced, particularly among the traditional sectors and elites.  
As the import-export sectors feared a loss of social status and importance, an emotional 
appeal to economic nationalism was dangerous as these ideas were associated with a 
                                                          
70 MIT.  The Observatory of Economic Complexity.  http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/.  Accessed 14 January 
2018. 
Graph 34: Brazil Exports (Commodities and Products) 
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restructuring of the Brazilian economy.  As evident in contemporary Brazil as it was 
during the Vargas era, economic nationalism could be useful to construct public 
consensus, but it could be equally dangerous as it could deepen social, economic, and 
political divisions. 
Such dangers of nationalism, particularly economic nationalism, are not 
exceptional; however, how they manifested themselves in Brazil is rooted in the 
country’s unique history.  Brazilian nationalism specifically may be traced to Europe, 
particularly Portugal, and this sentiment has a long history of development.  Brazil had all 
the characteristics that historically favored the formation of strong nationalism.71 
Brazil did eventually experience its own nationalist development, which has been 
periodized into three distinct eras.72  The most recent period of Brazilian nationalism 
arrived in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, and is further divided because 
of the systemic instability of two world wars and associated economic crises.  Economic 
nationalism came into play during the Vargas era whereby nationalism became an 
instrument for change and was considered crucial for Brazilian development.  During the 
long Vargas era, Brazil drew from Iberian traditions of patrimonialism, balanced 
competing groups, and softened some conflict in the country.  These Iberian traditions 
were subsequently converted into a form of 1950s technocracy (Wirth 1970, 12).  
                                                          
71 The unity of territory, a shared desire to settle its interior, a language different to that of the rest of Latin 
America, a Roman Catholic majority, and shared ideological preferences are the most salient 
characteristics.  That Brazil remained under a monarchy while its neighbors endured republican revolutions 
is a defining political difference (Burns 1968, 6). 
 
72 The first period (Colonial Nativism) developed during the 16th through 18th centuries, reflected colonists’ 
love and pride in the land, and was not necessarily antagonistic towards Portugal.  The second period 
(Defensive Nationalism) came during the 19th century, and was a period of increased awareness that Brazil 
differed from other countries, particularly from Europe and its Spanish-speaking neighbors (Burns 1968, 
9). 
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However, populism, arguably, was the thrust in Brazil between 1930 and the military 
takeover in 1964.73 
During the first Vargas presidency (1930-1945), the desire was to increase 
Brazilian exports where it had both a cost and geographical advantage.  The goal was to 
keep up with debt payments, and cover imports.  Vargas in his second presidency (1951-
1954) greatly encouraged state planning to develop power resources, with Petrobras 
being the most salient (Wirth 1970, 10).  Additionally, during the Estado Nôvo period, 
the Brazilian Army emerged as the main engine of economic nationalism, the ideology 
later taken up by Vargas’ technocrats. 
Nationalists of the time argued that Brazil could only become truly independent 
through economic development.  This feeling was the zeitgeist across Latin America.  
The region became increasingly hostile towards, or resentful of, foreign capital, was 
suspicious of private enterprise, and there was also a growing preference for state 
ownership while simultaneously encouraging industrialization well beyond the 
production of key industry (i.e. non-durable consumer goods, durable goods, steel, 
power, oil).  The Vargas era marked a definitive shift from cultural to economic 
nationalism in Brazilian history.74 
                                                          
73 Vargas adopted the populist strategy after he had already been in power for over a decade and carried in 
this direction until 1945 when the military forced him from office.  Later and similarly, João Goulart was 
president for roughly two-and-a-half years before adopting populist discourse, which resulted in him being 
deposed by the military in 1964 (Bethell 2013, 77). 
 
74 Economic nationalism is not solely a result of Getúlio Vargas, but has deeper roots in the nineteenth 
century writings of Alberto Tôrres (1865-1917), in which economic development was equated with 
nationalism. 
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A major test of Vargas’ skill is seen in the response to the long-term fall in coffee 
prices (~1930-45), when Vargas simultaneously adopted two solutions: the need to 
diversify the economy away from a single commodity, which varied over time (i.e. 
Brazilwood; sugar; gold; coffee); and, to accelerate industrialization (Burns 1968, 74).  
Greatly attributable to Vargas’ actions, by the mid-twentieth century Brazil was the most 
industrialized country in Latin America, which revolutionized Brazilian life and 
challenged the traditional social structure.  Of course, the great symbol of economic 
nationalism for Brazilians, and all Latin Americans, was petroleum (Burns 1968, 76).  
Although Vargas and other leaders of that era saw the need to diversify away from a 
commodity-driven economy, Brazil and Latin America have returned to this model in 
recent years. 
Ultimately, the first Vargas period would collapse; this happened alongside the 
conclusion of the war against fascism.  The end of fascism united the large urban sectors, 
and appeared to indicate the beginning of democracy, a dream of Brazil’s urban classes 
since the 1920s.  After 1945, the political participation of the urban masses acquired 
greater importance than what was foreseen in the dictatorship as populist leaders emerged 
and won national elections.  Nationalism then became politically significant when the 
federal government adopted it as the ideological justification for development policy 
(Weffort 1966, 191). 
There was a prevailing belief in Brazil, as remains largely the case worldwide 
today, that oil is an economically desirable export, which may project countries to at least 
regional power prestige.  During Vargas’ second administration (1951-1954) he exploited 
oil as a symbol for wider political support.  During this period, Vargas proposed the 
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creation of Petrobras.75  Vargas replicated the European nationalists’ success of the 1930s 
to strengthen Brazil’s national government through the use of institutions and state power 
to further nationalist goals.  Vargas set the foundation to drive the course of Brazil’s 
development toward economic progress.  However, after Vargas nationalists76 played a 
more assertive role in the government, the military became increasingly suspicious of 
their agenda, and ultimately seized power in 1964.77 
Nationalism is a potent force which cannot be suppressed eternally, and resurfaces 
throughout contemporary Brazil, often flirting with populism.  However, industrial 
development depends greatly on foreign capital investment.  Thus, the creation of a 
policy independent of foreign interests is inherently incongruous.  Echoes of the 1930 
Revolution were felt for decades, and the continuity of mass democracy from 1945 until 
the fall of João Goulart in 1964 results from the persistence of these structural conditions. 
 
Waning Populism and pre-Dictatorship in Brazil: 
The term populism is an abstract concept and difficult to define.78  What follows 
below is a cursory review of populism, and its manifestation in Brazil during the 
                                                          
75 After two years of congressional wrangling, the creation of Petrobras was approved in 1953.  Today, 
Petrobras remains the single enduring achievement of the Brazilian nationalists. 
 
76 The nationalist movement was a very diverse group (from the left to right along the political spectrum), 
and included intellectuals, students, the urban proletariat, middle class, and elements of the military and 
industry (Burns 1968, 93). 
 
77 After Vargas, Brazilian nationalism took on four central characteristics: 1) The political Left took over 
the leadership of the movement; 2) Nationalist leaders became increasingly critical of foreign economic 
influence, which led to 3) Brazil’s strongest attack focused on the United States; 4) Economic nationalism 
was the only way to liberate Brazil from its past and project the country into the future (Burns 1968, 78). 
 
78 For a detailed examination of populism in Latin America, please refer to the literature review in Chapter 
One. 
 
135 
 
twentieth century.  In its simplest form, populism is best understood as a political 
phenomenon that encompasses parties or movements.  These parties or movements are 
often embodied in one individual, who is able to reach power through identification with 
previously excluded or marginalized sections of the population.  These historically 
marginalized populations are mobilized from above, or through identification with 
someone who shares their historical experience. 
Populism is heavily associated with Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in 
Latin America; however, the former is not always tied to the latter.79  A country that 
adopts economic nationalism usually relies upon ISI for its industrialization program 
(Smith 1969, 2).  It is the overlap of the concepts of populism and economic nationalism 
that drive much of this dissertation.  In the case of Brazil, ISI was evident in the 1930s, 
but populism did not emerge until Vargas’ second term (1950s).  Most scholars argue 
populism emerges in a country during times of crisis such as a transition to modernity, a 
crisis of export-led development, or concomitantly with a state-centric developmental 
model (De La Torre 2013, 8).  That this crisis came on the heels of the 1930 Revolution 
in Brazil is not surprising. 
After Vargas’ fall and associated instability in Brazil, the Jucelino Kubitschek 
(1956-1961) years were considered politically stable, but not entirely ideal.  Under 
Kubitschek (JK) the economy demonstrated solid economic growth, and the military 
favored the backing of democratic governments; however, some limits remained to 
counter the communist threat (Fausto and Fausto 2014, 247).  Ironically, although some 
                                                          
79 For a succinct definition of Import Substitution Industrialization, please see Chapter One. 
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nationalist officers preferred communism, others desired democracy despite supporting 
the idea of a coup to renovate Brazil’s institutions in attempts to weaken trade unions and 
communists. 
The Kubitschek program promoted state intervention in the economy in the form 
of direct aid, and seeking foreign capital investment; attention centered on six important 
sectors to include energy, transportation, and basic industry.  During the JK era, 
nationalism lost some ground, and the president’s troubles occurred where foreign trade 
and government finance overlapped.  Increased spending on industrialization and the 
founding of the new capital in Brasilia weakened the exchange rate and led to growing 
federal budget deficits, which combined with inflation (Fausto & Fausto 2014, 252).  
Essentially, JK pushed forward with industrial production amid lagging development in 
the Brazilian northeast.  Although Kubitschek maintained the economic program, he 
ultimately severed with an International Monetary Fund (IMF) plan and left the country’s 
economy in shambles.  Despite the collapsing economy, Kubitschek entered and left 
power peacefully. 
After JK ended his term, Jánio Quadros carried out a brief presidential stint; he 
resigned after seven months in office.  Quadros lacked a support base, and alienated both 
the political left and the right.  During this compressed period, Quadros pursued an 
orthodox economic stabilization plan; international creditors appreciated his actions 
while Brazilians suffered (Fausto and Fausto 2014, 257).  Quadros was succeeded by 
Vice-president João Goulart in a curious turn of events. 
Although constitutionally president, João Goulart’s (1961-1964) ascension to 
power was blocked by Quadros’ military ministers in the name of national security.  The 
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military believed Goulart represented trade-unionism, which at the time was considered a 
way for communists to enter power.  Ultimately Congress adopted a compromise; 
Goulart would become president, but would rule in a Parliamentary system with 
diminished power.  After taking office in 1961, Goulart signaled a return to populist 
policies, and as a result lost some of his legitimacy (Fausto and Fausto 2014, 271).80  
What is ultimately important during this period is that populists were cast aside as the 
military took power in 1964. 
 
Military Rule and Dictatorship (1964-1985): 
Many greeted the 1964 military takeover of government with enthusiasm 
including the media, most sectors of the Catholic Church hierarchy, and the political elite.  
Beginning in 1964, a coalition of generals desired to change the state as well as society; 
fear of communism among the political right largely drove this activity.  The desire to 
change state and society was encapsulated in what would later be defined as a national 
security regime.81  However, it is important to clarify here that centralized control of 
Brazil did not happen overnight.  In fact, it is commonly held that since the 1930s the 
Brazilian military increasingly began to occupy the function of a moderating force 
                                                          
80 Populism in the region is not limited to nationalism, and has emerged during periods of neoliberal 
reform.  Countries in the region such as Peru under Fujimori, Argentina under Menem, and Ecuador under 
Bucaram experienced such transitions during the period of neoliberal economic reform known as the 
Washington Consensus (Demmers et al 2000).  In the case of Brazil, this form of populism took place 
initially under the leadership of Fernando Affonso Collor de Mello (1990-1992), who will be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
81 National Security Regimes were intent on national economic growth in a controlled environment, but 
were later discovered as being guilty of repressing human rights.  This period was not isolated to Brazil, but 
represented a trend in the region at the time. 
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through the centralization of power, thus reconditioning the state as guarantor of private 
and public negotiations (Faoro 1958, 236).82 
Prior to the Vargas era, Brazil lacked a history of personalistic dictators; however, 
the national security regime model changed Brazil from the politics of personal 
clientelism to that of institutional and bureaucratic military rule.  Additionally, similarly-
minded countries adhering to this concept coordinated their actions in efforts to eliminate 
dissent among Southern Cone countries.83  This version of the Brazilian state rewrote the 
constitution, ultimately ratified by Congress in 1967 (Meade 2010, 164).  Although the 
military ruled, its generals searched for a political base amid growing opposition and 
growing repression (1964-1967).  Opinions differed between moderate and hardline 
elements in the military with the former allowing some public opposition; however, 
hardliners wanted to control the students and workers alike.  Ultimately, military 
hardliners took the upper hand and imposed a series of Institutional Acts (AI).84  The aim 
of the AIs was to change Brazil’s institutions.  The first AI in April 1964 preserved (with 
some modification) the constitution of 1946.  Under this AI, Congress would continue to 
meet, parliamentary immunity was suspended, and there was some curtailment of 
                                                          
82 Raymundo Faoro, one of Brazil’s greatest jurists, describes state involvement in the economy through the 
creation of the National Department of Coffee in the early 20th century; the later creation of Petrobras 
maintains this tradition.  Although Petrobras’ creation took place a few years prior to the publication of 
Faoro’s work, the proximity in time of events likely precluded the inclusion of the parastatal in his analysis 
(Faoro 1958).  Despite Faoro not speaking directly to the creation of Petrobras in his work, the similarities 
are palpable.  Essentially, economic liberalism in Brazil has a short history. 
 
83 For example, Operation Condor was a secret alliance among dictatorships in South America during the 
mid-to-late 1970s, which included a Southern Cone rendition and repression program designed to locate 
and eliminate opponents of military regimes in the region. 
 
84 According to Fausto and Fausto (2014), Institutional Acts (IA) were a series of acts passed by the 
military government during the long dictatorship.  The military implemented IAs to alter Brazil’s 
institutions, and justified these acts as a consequence of exercising power, which the military claimed was 
an inherent component in all revolutions. 
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peoples’ rights.  Although not purely authoritarian, rights were clearly not completely 
maintained.  The press was controlled, the right of habeas corpus was not consistently 
preserved, the military government persecuted its enemies through arrest and torture, and 
many people were killed. 
Under the military dictatorship (1964-1985), economic policy in Brazil was based 
on a hybrid strategy.  This strategy was essentially an alliance among the state, foreign 
and national private capital, and agricultural commodities (Petras 2013, 470).  The 
foreign and national capital was industry export based, and as aforementioned that of 
agriculture mostly comprised of coffee.  Ultimately, this model provided a foundation for 
the subsequent anti-dictatorial struggle and the return of democracy as neoliberal policies 
were in the ascendant.  It must be noted here that despite repression in the political realm, 
the military experienced success in economic policy, which led to a vigorous industrial 
recovery in 1968. 
Succinctly, from 1964 until the return of democracy the military took power and 
ran the government; however, it rarely acted as a political bloc.  The dictatorship was not 
a personal one as during the first Vargas era; instead, military leadership after 1964 
simply exchanged power.  Although Congress approved the ARENA-nominated 
president, it simply sanctified military decisions.85  The truth of the matter is that 
Congress was an unimportant body.  Professional politicians were no longer in charge.  
Nevertheless, the military did not govern alone, but offered leverage to individuals 
regarding the formulation of economic policy.  Also different from the Vargas era was 
                                                          
85 The National Renewal Alliance (ARENA) was a pro-government party during the military dictatorship 
(Fausto and Fausto 2014, 302). 
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that populism ceased to be an important means of attaining power despite the state 
maintaining a significant role in running the economy (Fausto and Fausto 2014, 302). 
Upon the conclusion of the military dictatorship, the voting franchise expanded to 
include illiterates, and all political parties were then made legal.  At the beginning of the 
1980s, Brazil had the most closed economy in the capitalist world.  The closed nature of 
the economy was a direct result from the 1950s industrialization model, and worsened 
because of the 1980s external debt crisis. 
In 1980, after roughly two decades of dictatorship, the process of Brazilian 
democratization began, was turbulent, and culminated with a transition to civilian rule in 
1985.  The first post-dictatorship president, Tancredo Neves died in 1985, and was 
replaced by his Vice-President Jose Sarney.  After Sarney completed his term in 1990, 
the result was the first directly-elected president since the dictatorship, Fernando Collor 
de Mello (1990-1992).  Amid this transition to democratic rule came some of the politics 
of the old populists. 
Collor de Mello ran a simple populist program and denounced traditional elites as 
well as public and private sector corruption; he defeated Lula in 1989.  However, despite 
his populist and anti-corruption rhetoric, the Collor de Mello government drowned in a 
corruption scandal, resulting in his impeachment, removal from office in 1992, and 
stripping of political rights.  Amid this shift towards democracy was the additional 
challenge of navigating a new and complex constitution (1988) concomitant with bouts of 
inflation (200% in 1985; 400% in 1987; ~3,000 in 1990), as demonstrated in Graph 35, 
below. 
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The electoral opposition that succeeded the military regimes was initially 
polarized between the liberal, free-market, and agro-mineral elite and a worker-peasant, 
rural-lower-middle class nationalist bloc (see Table Two, below).  The parties involved 
were those of militant labor that formed the CUT, and landless peasants that formed the 
MST.  The CUT and MST, along with many intellectuals and artists, joined the middle-
class to form the PT (Petras 2013, 471).  The decade following the dictatorship (through 
1994) was characterized by tension between lingering state capitalism and an emerging 
liberal, free-market bourgeoisie.  It was during this time that Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
(FHC), the former leftist, reinvented himself and became Brazil’s main free-market 
evangelist. 
 
                                                          
86 The Global Economy. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/.  Accessed 14 January 2018. 
Graph 35: Brazil Inflation (% Change in CPI) 
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Brazilian Political Parties mid-1980s 87 
Left/Center-Left Center/Center-Right Center-Right/Right 
PT (Workers’ Party): 
Formed 1980; industrial 
worker base; brought 
together trade unionists 
(CUT party), some leftists, 
and a handful of 
Trotskyists; first major 
authentic socialist party 
PMDB (Brazilian Democratic 
Movement Party): founded in 
opposition to dictatorship; 
internal split between 
moderates and leftists in mid-
1980s; some elements went to 
PSDB 
PFL (Liberal Front 
Party): Formed 1984; 
center-right; 
subsequently joined AD 
party (later withdrew), 
and supported PSDB 
candidate Cardoso 
PSDB (Party of Brazilian 
Social Democracy): 
Center-Left; strong among 
middle-class and non-
radical leftist intellectuals; 
Cardoso’s party 
PSD (Social Democratic 
Party): Formed in 1945 as 
part of the state political 
machine; split later to form 
ARENA 
ARENA (National 
Renewal Alliance): 
Formed by dictatorship 
in 1965 as pro-
government party; 
comprised of many 
from PSD 
 
Democratic Aperture, Cardoso, and the Real Plan: 
The transition from military dictatorship to an incipient democracy was not an 
overnight event, but resulted from increasing pressure on the military governments to 
accept that their rule could not legitimately endure much longer.  The military, partly by 
its own design, and partly through external forces, concluded that as an institution it 
needed to voluntarily leave politics before it was forced back into the barracks through a 
confluence of political and economic pressure. 
Taking a regional reflective approach, Scott Mainwaring (1995) centers on four 
issues relative to the achievements and failures of the then new democracies in Brazil and 
the Southern Cone: economic performance; effectiveness in addressing poverty and 
                                                          
87 For a description of Brazilian political parties at the time, see Petras (2013). 
Table Two: Brazilian Political Parties, mid-1980s 
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inequality; quality of democratic practice; and, popular support and legitimacy.  In the 
case of Brazil, Mainwaring argues the great achievement of democracy in the region is its 
survival (Mainwaring 1995, 131).  Nevertheless, despite the military regimes’ problems 
in Brazil, they were more successful than other countries in the Southern Cone that had 
similar experiences.  Although not discussed in Mainwaring’s study, the Brazilian 
military governments were more successful than those of neighboring Bolivia as the 
former oversaw rapid modernization and industrialization with more success than the 
latter. 
After the military dictatorship came to an end, president Jose Sarney’s (1985-
1990) Cruzado Plan (a heterodox economic stabilization plan implemented in 1986), held 
early promise; however, it led to economic imbalances in the country.  Sarney ignored 
these problems because he benefitted politically from the plan’s initial success.  Later he 
adjusted, but the delayed action took a heavy economic toll on Brazil (Mainwaring 1995, 
133). 
By this point the Brazilian economy was again on the rocks, and this reality 
discredited both political parties.  The discrediting of the traditional parties arguably led 
to the 1989 election of political outsider Collor de Mello.  Collor’s stated platform was to 
lead Brazil towards economic neoliberalism with some inbuilt societal protections; 
however, it is likely his model included a greater role of the state in the economy than 
orthodox neoliberals wanted (Mainwaring 1995, 135).  Despite Collor’s attempts 
resulting in some drops in inflation, Brazil’s macroeconomic performance remained poor.  
Moreover, during his tenure, Collor implemented a neoliberal agenda that did little to 
improve the condition of those who elected him into office. 
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As will be clarified in a separate section of this chapter, unlike Collor, Lula (a 
populist of the left) accepted challenges that resulted in a net benefit for the people 
responsible for his election.  In Lula’s case, the establishment of anti-poverty programs 
and redistributive social policies endeared him to many Brazilians.  However, a worrying 
concern with populism remains potential erosion of state institutions, and that inevitable 
transitions away from populist rule are messy and sometimes dangerous. 
Itamar Franco (then Vice-president) succeeded Collor after a corruption-related 
impeachment.88  Franco wavered between populist expansion and stabilization policies.  
It was during this period that Fernando Henrique Cardoso (then Finance Minister) 
introduced a new stabilization plan that controlled inflation and allowed the economy to 
expand.   
Cardoso as Finance Minister was charged with the thankless task of improving 
Brazil’s finances.  His Plano Real (named for the new currency) was an attempt to 
confront inflation amid the introduction of a new currency while simultaneously 
implementing mild austerity.  The plan was a success relative to controlling inflation and 
resulted in a vertiginous rise in Cardoso’s popularity.  Though, austerity created serious 
domestic problems including increasing inequality.  Cardoso became a major political 
contender in the 1994 election in the face of his historic leftist critique of the government.  
                                                          
88 Collor de Mello’s impeachment brought an end to the political crisis without the involvement of the 
military (Collor was tried and convicted by the Senate).  The investigation revealed the enormity of the 
corruption scandal, even by Brazilian standards, as media and congressional investigations discovered deals 
at the highest levels of government.  The scandal and subsequent resolution demonstrated Brazil had a free 
press, unlike in the past; moreover, in the opinion of many, it placed the Brazilian justice system above that 
of the U.S. 
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Despite his leftist tendencies, Cardoso, like many others during this period in Latin 
America, converted to neoliberalism.  It is important here to note that both Cardoso and 
Lula, as well as Lula’s handpicked successor Dilma Rousseff, politically developed under 
opposition to military rule.  The elites distrusted Cardoso because of his leftist past; 
however, preferred him to Lula.  Cardoso was reelected in 1998, constitutionally barred 
from seeking a third term, and left office peacefully in 2002 with very low approval rates. 
89 
 
 
Brazil experienced what was one of the most impressive socio-economic reversals 
in modern history, as it moved from a nationalist-industrialist economy to one of primary 
exports.  After the 1964 military coup, the balance changed in Brazil relative to national 
and foreign capital, with the latter accelerating after the electoral change in the mid-
1980s.  By the time Cardoso left office in 2002, inflation was largely under control (see 
Graph 36, above).  The election of neoliberal politicians such as Cardoso arguably 
                                                          
89 The Global Economy. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/.  Accessed 14 January 2018. 
Graph 36: Brazil Inflation (% Change in CPI) 
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affected the strategic sectors of the national economy as privatization accompanied some 
denationalization.  Cardoso’s economic liberalization policies were successful in 
controlling inflation, but denationalized Brazil’s industry and affected strategic sectors 
that were the engine for growth.  Moreover, Cardoso laid the groundwork for a massive 
inflow of foreign capital investment (see Graph 37, below). 
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After a decade or so of distance from the military to democratic transformation, 
Peter Kingstone (2000) explains how Brazil exceeded observers’ expectations through 
the incremental extension of reforms; however, challenges remain.  The most salient 
challenge is the formulation of a clear economic policy, particularly concerning currency 
(Kingstone 2000, 187).  For example, if the currency or economy becomes unstable, 
foreign capital may flee, likely causing substantial shock (i.e. inflation; balance of 
payments problems).  Shocks may compel the government to alter an already unclear 
policy.  Present-day Brazil may be experiencing this exact scenario as it returned to 
                                                          
90 The Global Economy. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/.  Accessed 14 January 2018. 
Graph 37: Brazil Foreign Direct Investment (% GDP) 
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commodity exports as its central economic driver.  The return to a commodity-based 
model happened because commodities were growing, and because the government lost its 
ability to run an industrial policy.  With most businesses becoming foreign owned, Brazil 
essentially lost control over its industrialization.  Nevertheless, unlike the mid-twentieth 
century, Brazilian exports are not limited to raw materials alone (see Graph 38, below). 
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There is clearly an export shift away from agriculture to manufacturing (see Graphs 39 
and 40, below). 
 
                                                          
91 MIT.  The Observatory of Economic Complexity.  http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/.  Accessed 27 May 
2018. 
 
Graph 38: Brazil Exports (Commodities and Products) 
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92 The Global Economy. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/.  Accessed 14 January 2018. 
 
93 The Global Economy. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/.  Accessed 14 January 2018. 
Graph 40: Brazil Manufacturing Value Added ($ Billions) 
Graph 39: Brazil GDP (Share of Agriculture) 
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Without continued diversification away from an export-centric model, and 
simultaneous pursuit of regional economic integration, Brazil may remain in the situation 
that has historically plagued its development.  Essentially, there has been a reciprocal 
relationship between democracy and economic integration for Brazil and other countries 
of the Southern Cone.  Integration for political reasons helped consolidate a new 
democratic regime in Brazil, and because of this logic, integration receives high-level 
political attention throughout the region.94 
The election of Cardoso was clearly a decisive break from the nationalist and 
statist policies of the previous sixty years, whose policies permitted the takeover of 
foreign capital in critical industrial sectors.  The subsequent election of Lula and Rousseff 
completed this “great leap backwards” by decisively turning to extractive capital as the 
driver of the economy (Petras 2013, 472).  Cardoso’s election resulted in a push towards 
denationalization and privatization of the economy, coupled with the ascendancy of 
extractive capital.  The present extractive economy centers on agriculture, mining, and 
energy.  The opening of these sectors arguably comes at the expense of productive forces 
in manufacturing, technology, and high-end services. 
Cardoso’s plan to reform Brazil was a major success in pushing back the state’s 
role in the economy.  The plan ended the state monopoly of oil, gas distribution, and 
communication while pushing forward with privatization.  However, Brazilian 
privatization was not as intense as that of other countries in Latin America: Petrobras was 
not privatized, but lost its monopoly.  Also under Cardoso, Brazil put in place a social 
                                                          
94 Mercosul (Mercosur, in Spanish), a regional trading and economic integration bloc, has made it difficult 
for countries in the region to implement military rule once more. 
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safety net.  Lula, although a critic of Cardoso, kept some of the latter’s economic reforms 
in place once elected.  Because Lula stated he would not alter the work of Cardoso, 
Brazilians felt they could safely elect the determined leftist (Reid 2014, 137).  However, 
many Brazilians disliked Cardoso’s policies, and it was Lula’s social policies which 
drove the electorate. 
 
The Lula Era and Beyond: 
Lula (2002-2010) entered the political stage as a person who overcame great 
obstacles to reach power; his struggle inspired Brazilians and the world alike.  Despite 
fears of leftist populism, Lula maintained some of the policies of the Cardoso 
administration, particularly those of economic stabilization to control inflation.  Lula was 
less aggressive concerning neoliberal policies than Cardoso, and more committed to 
redistributive income and social improvement. 
The 2002 electoral victory of Lula, contrary to what many expected or hoped, was 
to some extent the deepening and expansion of neoliberalism in Brazil.  According to 
Petras (2013), this was a “great reversal” as Brazil returned to being a primary 
commodity exporter: soy, cattle, and iron increased, while textiles, transport, and 
manufacturing decreased.  During this time, Brazil also became one of the leading 
extractive commodity exporters in the world, and the country’s dependency on these 
exports was aided by the massive entry of MNCs (Petras 2013, 470).  Brazil lost its 
ability to run an industrial policy and was compelled to rely on commodities. 
Lula’s journey began with the creation of the Worker’s Party (PT) in 1980, which 
argued for a new socialist party based on the working class, as well as one that broke 
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from elitist conciliation.  The PT formed itself from union leaders, as well as three other 
important groups.95  The PT became Latin America’s biggest, most authentic, and most 
successful left-wing party.  By the end of the 1990s it had over 200,000 active members 
(Reid 2014, 141).  This party also could claim to be the only one created from below as 
opposed to from within the state; its only challenger was the communist party, whose 
policies were dictated from abroad.  Once in power, President Lula called for several 
reforms across the political, economic, and societal spectrum: pensions, tax, labor, the 
political system, the financial system, and land. 
During Lula’s tenure, he began to drift towards state capitalism, and launched the 
Growth Acceleration Program, placing Dilma Rousseff in charge.  Two years later, there 
was a major oil discovery off the south-east coast, and Lula placed Rousseff in charge of 
this as well.  At the time, Rousseff chaired the Board of Petrobras, and drew up a new 
legal framework for the sub-salt layer giving Petrobras a monopoly over its exploitation 
while maintaining existing contracts.  By 2008, Brazil became a net foreign creditor with 
a solid credit rating, thus allowing for a deepening of capital markets in Brazil (Reid 
2014, 189).  During this period there were also heavy investments in Petrobras. 
President Lula continued with some of Cardoso’s privatizations and reconfigured 
Brazil’s policies towards the benefit of foreign and domestic capital, which was in the 
primary goods export sector.  Lula was unable to completely escape the neoliberal 
policies implemented under his predecessor.  Brazil’s export sector benefitted from the 
rise in commodity prices, akin to the experience of Bolivia and elsewhere.  Free-market 
                                                          
95 These groups comprised Catholics who favored Liberation Theology and the landless; the remnants of 
guerrilla movements of the 1960s and 1970s, to include Trotskyist elements; and, leftist intellectuals and 
students. 
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policies in Brazil allowed in lower-priced manufactured goods from Asia, particularly 
China.  Brazil’s dependence on a limited number of commodities resulted in a decline in 
productive forces (Petras 2013, 473).  Moreover, under the leadership of the PT, FDI 
continued apace into Brazil, but only because the country was performing very well, 
leading to increasing expectations (see Graph 41, below).  By many indicators, the Lula 
and Rousseff regimes were quite lucrative for foreign financial capital. 
 96 
 
As global demand decreased, the extractive-led model in Brazil and elsewhere 
stagnated and declined around 2012/2013.  The Cardoso, Lula, and Rousseff regimes 
pursued a conservative, elitist agenda buoyed by clientelist and paternalist politics that 
neutralized opposition for an extended period (Petras 2013, 477).  Essentially, economic 
orthodoxy and populist demagoguery are no substitute for structural changes in the 
economy.  In a classic example of continued rentism in Brazil, competition for mining 
                                                          
96 The Global Economy. http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/.  Accessed 14 January 2018. 
Graph 41: Brazil Foreign Direct Investment (% GDP) 
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contracts, land grants, and large infrastructure projects encourages elites to buy off the 
party in power to secure competitive advantage.  The worldwide commodity boom hid 
the vulnerability of Brazil’s extractive economy, which remains dependent upon primary 
exports to limited markets. 
Despite Petras’ “great leap backward,” he offers a weak conclusion and no serious 
prescription for the future (Petras 2013, 472).  Petras ends his work by lamenting the Lula 
and Rousseff dream failed to bring about structural changes.  He then shifts the argument 
towards the emotive by citing the plights of Brazil’s indigenous people, climate change, 
and how capitalism will destroy the Amazon.  His paper then critiques the lack of 
structural change under Lula and Rousseff, but fails to consider that these leaders were 
simply caught in the middle of internal and external forces, which are likely resistant to 
such change. 
Relative to external economic forces, Markus Kroger (2012) argues that Neo-
mercantilist capitalism (NMC) had an impact on Brazilian capitalism and industrial 
policy.97  Kroger argues statism, a return to the 1950-1970 period of government 
intervention, is again being embraced and relies on the same institutions created during 
the earlier era.  Because of external shocks, state-steering of the economy is now more 
legitimate than previous periods.  This new statism in the emerging markets largely 
adopts a neo-developmentalist agenda.98 
                                                          
97 Neo-mercantilist Capitalism (NMC) is defined as a strategy aimed to create export-focused, leading 
global-sector corporations via mergers orchestrated by key-politicians, capitalist, and state financial 
institutions (Kroger 2012, 888). 
 
98 Neo-developmentalism is used by neo-mercantilists as it integrates a national system of control and 
export-led accumulation of capital (Kroger 2012, 889). 
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Upon reelection in 2014, the fourth consecutive PT win, Rousseff was beset with 
domestic challenges, the most salient being a probe into a kickback scheme at Petrobras.  
Despite reelection, Rousseff’s mandate was weak; her narrow defeat (51.6 %) over her 
challenger, Aécio Neves of the PSDB (48.4 %) did not strengthen her hand.  The PSDB 
never accepted Rousseff’s win, and arguably began to sabotage the government, creating 
unrest that only added to the burgeoning economic crisis.  Up until her impeachment in 
2016, Dilma Rousseff maintained Lula’s approach and included regional integration, a 
central component of Chapter Four in this dissertation.  During Rousseff’s presidency, 
social unrest and a weakening economy worsened amid a major scandal involving 
Petrobras.  A weakened Petrobras had trickle-down effects across the country as the 
parastatal is estimated to affect roughly 20% of Brazil’s national economy through its 
subsidiaries, suppliers, and contractors (Mares and Trinkunas 2016, 78).  During 
Rousseff’s second term, a lack of confidence in markets, a recession, and credit 
downgrade resulted in stalled or reversed social programs, nourished the overall negative 
atmosphere that accompanied numerous corruption scandals, ultimately encouraging 
mass protests.  Essentially, Brazil’s commodity-fueled growth at a time of high demand 
led to unrealistic expectations for a sustainable and rising economy. 
The constraints at the end of Rousseff’s presidency (impeached and replaced by 
Michel Temer in 2016) pushed her administration toward a more liberal economic policy, 
as well as improving relations with major powers (Mares and Trinkunas 2016, 83).  
Historical experience suggests that Brazil will lean towards a centrist leader who will 
push ahead with Temer’s reforms.  However, this assessment risks miscalculation. 
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Brazil’s Natural Gas Relationship with Bolivia: A Synopsis 
To support its industrialization, Brazil needed to look to hydrocarbons, whereas 
previously Brazil mostly relied on firewood and charcoal for its energy needs.  As 
aforementioned, Petrobras was created in 1953 and granted a near-monopoly of 
exploration, production, refining, and the transportation of oil.  Global events brought 
about a policy shift in the 1970s and compelled Brazil to reduce its dependence on 
imported energy.  Such thinking was the foundation for the pipeline agreement between 
the NOCs of Brazil and Bolivia in 1992 (GASBOL pipeline). 
The pipeline plan was to transport Bolivian natural gas to the Brazilian southeast.  
Between Bolivia and Brazil, GASBOL initially provided a 16 million m3/day (cubic 
meters per day) capacity, and subsequently increased this to 30 million m3/day (Prates 
2006, 10).  With the construction of GASBOL, Bolivia became the largest external 
natural gas provider to Brazil. 
Presently, natural gas accounts for roughly 11% of primary energy consumption 
in Brazil, and its domestic production is insufficient to meet demand (BP Statistical 
Review 2017).  Despite much of Brazil’s energy deriving from hydroelectric power, 
during droughts this solution becomes a costlier alternative than other available forms of 
energy such as hydrocarbons.99  Because of strategic planning and investment in 
exploration, Brazil’s gas reserves increased 25% between 2009-2014.  Along with 
Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela, Brazil is one of the only countries to witness growth in 
gas reserves during this period.  This situation is unlike Argentina and Bolivia, which 
                                                          
99 As renewable energy forms become cheaper these types of calculations will remain fluid. 
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suffer from a lack of research and exploration investments; Bolivia experienced a halving 
of reserves during the same period (Gomes 2014, 14). 
The discovery of pre-salt deposits off the southern coast of Brazil has increased 
proven reserves; market experts anticipate the amount of reserves will increase as 
exploration continues.  Regardless of additional discoveries, Brazil, as the largest 
regional economy, will remain a key player in any Latin American energy integration 
scenario.  However, the devil is in the details as questions remain regarding cooperation 
prospects in the region. 
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IV.  CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Introduction 
This dissertation defines and compares two concepts: resource nationalism and 
energy integration.  The study then tests to determine if there is a relationship between 
the concepts.  Key to this dissertation is understanding and explaining why populists or 
economic nationalists pursue market integration.  Resource nationalism (Independent 
Variable) is the notion that control over a nation’s economy should be in the hands of 
nationals, that nationals should have preference over foreigners in reaping the benefits of 
business and economic opportunities in the country, and nationalist resentment of foreign 
investment.  Energy integration (Dependent Variable) is reflected in exports of natural 
gas from Bolivia to Brazil, whereby an increase of natural gas imports into Brazil is the 
central indicator (Gonzalez et al 2008). 
Chapters Two and Three identified the political leaders who are considered 
resource nationalists in Bolivia and Brazil.  Macroeconomic data presented thus far 
demonstrates there is not a clear delineation when resource nationalists cum populists did 
what was expected relative to ISI, open markets, and energy trade relationships.  
Resource nationalists in each country during the periods under study have always been 
under both internal and external pressure to do what was needed and required, which was 
not always what was desired or initially promised. 
Nowhere were these inherently difficult decisions more salient than when 
concerning the hydrocarbons sector in both countries, whether in an import or export 
capacity.  The natural gas pipeline relationship between Bolivia and Brazil is key in 
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answering two questions.100  First, what is the relationship between resource nationalists 
and open markets in the hydrocarbons sector, particularly natural gas?  Second, what is 
the relationship between populists, who are typically resource nationalists, and their 
decision to choose policies of energy integration?  To compare concepts, macroeconomic 
and natural gas data (indicators for integration) are compared against the previously 
defined periods of resource nationalism in both Bolivia and Brazil. 
 
Data, Sources, and General Statement: 
This chapter offers a better understanding of the benefits of Bolivian natural gas 
integration with Brazil as the relationship between resource nationalism and market 
integration is better understood.  Data descriptions may be found in Chapter One.  
Interviews and discussions with key informants took place between September and 
November 2017. 
This chapter is broken into several sections.  Earlier in the dissertation, energy 
conversions and a timeline provide fundamental understanding and context.  Such context 
additionally explains why natural gas is increasingly important to consider in the global 
energy portfolio.  Second is a discussion of national oil companies (NOCs), to include 
historical presence and influence in both Bolivia and Brazil.  Next, separate sections on 
                                                          
100 GASBOL is a 3150km (~1957 mi) pipeline, which includes a 557 km (~346 mi) portion from Santa 
Cruz de la Sierra in Bolivia to the Bolivian border near Corumbá, Brazil.  On the Brazilian side, the 
pipeline continues to São Paulo, then on to Porto Alegre.  GASBOL is the single largest private sector 
investment in Latin America, when at the time of GASBOL’s envisioning, there was a growing 
understanding that private participation in the energy sector could reap economic benefits as well as lessen 
government risk. 
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natural gas and energy use in Bolivia and Brazil provide additional scaffolding for the 
subsequent section on their integration.  Last, this chapter presents a summary of major 
findings. 
Energy is and will remain vital to all modern economies.  The dual revolutions of 
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing have fundamentally changed the worldwide 
hydrocarbon landscape.  The clearly demonstrated U.S. ability to extract hydrocarbons 
from under the Earth’s surface has resulted in other countries’ desires to take a similar 
approach.  This dual revolution will soon alter the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
the most important nations in the world.  Particularly concerning pipelines and the oft-
uncomfortable geopolitical marriages between energy rich and energy poor countries, 
many countries and economies in the world were hitherto held hostage to their energy 
demand.  Resource rich countries have historically been more fortunate than the resource 
poor.  That there are now additional options, countries without hydrocarbon resources are 
presently at least able to consider a variety of suppliers to include political allies. 
Unlike oil, there is no unified world market for natural gas, but a segmented one 
whereby prices are established taking several factors into consideration, particularly local 
and regional markets (Garron et al 2007, 4; Medinacelli 2018).  The Southern Cone, 
comprised of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay represents the 
largest market for natural gas in South America and reflects interconnections as well as 
transactions between countries.  The sheer volume of gas transactions between Bolivia 
and Brazil represents an important percentage of this market (Garron et al 2007, 7).  The 
weightiness of this market drives the focus of this case study. 
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Why Natural Gas is Important 
Natural gas, like other forms of anthropogenic energy, is one of many 
arrangements whereby humans use the Earth’s resources to improve their chance of 
survival and enhance their quality of life.101  Throughout history, energy prime movers 
evolved from human and animal labor, to the pre-industrial use of biomass fuels.  Beyond 
biomass, humans adopted new energy forms during the last two centuries, which have 
predominantly been hydrocarbons.  Nearly five millennia of preindustrial history were 
mostly dominated by the inefficient burning of biomass fuels as a source of heat for 
households, metallurgy, and artisanal manufacturing.  A major transition took place only 
in the last few centuries, demonstrated by the move from biomass to fossil fuel.  This 
transition began in small scales, and the earliest innovators maintained their advantage 
for a time (Smil 2010, 25). 
Natural gas was known to antiquity.  In the modern era, and in the absence of 
long-distance pipelines, gas was used for local lighting, but was mostly flared (wasted) 
when drilling for oil.  Large-diameter and high-pressure pipelines carried gas over long 
distances.  After the Second World War, metallurgical advances allowed for a pipeline 
construction boom where gas became an important global industry (Smil 2010, 37). 
Today natural gas is more efficiently captured, although much continues to be 
wasted.  According to interview subject 25800-201, natural gas continues to be grossly 
wasted where the substance is often flared for a week at a time despite its economic use 
as a fuel.  Often, field operators are inefficient, wasteful, and reactive to events rather 
than considering economic efficiency.  Despite sunk costs, many field operators will shut 
                                                          
101 Anthropogenic: caused or produced by humans. 
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down drilling operations based on a $1 to $2 dip in the price of oil, only to restart drilling 
a week later when there is a rebound.  Shutting down a drill requires about four days (24 
hours/day operation) and costs hundreds of thousands of dollars.  “Nobody wastes money 
like the petrochemical industry.  You think government is wasteful until you see the 
amount of money wasted first hand in the petrochemical sector.”102 
Natural gas moved from less than ten percent to over a quarter of the world’s 
energy usage in the last seventy years.  This is an impressive amount if juxtaposed 
against total world energy use.  The clean combustion of natural gas makes it an 
attractive choice when compared to coal and oil.  However, despite the cleaner nature of 
natural gas and the desirable and eventually inevitable transition towards a non-fossil fuel 
future, it is exceedingly difficult to restructure our modern and high-energy civilization 
based on non-fossil fuels (i.e. renewables). 
A central paradox for natural gas is its great value for human use alongside its low 
economic value per unit, especially when compared to oil (Smil 2015, 11, 68).  
According to interview subject 25800-201, whereas oil is used across the spectrum from 
energy to manufacturing and goods (i.e. lubricants; plastics; paints), natural gas is good 
for energy use and production alone.  Natural gas is cleaner, and it will be possible to run 
drilling operations with natural gas once systems become more efficient.  However, oil 
will not simply give up its economic space to natural gas with the justification of being a 
cleaner fuel source.103  Additionally, there has never been a worldwide transportation 
network for natural gas in its gaseous state, as compared to that of oil, which is fungible 
                                                          
102 Interview which took place between SEP and NOV 2017. 
 
103 Interview which took place between SEP and NOV 2017. 
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across geographies.  Gas is uneconomical to transport except via pipeline, which results 
in a highly-localized market and widely varying price.  Advances in energy trading may 
change this dynamic as the world is undergoing a major shift from oil to natural gas 
resulting from the shale revolution and LNG, possibly making natural gas a worldwide 
market. 
Hydrocarbons presently comprise roughly 80% of world energy demand.  Despite 
implementation of projected climate change agreements, this percentage will potentially 
decrease to 75% amid a world energy usage increase of 35% based on 2040 projections 
(IEA 2017).  According to interview data from subject 25800-201, populist governments, 
like all governments, need to sell oil and natural gas regardless of their political ideology 
if they are to maintain a positive balance of payments, as well as to generate income to 
develop or improve the country; though, elites remain the big winners.  Commodities are 
useless if they remain in the ground, and in many countries in Latin America, natural 
resources are pretty much all they have.  Concerning natural gas, the potential to 
capitalize on the LNG market is possible if liquefication plants are developed in time to 
meet market need.  “LNG is a major issue and a potential game-changer at a global level, 
if it takes off.”  Specific to Bolivia, unless it develops its own markets away from being a 
simple supplier of commodities in the larger world market, it will not be able to develop 
as fully or as well as other countries in the region like Argentina, Brazil, or Chile.  In the 
case of Bolivian markets in general, this may also possibly include lithium as a 
commodity.104 
                                                          
104 Interview which took place between SEP and NOV 2017. 
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Additionally, interview subjects 25800-201, 25800-203, 25800-204, 25800-205, 
25800-206, 25800-207, and 25800-209 maintain the region is mostly a consumer of 
finished products, and provider of commodities and services.  Of course, larger or more 
advanced economies are better able to develop markets than poorer ones.  Brazil is one 
economy large enough to have consumers of finished products both domestically and 
internationally, whereas Bolivia is mostly a producer of natural resources such as 
agriculture and natural gas.105  Interview subject 25800-209 adds that in addition to much 
economic activity in South America providing agriculture and commodities for export, 
there is still great economic differentiation in the region whereby countries such as 
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile look outside of the region for markets and investment while 
“…fragile democracies in the region suffer from weak institutions, poor governance, and 
transnational criminal threats that undermine political stability, which in turn frightens 
away needed FDI.”106 
Returning to a global perspective, in addition to a potential wider array of energy 
import options, there is now the increased opportunity to choose to not exploit the 
resources of one’s own country, but instead buy from exporters that may provide 
necessary resources at a lower price.  Separately, reduced costs may bring once-lost 
manufacturing jobs back to countries where opportunities were cost prohibitive only a 
few years ago (Dumaine 2015).  The ramifications for such a sea change in economic 
arbitrage are not yet wholly understood or appreciated.  Cheaper energy via a wholesale 
reduction in costs across the manufacturing supply chain clearly exist (Arezki 2016). 
                                                          
105 Interview which took place between SEP and NOV 2017. 
 
106 Interview which took place between SEP and NOV 2017. 
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Beyond the importance of natural gas as a fuel, no serious discussion of this 
resource may take place without at least a brief mention of contracts between producing 
and consuming nations, or the involvement of IOCs and NOCs in their facilitation.  The 
two central actors in the development of any resource are the country which holds the 
resource and the extracting IOC or NOC.  The central difference between gas and oil 
projects is the long-term nature of the former, as gas projects must be seen in their totality 
(i.e. planning, market development, financing, production, delivery, distribution, and 
consumption).  The fungible nature of oil transactions does not require the same 
considerations as does natural gas.  Historical distrust between governments and IOCs 
further complicates natural gas relationships.  According to interview subjects 25800-
201, 25800-203, 25800-207, and 25800-209, trade, particularly that of energy, can 
benefit all; however, in South America, historical grievances often inhibit sensible 
economic agreements.107  Despite challenges, the development of legal, contractual, and 
fiscal frameworks is a step towards resolving such distrust in South America.  According 
to interview subject 25800-209, trade frameworks in Latin America are also challenged.  
Unlike the European Union (E.U.), Latin America differs first because of it being less 
industrialized, but also that the E.U. was better able to efficiently craft or develop 
guidelines and regulations because of a deeper and shared history.  These regulations 
facilitated integration in the E.U., while in Latin America, regional diversity impedes 
integration despite natural gas being its best option, at least in the Southern Cone.108 
                                                          
107 Interview which took place between SEP and NOV 2017. 
 
108 Interview which took place between SEP and NOV 2017. 
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Take-or-Pay contracts help safeguard the interests of both upstream and 
downstream parties in the natural gas industry.109  The Bolivia-Brazil case demonstrates 
how positions change during the three phases of the ToP lifecycle.  Contract enforcement 
requires central mechanisms such as stakeholder self-enforcement, and recourse to a third 
party which guarantees dispute settlements.  The ToP contract allows for the maintenance 
of good relations between the parties, and its ability to adapt to change.  ToP is a risk-
sharing agreement and insurance mechanism for upstream production and downstream 
consumption (Glachant and Hallack 2009, 651). 
Despite contractual agreements, the associated factors of regulation and legal 
complexities in negotiating cooperative agreements stand to confound the lofty aim of 
integration.  In the case of Bolivia, concern exists in the wake of the 2005 Hydrocarbon 
Law, whereby the increased cost of IOC operation and investment in the natural gas 
sector may inhibit IOC investment in exploration and development of natural gas 
deposits.  As the Bolivian government is becoming increasingly aware of the looming 
need for such investment, nowhere are clear contracts and arrangements more important. 
 
Background on NOCs, Petroleum, and their Relationships in Brazil and Bolivia 
The petroleum industry dominates the economies of many developing countries 
and has consequences for democratization, development, institutional performance, and 
the world economy at large.  The bulk of Bolivia’s revenue derives from natural gas sales 
                                                          
109 Take or Pay (ToP) is defined as a firm commitment to purchase a minimum quantity of gas downstream.  
Ship-or-Pay (SoP) is a firm commitment to provide a minimum quantity downstream.  For a detailed 
description of ToP contracts in the Bolivia-Brazil case, see Medinacelli (2017). 
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to Brazil, and we must understand how Brazil came to be such an important customer and 
the weight its parastatal, Petrobras, brings to the relationship. 
In the region, relationships among countries are often tenuous, and integration is 
challenging, particularly in the energy sector.  According to interview subjects 25800-
201, 25800-203, 25800-204, 25800-205, 25800-206, and 25800-207, relationships 
between and among countries in South America are frequently uncomfortable.  Such 
discomfort undermines economic and energy integration.  Often, countries in the region 
take foreign development and technical knowledge, then nationalize the already-
developed sector to their benefit.  This further weakens trust between governments, 
respective NOCs, and related IOCs.110 
Specific to Brazil’s NOC, the history of Petrobras divides into three main periods: 
early (1954-1973); middle (1974-1994); and 1995-present.111  Important is the post-1995 
period through the present, which was a period of deregulation in Brazil.  In 1995, the 
monopoly Petrobras enjoyed was removed under president Cardoso, who aimed to 
improve the economic ills then plaguing Brazil with the implementation of liberal market 
reforms.  The privatization of Petrobras (not complete, but it lost domestic monopoly 
power), along with the liberalization of the oil market, were part of a larger package 
intended to improve economic efficiency and associated performance (Victor et al 2012, 
538).  Brazil was late in ending the Petrobras monopoly, and what is presently happening 
                                                          
110 Interviews which took place between SEP and NOV 2017. 
 
111  The early period was when Petrobras used its state monopoly to organize its downstream.  The middle 
period was one of “learning by doing” as Petrobras developed offshore deposits, first mastering the 
shallows, then increasingly moving to deeper waters.  During these two periods, Petrobras used its position 
to lower risks amid attempting to insulate itself from hyperinflation and economic instability (Victor et al 
2011, 516). 
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is of interest to the parastatal.  Historically, Petrobras bought imported gas and 
occasionally lost money because it assumed all the risk.  Now, Petrobras does not want to 
assume these same risks.  As there are other actors in the market, the ability of Petrobras 
to absorb such risk is unsustainable (Almeida May 2017). 
With the support of Brazil’s National Bank for Economic and Social 
Development (BNDES), Brazilian companies are likely to play a major role in 
positioning Brazil as a partner in development.  However, despite the stated desire of 
countries in Latin America to promote energy integration, there is no agreed-upon 
approach to achieving this goal.  Brazil is often trapped in costly or pointless efforts 
which undermine integration.  One example of such an effort was the failed 2005 Brazil-
Argentina pipeline through the Amazon.  In this instance, Petrobras was reluctant, but 
Lula invested in this project to promote positive political relations.  A similar mentality 
forced Petrobras to involve Venezuela’s PDVSA to construct a refinery in Pernambuco.  
Venezuela was ultimately unable to collaborate, and Petrobras constructed the project 
alone (Mares and Trinkunas 2016, 118). 
Another example of how integration enthusiasm is undermined was palpable in 
2006 between Bolivia and Brazil, as the former nationalized its upstream gas sector.  That 
this nationalization took place and simultaneously detracted from regional integration 
clearly speaks to the heart of this dissertation as natural gas is indicative of integration 
between Bolivia and Brazil.  The natural gas industry in Brazil is a relatively new market, 
having been increasingly developed since the late-1990s, when the country’s oil activity 
was opened to private initiatives.  Natural gas consumption in Brazil has also seen steady 
growth since the operation of the Bolivia-Brazil pipeline. 
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Unsuccessful integration efforts are not limited to Brazil, however.  According to 
interview subject 25800-202, in the late-1990s, Bolivia created an LNG consortium 
(Pacific LNG), which aimed to move LNG to the U.S. state of California.  There was 
major investment in this project, and the Bolivian government chose to construct a 
pipeline through Chile for economic reasons.  Bolivian historical animosity towards Chile 
was intense, and the resulting protests against transporting Bolivian LNG through Chile 
deterred the government from pursuing this option.  An alternative through Peru was 
floated, but the additional cost made the project unviable.  This was an interesting 
development as polling data suggested 80% of Bolivians agreed the Chilean deal and its 
associated economic benefits would aid Bolivia.112 
Bolivian resistance to natural gas sales to Chile touches on the long history of 
government intervention in markets.  According to interview subject 25800-206, it is 
foolish for Bolivia to not sell natural gas to Chile, but nationalist sentiment in Bolivia is 
strong and the context for this perspective is understood.  Despite nationalist emotion, the 
natural gas market between Bolivia and Chile already exists, just not officially or legally.  
Argentina takes advantage of the situation by purchasing Bolivian gas (from Tarija, 
Bolivia), and then directly selling the gas to Chile for a marked-up price.  “They just 
wave the trucks of gas through Argentina and on into Chile.  It is an open secret in the 
region.”113  The natural gas market transcends government policy, but the political 
decision to not sell natural gas to Chile also denies Bolivia an additional source of 
revenue. 
                                                          
112 Interview which took place between SEP and NOV 2017. 
 
113 Interview which took place between SEP and NOV 2017. 
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According to interview subject 25800-208, government should play less of a role 
in the gas sector as energy nationalism is the greatest barrier to integration between 
Bolivia and Brazil.  Geopolitical realities, not markets, drive energy integration and 
energy projects almost always have a geopolitical rationale.  Political agreements need to 
exist on integration before integration negotiations can begin, and despite political 
differences between countries, one can always find potential for bilateral agreements, but 
not integration per se.  Integration agreements exist across the region, but not in 
energy.114  Essentially, market-based energy agreements are preferable as they will 
function independently of political arrangements.  Concerning the Bolivia-Brazil natural 
gas relationship, it is important to look beyond sympathetic political policies.  The 
greatest cost to integrate the Bolivia and Brazil markets took place twenty years ago, and 
without political involvement would not have been a viable project because the risk was 
great and required the two countries cooperate politically (Fagundes de Almeira May/Jun. 
2017).  With market-driven agreements, government policies may change, which is 
normal in a democracy; however, markets endure. 
According to interview subject 25800-204, countries benefit from energy trade, 
whether in raw materials or electricity.  The benefits to each partner depend on market 
moves, which are often outside of the control of political leaders, and subject to domestic 
politics. 
“It is better to have cheaper and more accessible energy than more expensive and 
less accessible, but costly electricity and resources bring up issues of rent-seeking, 
while cheaper electricity allows poorer elements of society to participate in the 
economy which ultimately aids GDP.  The flip side of this is in Brazil where the 
poor in the favelas steal or pirate electricity, while middle-classes that are 
                                                          
114 Interview which took place between SEP and NOV 2017. 
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adjacent to the poor areas continue to pay for the service.  In the favelas, the 
criminal element controls much of the activity, to include providing electricity, 
and there is a need to bring these criminal elements, who are local power brokers, 
into the system, but this will require very skilled political action…There is the 
need to formalize these power brokers into the Brazilian system somehow.”115 
 
Returning to macroeconomic relationships, many decision-makers do not 
understand that prices in monopolies are established through a process in which an 
authority calculates price based on a cost structure inclusive of pre-established rents.  
This balance is upset when the boom in a commodity cycle becomes a bust.  According 
to interview subject 25800-203, the commodity boom/bust cycle in South America 
resulted in historical regional volatility, and argues that populism and associated 
movements are a result of this same cycle as more integration into the larger, global 
economy results in additional volatility and upheaval.  Within the extractivist model in 
South America, Bolivia suffers the most and is the worst example of regional extractivist 
abuse.  Brazil is more economically advanced, and has a better ability to develop internal 
markets.  In the case of commodities, Brazil weaned its country from oil dependence 
using price, and is now an exporter of oil.116 
Specifically concerning Bolivia and Brazil, these countries are expected to 
negotiate new contracts by 2019, and a central question is if Henry Hub, benchmark price 
for natural gas in North America, will be the reference used in Brazil and Bolivia.  
However, because of hydroelectric power generation in Brazil, natural gas plays a small 
role in its energy matrix at under 12% of the domestic energy supply, and just over seven 
                                                          
115 Interview which took place between SEP and NOV 2017. 
 
116 Interview which took place between SEP and NOV 2017. 
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percent of final energy consumption.  Nevertheless, natural gas consumption has steadily 
grown since the 1999 creation of the Bolivia-Brazil pipeline.  The compound average 
growth rate was 10.8% from 2000-2013, but with the bulk of demand deriving from 
Brazil’s industrial sector.  Despite limited public demand for gas, however, the pipeline 
was a definite game-changer for both countries (Gomes 2014, 42).  Complicating this 
relationship was the 2006 nationalization of Bolivia’s parastatal, Yacimientos Petroliferos 
Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) under Bolivian President Evo Morales, which converted it 
into the sole export aggregator of natural gas in Bolivia, ultimately denying Brazilian gas 
buyers the ability to engage in contracts directly with private producers (Gomes 2014, 
35). 
With the increase in natural gas coming into Brazil from Bolivia since the 
creation of the pipeline, it will be later demonstrated that 2006 was an important year in 
the Bolivia-Brazil relationship.  This importance derives from the nationalizations taking 
place under Bolivian President Evo Morales, a staunch resource nationalist.  The effects 
of nationalization are also reflected in the price of Bolivian natural gas imports into 
Brazil.  Despite the 2006 nationalizations, there remains a solid case for why Brazil and 
Bolivia are in an excellent position to maintain their natural gas relationship. 
At the retail level, the electricity sector appears to be the most promising for the 
expansion of cross-border economic ties.  Because Brazil dwarfs its neighbors in the size 
of its power sector, any integrated network would largely be driven by the dynamics of 
the Brazilian system.  In this context, natural gas in the Southern Cone is the best 
opportunity for regional market integration.  Although this dissertation focuses on 
macroeconomic relations between Bolivia and Brazil, the separate theme concerning the 
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export of electricity as a finished product is something that cannot be ignored, and is 
briefly touched upon later in this chapter. 
It is important to keep this dissertation in its proper global context regarding 
levels of natural gas production, consumption, and proven natural gas reserves.  In the 
case of natural gas production (which excludes flared or recycled gas), Bolivia produced 
19.7 Bcm to Brazil’s 23.5 Bcm in 2016.117  Regarding trade, natural gas movement from 
Bolivia to Brazil by pipeline was 10.4 Bcm in 2017.  Consumption is another matter and 
varies across the region, per each country’s individual energy matrix (see Graph 42, 
below). 
   
(Condor 2014, 25) 
 
 
                                                          
117 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017. 
Graph 42: Natural Gas Consumption in Latin America (Bcm) 1965-2013 
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Concerning natural gas endowments, Bolivia and Brazil each comprise 0.2% of 
the world’s proven reserves.  Regionally, this number pales in comparison to Venezuela, 
which holds 3.1% of the world’s proven natural gas reserves.  The remainder of proven 
natural gas reserves break down as follows: Middle-east (42.5%), Europe and Eurasia 
(30.4%), Asia Pacific (9.4%), Africa (7.6%), North America (6%), and all Central and 
South America (4.1%).  These numbers exclude crude oil, and do not preclude additional 
discoveries.118 
 
Bolivia 
Bolivia has favorable natural gas prospects, and its strategic location in South 
America as an exporter amid numerous importers bodes well for its future performance 
as a natural gas producer.  However, a potential shift in focus from exports to domestic 
natural gas consumption, which is necessary (and legally mandated) to satisfy local and 
industrial needs first, could tighten supply in the years ahead.  Last, as the worldwide 
shale revolution progresses, Bolivia may find additional hydrocarbon resources in its 
Chaco Basin (Reuters Nov. 2016). 
                                                          
118 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017. 
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Referencing Graph 43 (above), Bolivia currently produces most of its electricity 
from natural gas, which is inversely correlated to its use of hydro power.  The use of coal 
and oil is absent, and that of solar or wind never passed two percent (excluded from 
graph).  Natural gas became increasingly important after the early 1970s, and replaced 
both coal and oil as the hydrocarbon of choice for electricity production in the early 
1990s. 
Natural gas trade discussions in South America date to the 1950s/60s, and 
integration attempts began in 1970s with the Bolivia-Argentina pipeline (Yabog).  
Argentina’s discovery of gas subsequently expanded its market to Chile (1996-2001), 
with aspirations to enter the Brazilian market and compete with Bolivian gas, which it did 
in 2000 (Honore 2016, 6).  According to interview subject 25800-202, the natural gas 
agreement between Bolivia and Argentina was an IOC concept of integration, not 
                                                          
119 The World Bank. 
Graph 43: Bolivia Percentage Electricity from Source 
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developed indigenously.  Nevertheless, because of its success, Bolivia and Brazil later 
looked toward their own energy integration with the initial agreement focusing more on 
state needs than those of any IOC.120 
Additionally, interview subject 25800-202, explains the history of natural gas in 
Bolivia dates to the 1960s, when exploration in Santa Cruz resulted in substantial 
discoveries.  Because the demand in Bolivia was weak, the decision to export gas to 
Argentina was made via U.S. firm Gulf Oil Company despite many Bolivians describing 
the arrangement as unfair.  Presently, although Bolivia desires hydropower, such a 
project requires freshwater, a scarce resource in the country.121  Electricity produced from 
nuclear, biofuel, and waste are either absent or nominally used in Bolivia. 
Of note regarding the development of natural gas as a potential Bolivian export, 
according to interview subject 25800-208, the development of the natural gas market in 
Bolivia was strongly influenced by the U.S as at that time Bolivia had two strong 
markets: coca (the base of cocaine production) and natural gas.  U.S. influence in the 
development of the Bolivian gas market was driven by the U.S. desire to curtail cocaine 
production in Bolivia, and possibly the subsequent result of Bolivia becoming a failed or 
narco-state.122 
Graphs 44 and 45 (below) demonstrate the impact of Bolivian natural gas exports 
to Brazil.  First, there is a deficit in Bolivia’s commercial balance (exports minus 
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122 Interview which took place between SEP and NOV 2017. 
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imports) with Brazil during the 1990s.  Owing to an increase in exports of natural gas to 
Brazil after 1999, as well as an increased price for the commodity, the economic situation 
clearly improved for Bolivia. 
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124 MIT. Atlas. http://atlas.media.mit.edu.  Accessed 1 September 2017. 
Graph 44: Bolivia Trade with Brazil ($ Million) 
Graph 45: Percent of Bolivia’s Natural Gas to Customers 
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The change in Bolivia’s GDP from 1991-2015 is largely based on its exports of 
natural gas to Brazil (see Graph 46, above).  Exports of natural gas to Brazil came at a 
time when the price of natural gas, often linked to the price of oil, increased.  However, 
there is a downside to such windfalls as Bolivia’s natural gas revenues are highly volatile, 
historically ranging from $600M - $2,700M, and there is a need to make natural gas rents 
more transparent, as well as to change the way these rents are spent.  Royalties are vital 
for Bolivia and fluctuate based on elasticity of demand (Dussan 2004, 64).  Moreover, 
such rents are a finite resource and there needs to be priority in spending, fiscal discipline 
in the country, investment in YPFB, and sustainable investment in the productive sectors 
of the economy.  For example, natural gas royalties have been used to develop 
                                                          
 
125 MIT. Atlas. http://atlas.media.mit.edu.  Accessed 1 September 2017. 
Graph 46: Bolivia GDP (Million $) 
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departments within Bolivia, including improvements in electrification and roads; 
however, health spending is low, and there remains the additional need to reduce poverty 
(Medinacelli 2007, 4).  It is only logical to appreciate the looming instability facing 
Bolivia once associated hydrocarbon revenues cease to contribute as much as during 
commodity booms.  According to interview subject 25800-202, the 2005 Direct Tax on 
Hydrocarbons (IDH) law in Bolivia is the main source of fiscal revenue for the country 
and the associated harvesting of these rents has already taken place.126  
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Graph 47 (above) demonstrates the trend of Bolivia as a natural gas and crude oil 
exporter to Brazil, with the former commodity larger in both percentage and real terms.  
Again, there is an important shift in revenues after 2005.  According to interview subject 
                                                          
126 Interview which took place between SEP and NOV 2017. 
 
127 Atlas MIT Database.  http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/.  Accessed 26 August 2017. 
 
Graph 47: Bolivia Natural Gas and Crude Exports to Brazil 
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25800-202, for Bolivia to maintain its natural gas revenues, the system must be 
restructured to encourage IOC exploration, and Bolivia must open its economy if it is to 
further develop its resources.  Moreover, at the domestic level, Bolivia’s IDH is too high 
as well as not progressive in nature, and the associated spending of natural gas revenues 
provided a great boom for the economy; however, this is because the markets and 
reserves were already there.128 
Graph 48 (below) represents the yearly mean average in $/MMBtu natural gas, 
based on the Henry Hub (HH) benchmark for North America.  The HH benchmark is a 
guideline for determining prices in South America; however, the exact price at which 
Bolivia sells natural gas to Brazil is not entirely clear.  Ieda Gomes demonstrates the 
price Brazil pays for Bolivia’s natural gas is almost double that of HH (Gomes 2014; 
Honore 2016).  This very important point holds substantial consequences for determining 
the true value of Bolivia’s natural gas revenues and overall GDP.  Additionally, findings 
for the price of wellhead exports to Brazil and Argentina was ~$10/MMBtu, while the 
price for internal consumption was ~$1MMBtu (ABS Consulting Group 2013, 73, 91).  
At many times less than its export price, it is in Bolivia’s economic interest to sell abroad, 
especially if their internal market is unable to consume all gas produced. 
                                                          
128 Interview which took place between SEP and NOV 2017. 
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Bolivia earns considerably more exporting natural gas, which makes it difficult to 
economically justify use in domestic consumption (see Graph 49, below).  The HH 
benchmark for natural gas decreased after 2009; however, both Argentina and Brazil pay 
prices for Bolivian natural gas which resemble what is paid for the commodity in Asia 
(Gomes 2014; IEA 2016; YPFB 2014; YPFB 2016).  Price data for Bolivian internal 
consumption is spotty.  Taking the conservative estimate that Bolivia’s natural gas price 
remains constant for the above period, it remains clear there is greater economic incentive 
to export than to sell domestically.  Additionally, Bolivian gas is costly compared to that 
of the Brazilian variety because of high transport costs which make the former 40% more 
costly than the latter (Fagundez de Almeira 2004, 82).  Considering transportation costs 
combined with the disparity in price of the increased cost of exploration and development 
                                                          
129 Energy Information Administration; https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdA.htm; Accessed 20 
January 2018. 
Graph 48: Yearly Mean Average ($MMBtu) for 
Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Prices 
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after the Bolivian 2005 Hydrocarbon Law, IOCs clearly see investment in Bolivia as 
unattractive.  Ultimately, the issue of price is muddled and difficult to resolve, which 
demonstrates the inherent complexity of viewing natural gas integration in simple 
macroeconomic terms. 
 
(Glachant 2009; Prates 2006; Honore 2016; Gomes 2014; IEA 2016; YPFB 2014; YPFB 
2016) 
 
 
According to the below data (overlaid on Graph 50, below), there was a sharp 
increase in natural gas spot price ($/MMBtu) from 2003 through 2009, particularly 
during 2005.  This increase, coupled with the increase in royalties, allowed Bolivia to 
experience an increase in natural gas revenues. 
Graph 49: Natural Gas Prices for Bolivia, Brazil, and Henry Hub Benchmark 
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(Glachant 2009; Prates 2006; Honore 2016; Gomes 2014; IEA 2016; YPFB 2014; YPFB 
2016) 
 
However, when we look more closely at natural gas exports and associated 
revenues, the story becomes increasingly interesting.  Bolivia’s proved reserves, 
production, and price of natural gas show tremendous change after 1999 (see Graph 51, 
below).  There are also subsequent shifts in production and price prior to the 2006 
nationalization of Bolivia’s hydrocarbon sector.  According to interview subject 25800-
202, the natural gas agreement between Bolivia and Brazil was 25 years in the making, 
and transcended governments and politics.  The intensity of the project increased in the 
1990s, as the goal of five Bolivian presidents’ pursuit of natural gas integration with 
Brazil was ultimately realized (Banzer, Siles Zuazo, Paz Estenssoro, Paz Zamora, 
Sanchez de Lozada, and Banzer again).130 
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Graph 50: Natural Gas Spot Price, Total Bolivia Revenues, 
and Bolivia Percentage Exports 
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Below, with the production of natural gas extrapolated for context relative to its 
price, there are two major shifts (see Graph 52).  First, after 1999, there is an increase in 
production when the Bolivia-Brazil pipeline came online.  Second, there is an additional 
shift upward between 2000 and 2004, when the amount of natural gas produced almost 
tripled.  Juxtapose this increase with the associated increase in natural gas price, and the 
post-2005 increase in royalties under the hydrocarbon law and the Bolivia natural gas 
trifecta is clear. 
                                                          
 
131 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017; U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
Graph 51: Bolivia Natural Gas Reserves, Production, and Price 
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President Morales has essentially taken advantage of the dual benefits of 
increased natural gas prices alongside laws enacted prior to his election.  While claiming 
credit for the natural gas resource boom in Bolivia, Morales has simultaneously decried 
the behavior of past neoliberal governments.  Interestingly, these very same governments 
provided the foundation for Bolivia’s strong economic growth, Morales’ concomitant 
political success, and resultant social spending.  Bolivia’s combination of increased 
natural gas production, substantial increase in the price of natural gas, and increase in 
percentage of royalties from the 2005 Hydrocarbon Law were all events that either 
preceded or were in their ascendant before Morales’ election. 
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133 Energy Information Administration; https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdA.htm; Accessed 20 
January 2018. 
Graph 52: Bolivia Natural Gas Production and Price 
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However, unless additional exploration and investment in the natural gas sector 
takes place, Bolivia may find itself experiencing a situation of diminishing returns 
relative to gas exploitation and subsequent sales to its coveted Brazilian market.  
Presently, it is too costly for IOCs to operate in Bolivia, and unless there is a change, 
Bolivia may soon face declining production, which will have secondary and tertiary 
effects on revenue and spending.  Presently, the hydrocarbon “pie” breaks down into 
royalties (18%), IDH (32%), an unknown percentage for YPFB, and the remaining 
percentage for the private operator to cover costs.  The 18% of royalties are further 
divided between the producing department and the Treasury.  The 32% derived from IDH 
divides among various entities in Bolivia: municipalities, universities, Treasury, 
Indigenous Fund, etc. (Medinacelli 2015, blogpost #63). 
Ultimately, if additional IOC investment into Bolivia’s natural gas production 
does not appear, it is possible the country will face diminishing returns on its natural gas 
revenue.  Moreover, the potential of Brazil developing its own natural gas reserves may 
deny Bolivia its most secure market.  It is likely Bolivia will be forced to rescind, or 
severely adjust aspects of, its 2005 Hydrocarbon Law if it wishes to attract IOCs to 
develop additional natural gas reserves. 
For historical context, it was only one decade prior to the 2005 Hydrocarbon Law 
when a national referendum supported increased royalties on gas production, making 
them the 50% rate of today (Dussan 2004, 66).  Increased taxes and royalties stifled 
exploration and development.  It appears that just over ten years after Bolivia’s 
nationalization of its hydrocarbon resources, the time has come to consider changes that 
will attract needed private capital investment. 
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According to interview subject 25800-209, arguably FDI drops or declines under 
populist governments, which presents problems for development.  “In Bolivia, there is 
plenty of natural gas as well as tungsten, tin, silver, and the like.  Presently, Morales, who 
I consider to be a smart man, is posturing for reelection and attempting to establish 
additional trade relationships in the region.  Bolivia remains challenged to compete in this 
environment, though, as it is surrounded by economic giants, regionally speaking of 
course.  Bolivia wants a piece of this market, too, and is focusing on opening its market 
despite Morales’ ‘socialism.’”134 
Last, and tangential to energy integration, although Bolivia is considering the 
export of electricity, this is an unlikely scenario as countries prefer to import 
hydrocarbons and produce electricity on their own.  According to interview subject 
25800-202, electricity integration in South America exists, but governments prefer to buy 
oil or gas, and then convert the resources into electricity on their own.  “This is because 
countries do not want to give up their power of electricity to another state or 
country…”135  Instead, governments prefer to purchase natural gas or oil because there 
are many markets from which to choose.  “Electricity imports may work in Central 
America because the region is one market, where all countries are energy importers.  
Former President of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, was successful in Central America 
because he provided much needed supplies to the region in exchange for U.N. votes and 
leftist promotion.”136  The decision to import resources instead of finished electricity is 
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likely rooted in a state’s desire to control its electricity production.  Hypothetically, if a 
country relies on a neighbor for its electricity, it may be held hostage should there be 
political instability, or if the provider decides to leverage its political power over a 
country or an entire region. 
 
Brazil 
What follows is a brief discussion of Brazil’s energy matrix, as well as 
macroeconomic indicators to place the country and natural gas relationship with Bolivia 
into context.  Brazil’s energy matrix is much more sophisticated than neighboring 
Bolivia.  Brazil’s sheer size requires a more complex pipeline network to feed its 
industrial areas of the South and Southeast, as well as to deliver energy to develop the 
interior.  The quantity of energy consumed by Brazil accounts for over 50% of South 
America’s demand.  Globally as of 2015 Brazil was the eighth-largest energy consumer 
on the planet and energy consumption has almost doubled in just over the last decade.137  
The potential development of Brazil’s offshore natural gas deposits will likely affect its 
decision to continue to import natural gas, which will also have implications for the 
region.  The below graph explains Brazil’s electricity production by source.  
Hydroelectric power is where the bulk of electricity derives (see Graph 53, below).  
Though, in years of drought Brazil supplements its energy needs with natural gas.  Other 
sources of fuel exist in Brazil’s energy matrix, such as nuclear and renewables; however, 
their use only exceeded 5% after 2009. 
                                                          
137 U.S. Energy Information Administration; Brazil; 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=BRA, November 21, 2017, accessed 29 January 
2018. 
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Brazil imports Bolivian natural gas at a higher rate than Argentina, another 
regional supplier (see Graph 54, below). 
                                                          
138 World Bank. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.FOSL.ZS?end=2014&locations=BR&start=1971&view=chart. 
Accessed 28 January 2018. 
 
Graph 53: Brazil Percentage of Electricity from Source 
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Brazil’s development of its hydrocarbons has waned because of a lack of internal 
reforms and infrastructure bottlenecks (Gomes 2014, 4).  The Petrobras monopoly over 
the hydrocarbon sector also inhibited development.  In 1995 this monopoly ended via 
constitutional amendment, and in 1999 under the Cardoso administration the government 
began to gradually liberalize the oil and gas sector by subjecting all public services to 
competitive bidding.  Additionally, the 2009 Gas Law further reduced Petrobras control 
over the sector.  By 2013, there were over 70 private companies active in the upstream, 
operating alone or in conjunction with Petrobras, with the bulk of produced gas also sold 
to Petrobras.  Presently there are over 90 companies, both local and foreign, that hold 
exploration areas in Brazil (ANP 2016).  Nevertheless, natural gas now accounts for 
roughly 15% of domestic supply because of hydropower preponderance and relatively 
undeveloped natural gas infrastructure. 
                                                          
139 Atlas MIT Database.  http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/.  Accessed 26 August 2017. 
Graph 54: Brazil Imports of Petroleum Gases 
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The history of natural gas in Brazil dates to the mid-19th century, with the creation 
of the Rio de Janeiro Gas Company (later renamed State Gas Company, CEG) in 1854.  
The creation of the Sao Paulo Gas Company (COMGAS) came about in 1872.  Several 
others came about between then and the early 1900s; however, the advent of electricity 
resulted in the collapse of all city gas companies except CEG and COMGAS (Gomes 
2014, 7). 
The Brazilian populist Vargas created the National Oil Council (CNP) in 1934 
and, although weak, the organization still carried out a geological survey of Brazil.  
Several years later, the “Oil Is Ours” campaign began, and lasted until Law 2004 was 
enacted (1952), which granted a monopoly of oil exploration to Petrobras.  Later, the 
military attempted to solve the oil problem and its effects on Brazilian economic 
development.  Brazil still operated on firewood as late as 1967, and if the county was to 
industrialize, it needed to make oil central to its energy policy (Biasetto 2016, 6).  
Brazil’s energy policy was directly related to its development policy. 
A few years after the military dictatorship began, Brazil experienced an economic 
miracle, resulting from planning carried out by the military regime and economists.  
During this period (1967-1974), Brazil was out of money, but given support from the 
U.S. (Lyndon Baines Johnson administration) in efforts to fight communism (Biasetto 
2016, 23).  Nevertheless, during this time, Brazil remained weak, and lacked a clear 
strategy to confront its energy challenges.  The oil shock of 1973 ended Brazil’s initial 
phase of ISI, and the subsequent 1979 oil shock did not help Brazil maintain its footing. 
In 1974, Brazil was under the Geisel presidency which managed the economic 
plan developed in 1964, and began to ease the dictatorship.  In fact, oil shaped the Geisel 
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presidency, and was also blamed for the 1980s debt crisis.  During the middle-1970s, 
Brazil was still importing 40% of its energy needs, and Geisel emphasized the 
development of nuclear, alcohol, and hydropower energy sources.  Such an expansion 
was facilitated by foreign financial markets (Geisel was not opposed to foreign 
investment, but did not trust foreign companies), eager to extend credit (Biasetto 2016, 
104).  By this time, Geisel was facing a change in Brazilian development from ISI to 
export substitution as the country shifted from an exporter of agriculture to industrial 
goods, which was a serious challenge as Brazil had not yet resolved its energy supply 
situation, which was largely imported.  Despite Geisel’s patriotism, he was under great 
pressure to open Brazil’s oil fields to the majors.  At the time, proponents of the free-
market in Brazil conceded that Petrobras was a costly failure, and there was a need to 
enter into risk contracts with the major oil companies.140  The majors could drill, but were 
required to sell all discovered oil to Petrobras (Biasetto 2016, 162). 
Later, the strategy was to increase the use of natural gas in the Brazilian energy 
portfolio, and Cardoso saw this resource as a way to fuel Brazilian industry.  Brazil 
signed gas deals with Argentina and Bolivia, with the latter’s pipeline coming online at 
the beginning of Cardoso’s second administration (1999-2002) (Silva 2009, 206).  More 
recently there has been a steady increase in natural gas consumption in Brazil, 
particularly after the pipeline linking Bolivia to Brazil in 1999 was completed, a true 
game changer for the region (see Graph 55, below). 
                                                          
140 The lack of a guarantee of certain profits are what made these agreements risk contracts. 
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Brazil’s pre-salt discoveries, if developed, will likely result in great opportunities 
amid substantial growth in its upstream; the underlying assumption is that the pre-salt 
discoveries of recent years (Santos and Campos Basins) will result in increased outputs of 
both crude oil and natural gas.  According to interview subject 25800-206, “Brazil’s pre-
salt discoveries were used to pay for everything, but the Brazilians spent the money 
before it was earned.  Certainly, some folk were brought out of poverty during the Lula 
and Rousseff period, but these same people are now falling back into it because there was 
not sufficient and sustainable investment in education, health, and other social services.”  
Regarding economic development, “…at least under the dictatorships there was 
development progress; however, since Lula, there is nothing to show for investment in 
the productive or manufacturing sector of the economy despite billions flowing into the 
country from China.”142 
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Graph 55: Brazil Natural Gas Consumption (Bcm) 
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As in the previous section on Bolivia, a closer look is warranted.  In Graph 56 
(below) of Brazil’s proved reserves, production, and price of natural gas, we can see 
tremendous change after 1999, then subsequent shifts in production and price prior to the 
2006 nationalization of Bolivia’s hydrocarbon sector, and finally an uptick in production 
after Brazil’s 2009 Gas Law (11909).  The intensity of the project increased in the 1990s, 
as the goal of several Brazilian presidents’ pursuit of natural gas integration with Bolivia 
was ultimately realized, and then maintained (Collor de Mello, Franco, Cardoso, Lula, 
and Rousseff). 
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With the production of natural gas extrapolated for context relative to its price, 
there are two major shifts (see Graph 57, below).  After 1999, there is an increase in 
                                                          
143 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017. 
Graph 56: Brazil Natural Gas Reserves, Production, and Price 
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production when the Bolivia-Brazil pipeline came online.  Second, there is a major shift 
upwards after 2009 when Brazil’s Gas Law passed.  Brazil’s production of natural gas 
doubled from 2009-2016. 
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A downside has been as Brazil increased output there has been a decrease in 
revenue because of lower oil prices.  According to interview subject 25800-206, Brazil is 
natural gas self-sufficient on paper, or is projected to become so, but this is not truly the 
case.  Development is costly, and despite Brazil’s advances in deep-water drilling, it is 
unlikely to develop its resources.  Instead, Brazil is politically inept and will absolutely 
require the help of IOCs to develop its pre-salt resources.  Moreover, the recession in the 
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Graph 57: Brazil Natural Gas Production and Price 
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country combined with the fallout from the Car Wash scandal inhibits Petrobras success, 
and by extension much of that of Brazil.145 
Brazil will remain a natural gas importer for the foreseeable future, and instead 
focus on developing its strong oil sector.  However, the ongoing fallout from the Car 
Wash corruption scandal, to include project delays, tempers some of this optimism.  The 
ascension of Michel Temer to the presidency will presumably bring to Brazil a more 
investment-friendly environment to the oil and gas sector.  The CEO of Petrobras, Pedro 
Parente, is naturally business-friendly and will likely provide additional optimism and 
stewardship as the parastatal rides out the scandal.146  Nevertheless, a loss of confidence 
in Petrobras could entice investors away from Brazil and toward other hydrocarbon 
markets in Latin America.  Despite this potential, Brazil will certainly remain a major 
player in the region.  The relationship between Bolivia and Brazil does not exist in a 
vacuum, however.  If Brazil elects to develop its offshore reserves, it may decide to 
continue to purchase Bolivian gas for some time.  If so, Brazil will be able to negotiate 
with Bolivia from a position of strength. 
Non-economic considerations may contribute to the calculus of Brazilian 
decision-makers.  According to interview subject 25800-204, the discovery of gas and oil 
deposits off Brazil’s coast is definitely a game changer, but has some second and third 
order effects, and such considerations weigh heavily in the minds of Brazilian planners.  
“There is a pre-existing concern in the Brazilian government of Bolivians moving into 
the country in search of better opportunities, and the Brazilians do not care for such 
                                                          
145 Interview which took place between SEP and NOV 2017. 
146 Parente resigned from Petrobras in June 2018, after a national trucker strike took place during May 
2018.  The board of Petrobras named Chief Financial Officer, Ivan Monteiro, as interim CEO. 
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migratory movements.  Even though Brazil may eventually become self-sufficient in 
natural gas, Brazil may continue to purchase Bolivian gas to not weaken the Bolivian 
economy as such a situation will likely result in increased Bolivian immigration into 
Brazil.”  Brazil considers the “minor expense” of Bolivian natural gas as acceptable to 
avoid what it considers a potential demographic shift.147  This sentiment is partly 
corroborated by interview subject 25800-209, who posits that countries in the region such 
as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are skeptical about helping less stable countries like 
Bolivia.  These countries see migration out of Bolivia as a concern and may be compelled 
to apply pressure on the government of Bolivia to control or stop migratory outflows.  
There is a need for Bolivia to confront its major internal problems such as coca/cocaine, 
free movement of drug trafficking organizations, its indigenous social issues, myriad 
economic problems, and poor governance if migration is to be better managed.148 
The initial development of the natural gas market in Bolivia was arguably not 
purely market-driven or indigenous in nature.  Brazil’s decision to continue to buy 
Bolivian natural gas may not purely be driven by price or need. 
 
Toward the Future: The Natural Gas Relationship between Bolivia and Brazil 
It is likely the natural gas relationship between Bolivia and Brazil will continue, 
regardless of who becomes president of either country, whether resource nationalist and 
populist or neoliberal in their views on integration.  For example, according to interview 
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subjects 25800-201, 25800-203, 25800-204, 25800-205, 25800-206, 25800-207, and 
25800-209 populist governments, whether dictatorships or democracies of the left or of 
the right need to pay the bills, as economic decline often results in a change of 
government, and nobody wants to lose power.149  Additionally, although there appears to 
be an emerging conflict of vision between Bolivia and Brazil, this was not always the 
case as the Morales and Lula governments were very close.  Continuing, these same 
interview subjects argue that specific to Morales in Bolivia, and both Lula and Rousseff 
in Brazil, these individuals have become part of the same system they spent their lives or 
careers fighting against, as the policies they once despised are the same ones they uphold, 
or even deepen, once in office.150 
The difference in vision between each country is an important aspect of this study.  
There is a new paradigm developing in the relationship between Bolivia and Brazil, as 
well as within the entire region.  On one hand, Bolivia will face uncertainty, but an 
opening of natural gas markets and associated competition may be of benefit to Bolivia 
rather than the country relying on the present single market of Brazil, a near monopsony.  
Interview subject 25800-209 points out that regarding trade relationships, Bolivia is at 
near-dependency on Brazil.  However, despite the Brazilian need for natural gas, it is 
economically growing and developing its own reserves, which will likely result in 
exports outside of the region as Brazil opens itself to new, external markets.  “Bolivia 
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will need to adapt to the potentiality of losing Brazil, its main trading partner for natural 
gas, which will be to Bolivia’s great detriment.”151 
Bolivia will have the option to negotiate with various potential buyers to decrease 
risk, which will be beneficial despite an associated increase in complexity.  Interview 
subject 25800-209 echoes this sentiment, and maintains that trade is beneficial to both 
sides of a bilateral agreement; however, the Trans Pacific Partnership is real and this will 
have yet unforeseen effects on the entire region as well as the fractious MERCOSUR.152  
On the other hand, the price of natural gas will not be the sole determinant for Brazil.  
Instead, flexibility will be increasingly important in its natural gas matrix.  According to 
interview subject 25800-208, Petrobras invested in LNG and this market moved very fast.  
It was the market that drove Brazil to import LNG because of the flexibility in contracts 
LNG offers.  The nature of Brazil’s need requires this flexibility more than that of long-
term pipeline agreements, as is the case with Bolivia.  Brazil requires a diversity of 
supply in energy sources, and it is this diversity of supply which will allow Brazil to 
negotiate from a position of strength during upcoming contract negotiations with 
Bolivia.153 
Brazil will likely continue to purchase natural gas from Bolivia.  However, 
because of Brazilian pre-salt discoveries, the potential of LNG trade, and new business 
models developing in Brazil and the region, Bolivia will face increasing pressure to 
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adapt.  Moreover, according to interview subject 25800-207, the sheer scale of Brazil’s 
economy dwarfs that of Bolivia.  Brazil’s market and professional diversity allow it to 
compete with IOCs on some level, which is not the case at all for Bolivia.  Basically, the 
natural gas discoveries off Brazil’s coast will cause Petrobras to begin to look at their 
development in purely economic or market terms, like IOCs do, and this perspective will 
benefit Petrobras, but likely not Bolivia.154  Continuing in this vein, interview subject 
25800-207 maintains that ideally NOCs should integrate themselves more with IOCs as 
they are more efficient and effective, and have better accountability.  People in countries 
with NOCs often do not trust the parastatal, or often even their own system.  Specific to 
Bolivia, YPFB should not try to compete with the IOCs, but instead work with them as 
the country has absolutely zero leverage over any IOC.155 
Brazil is presently in the throes of transition towards a new center-right coalition 
in the national congress.  As a result, the political and business context for natural gas has 
associated implications relative to competition in the natural gas market.  The energy 
policy in Brazil is market-oriented, as demonstrated through the restructuring of 
Petrobras, liberalization of price, privatization of assets, and the “Gas to Grow” structural 
growth program (Brazil Ministry of Mines 2016).  These changes may present challenges 
for Bolivian gas in Brazil. 
There are numerous companies in Brazil that want Bolivian gas, which will offset 
the risk of Bolivia not securing a long-term contract.  If Bolivia begins negotiating with 
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some buyers it will be able to quickly increase this number.  The advantage here is that if 
one buyer does not want Bolivian gas, there will be others.  The solution to market risk in 
natural gas is the market itself (Fagundez de Almeida May/Jun. 2017).  According to 
interview subject 25800-202, the future of the relationship between Bolivia and Brazil 
will likely be that the ToP contract between the two countries will decrease to 
~100Mm3/day with an established upper limit of natural gas price possibly close to Henry 
Hub, and that Petrobras will manage some important Bolivian natural gas fields, as it has 
done in the past.156  Note the ~100Mm3/day (~36.5Bm3 total) estimation dovetails with 
the earlier natural gas consumption graphic, a decrease from Brazil’s high point in total 
consumption of over 40Bm3 in 2014 to just over 35Bm3 in 2015.  Petrobras, expelled 
from Bolivia after Morales’ nationalization of the hydrocarbon sector, will possibly once 
again manage some of Bolivia’s fields.  To substantiate this point, Brazil’s total demand 
is 100Mm3/day when all terminals are being consumed which breaks down into 
55Mm3/day derived from domestic production with the remainder satisfied by Bolivian 
imports and LNG (Fagundez de Almeida May/Jun. 2017). 
If the long-term nature of Bolivia’s ToP contract with Brazil changes because of 
market fluctuations, a near inevitability, Bolivia will need to adapt to short-term contracts 
of less than twenty years, or even consider trading natural gas on the spot market as is the 
case in more nimble markets like the U.S.  According to interview subject 25800-208, 
presently, investors will not invest in Bolivia until they know the outcome of the Bolivia-
Brazil natural gas contract as investors want to make a profit.  If domestic sales are on the 
                                                          
156 Interview which took place between SEP and NOV 2017. 
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rise in Bolivia, or if they are the only sales of natural gas for Bolivia, then there is less 
opportunity for profit as gas sales to Brazil will offer a greater return on investments.157 
A situation of few buyers will make short-term or spot market gas trades very 
risky for Bolivia as this may also affect government rents.  If Bolivian gas is only sold 
domestically (~$1/MMBtu), or less is available for export at a higher price, revenues will 
decrease as will associated royalties and rents.  For Bolivia to maintain its revenues and 
international balance of payments, it will essentially need to open to the market and move 
away from the strong nationalist approach under which it currently operates.  That this 
may transpire under Bolivia’s populist and resource nationalist Morales administration 
will be of keen interest. 
 
Major Conclusions of Chapter Four 
There are certain hard realities for each country in the case study.  Every country 
is limited in one form or another when making decisions; however, certain countries are 
more constrained than others. 
Bolivia needs to sell its natural resources to generate revenues.  The bulk of its 
revenue derives from natural gas sales to Brazil, its major customer.  During the period 
before Bolivia’s dictatorship (middle-1960s), natural gas trade was negligible and only 
harnessed as a commodity later, and mostly with Argentina.  Post-dictatorship Bolivia 
(1985 – present) witnessed an increase in natural gas as a significant percentage of GDP, 
but still mainly relied on Argentina as a customer.  This all changed as the Bolivia-Brazil 
                                                          
157 Interview which took place between SEP and NOV 2017. 
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pipeline came online in 1999, which resulted in a substantial increase in the sale of 
natural gas as Brazil replaced Argentina as customer of choice.  However, it is presently 
possible that because of natural gas discoveries off Brazil’s coast, the Bolivia-Brazil 
relationship may change. 
Bolivia benefitted from high prices.  Also, Brazil functioned as dedicated 
customer at a time when pre-Morales legislation paved the way for a vertiginous rise in 
Bolivian natural gas revenues.  The ebb of natural gas prices from earlier years’ rise 
likely looms large in Bolivian planners’ minds.  The volatility of rents associated with 
Bolivian natural gas requires fiscal discipline if Bolivia seeks to avoid the downside of a 
commodity boom. 
Essentially, Bolivia needs to reform its system if it is to attract FDI, particularly 
that of IOCs, to develop its natural gas resources.  The current situation in Bolivia 
inhibits IOC exploration because it is cost prohibitive, despite being good for revenue and 
rent generation at this moment in time.  Bolivia may face a hard lesson that it must again 
open its economy to the international market to attract needed investment.  Under 
Bolivian President Evo Morales (2005-Present), the trend of increased natural gas sales 
continued, and the amount of revenue generated from these sales also increased because 
of the combination of the global rise in price and the Bolivia-Brazil pipeline reaching 
capacity. 
In neighboring Brazil, choices are also necessary.  However, Brazil’s choices are 
likely to not be as difficult as in Bolivia; the former’s economy is much more developed 
than the latter’s.  Brazil needs natural gas from Bolivia despite much of its energy being 
produced hydroelectrically.  Natural gas will remain a necessity in times of drought, as 
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well as if Brazil desires to further develop its northeast and interior, which are vital to 
improve the quality of life, opportunities, and GDP.  Despite Brazil’s major hydrocarbon 
discoveries off its southern coast, the recent economic recession compelled Petrobras to 
sell exploration rights to some of its fields.  Selling off assets may affect Brazilian natural 
gas production in the years ahead. 
How this dissertation answers the original research questions is found in Chapter 
Five, Analysis and Assessment.  What is already certain is that Bolivia and Brazil are no 
longer able to hide the results of historic and egregiously poor policies. 
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V.  CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT 
General Statement: 
This dissertation fits into the overall context of twentieth century Latin America 
economics and politics.  The findings nest within more expansive questions on 
international political economy and export-driven models of development.  Why do 
populist regimes, historically operating under an economic nationalist cum protectionist 
paradigm, simultaneously pursue policies of economic integration?  What is the 
relationship between resource nationalists and open markets, especially in the 
hydrocarbons sector?  What is the relationship between populists, who are typically 
resource nationalists, and their decision to choose policies of energy integration? 
The most common responses to the above are that resource nationalists pursue 
protectionist policies in the hydrocarbon sector.  This dissertation demonstrates that once 
in power, resource nationalists do not always pursue protectionist policies in the 
hydrocarbon sector, but instead rely on market forces.  Another common response is that 
populists pursue policies of resource nationalism in the hydrocarbon sector.  This 
dissertation also demonstrates that populists do not always pursue policies of resource 
nationalism in the hydrocarbon sector, but instead choose policies of integration.  Policies 
of integration are compelled by market forces, and at times ironically provide the 
foundation for resource nationalism to later flourish.  In Bolivia and Brazil, populists are 
able to maintain or deepen free market policies during commodity upswings.  This is the 
true paradox of populism. 
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This conclusion begins with a synopsis of international economic events as 
generally experienced in Latin America, a brief section on the evolution of populism in 
twentieth century Latin America, then focuses on the Bolivia and Brazil experiences.  
The final section discusses the applicability of this dissertation and identifies avenues for 
future research. 
 
The Latin American Experience in the Twentieth Century: 
The worldwide economic depression of the 1930s greatly impacted Latin 
American export-driven economies.  The worldwide drop in commodity prices weakened 
the economies of Bolivia and Brazil respectively, and both countries learned hard-fought 
economic lessons from the experience.  From the depression through the 1960s, both 
countries attempted to implement ISI programs to help reduce foreign dependency as 
well as lessen their strict reliance on commodity exports.  From the mid-1960s through 
the mid-1980s, Bolivia and Brazil underwent great domestic transformations through 
military dictatorships.  During this period, the oil and interest rate shocks of the 1970s 
and 1980s strongly limited the countries’ development goals.  When the military as an 
institution abandoned direct political involvement in the mid-1980s, the private sector 
was free to implement neoliberal economic reforms. 
Populists of the right who eschewed the state capitalist model emerged during this 
time.  The subsequent leftward shift across Latin America in the early 2000s is often 
viewed as a direct result of failed market-based reforms that left large swaths of citizens 
bereft of the same economic gains realized by domestic and international elites.  
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However, these same market-based reforms ironically provided the foundation for 
resource nationalists to emerge.  Prior to 2010, the region returned to a commodity-driven 
export model buoyed by higher prices in oil, natural gas, and mining.  Bolivia and Brazil 
experienced resultant booms in export revenue.  However, increased wealth and 
government largesse masked persistent harmful rent-seeking behavior and weak 
government institutions. 
In Bolivia and Brazil, the twentieth century witnessed shifts from authoritarian to 
democratic regimes, and from populism, to anti-populism, to neo-populism.  In neither 
country did these regimes last long, although in Brazil some transitions were smoother 
than in Bolivia.  A cyclical, almost circular, experience remains in both countries.  Like 
most countries in Latin America today, Bolivia and Brazil remain challenged in 
developing their economies beyond a largely export-driven model.  Although some 
countries are diversifying their economies with more success than others, all countries in 
the region remain linked to the international system of trade and the fluctuation in world 
commodity prices. 
 
Bolivia, Brazil, Natural Gas Markets, and Nationalism; a Summary: 
Since Bolivia developed its natural gas deposits in the 1970s, revenues from 
subsequent sales became an increasingly important contributor to the economy.  No 
president in Bolivia whether overtly nationalist, populist, or neoliberal ceased exporting 
this commodity.  During the dictatorship in Bolivia, natural gas sales continued, mostly to 
Argentina.  After the dictatorship ended, the neoliberal experiment began in Bolivia, as 
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well as in Brazil.  During this period, Bolivia briefly sold gas to Chile, which ended in 
Bolivian political disaster.  The subsequent instability in Bolivia ushered Evo Morales 
into power as a would-be anti-neoliberal president.  Meanwhile in Brazil, the leftist 
Cardoso pushed through neoliberal economic reforms, which presidents Lula, Rousseff, 
and Temer maintained. 
In Bolivia, Morales maintained the commodity-driven export policies of his 
predecessors and thus the pipeline deal with Brazil.  Morales, however, altered the 
percentage of royalties distributed to the central and local governments, as well as other 
centers of patronage.  The Brazilians from Cardoso onward were also keen to maintain 
the relationship as it was mutually beneficial, and did so irrespective of political 
alignment.  A December 2017 meeting between Morales and Temer on the topic of the 
natural gas relationship supports this argument. 
Data demonstrates the relationship between resource nationalists and open 
markets is that in the case of the Bolivia-Brazil pipeline, much of the rhetoric of the 
Morales administration does not match its actions.  Morales likely considers the nature of 
IOCs and their relationship with Bolivia exploitative.  It is also likely the Bolivian 
government, and Morales himself, holds strong antipathy towards the private sector.  
Prior to the Morales administration, the pipeline was in place, the price of natural gas was 
on the rise, and the 2005 Hydrocarbon Law was already in effect.  Essentially, despite the 
very public seizing of foreign assets, the system in place prior to the Morales presidency 
remained mostly intact, barring some renegotiation of terms.  On the Brazil side of the 
border, the gas continued to flow and the Brazilians continued to buy.  Increased trade 
and associated revenue filled coffers and allowed patronage to expand and flow.  Natural 
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gas powered industry, and access to energy reached hitherto unintegrated interiors of both 
countries. 
Data also demonstrates the leftist Lula and his hand-picked successor Rousseff 
maintained some of the neoliberal policies in place during the Cardoso administration.  
Center-right president Temer is moving beyond former administrations and deepening 
these policies, just as Morales deepened the policies of his predecessors.  Also similar in 
both countries was some redistribution of wealth, bringing millions out of poverty.  
Regional energy integration remains as important as it is elusive, however. 
For Bolivia and Brazil, benefits exist on both sides of the border, especially 
during peak initial construction of the pipeline.  Pipeline construction afforded 
employment to many.  Primary employment during the creation of the pipeline, as well as 
secondary forms of employment (ancillary services and support), developed.  Upon 
completion of the pipeline, maintenance workers and technicians remained behind to 
ensure pipeline functionality.  Since the completion of the pipeline, Corumbá, Brazil, 
where the pipeline between the two countries passes, has benefitted from formal and 
informal economic activity.  Such activity ranges from food vendors to taxi drivers 
shuttling people across the Bolivia-Brazil border.  Shopping malls, entertainment venues, 
and other forms of commerce also are present in the city. 
Ultimately, while there are advantages to being a supplier of a desired 
commodity, the bilateral nature of trade between Bolivia and Brazil has its disadvantages.  
If Bolivia remains dependent on the large-scale export of natural gas to a single 
destination such as Brazil, its influence over the price of the commodity will remain 
limited.  As natural gas is vital to the health of the Bolivian economy, failure to meet 
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export commitments would threaten its development, and possibly its fiscal survival.  It is 
ideal for Bolivia to develop new markets or to stimulate new investment.  With large 
scale exports of natural gas, Bolivia may continue to benefit from economies of scale.  
 
Populism in Latin America; an Evolution: 
Old populism existed between the people and the oligarchy.  The results were an 
uneasy association (hardly a true alliance) among popular and middle-class sectors of 
society.  During this period, the state held its place as protector of the people and the 
marginalized.  During this time, powerful links between a charismatic leader and the 
masses undermined representative democracy and government institutions.  This old 
populism waned because of a confluence of factors.  First, in the post-Second World War 
period a democratic wave swept across Latin America.  Second, the ISI development 
model (core to old populism), was exhausted.  Third, during the Cold War period, the 
shift from populism to revolution in Latin America created a new paradigm. 
In the post-Cold War environment, a new populism emerged in several stages.  In 
the first stage, there was a successful macroeconomic period whereby governments 
attempted counter-inflationary policies.  Second, elected leaders began to govern by 
decree and held a direct appeal to the masses.  Third, democracy became more 
personalistic regardless of whether emerging from the left or the right.  Last, there have 
been both populist and non-populist responses to economic reform.  In the 2000s there 
emerged an ethnic-based component to populism; however, it is too soon to determine if 
this will last. 
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Both old and new populism demonstrate inherent tensions and contradictions 
between representative democracy and associated institutions.  The problem though is not 
populism per se, but underlying driving factors such as poverty, inequality, and the 
degeneration or decomposition of traditional political institutions.  Strong economic 
development is vital to democratic consolidation, while poverty and inequality clearly 
undermine the trappings of democracy, and often result in an unsustainable, if not 
dangerous, populism. 
 
Competing Development Logics/Models: Bolivia and Brazil: 
The most important factor in development models and a country’s subsequent 
political stability remains economic.  Common to the region, and within Bolivia and 
Brazil respectively, is the continual tension between political and economic logics that 
drive development policy.  Bolivia and Brazil mostly fit within the larger question of 
democracy as theorized by Robert Dahl (1971), and in the cases of Bolivia and Brazil 
electoral democracy exists.  Despite both countries meeting many of Dahl’s criteria for 
polyarchy, Bolivia and Brazil are not consolidated or institutionalized, although 
democracy endures.  There is concern, however, for authoritarian regression in both 
countries. 
Democracy remains in Bolivia and Brazil; however, each is uniquely rooted in 
recent historical experience.  Bolivian democracy is less institutionalized and less 
developed than in Brazil.  In fact, Bolivian democracy may be regressing as power 
increasingly concentrates in the executive.  Moreover, Bolivian political leadership 
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continues to bypass its own democratic institutions.  Meanwhile in Brazil, there is some 
democratic stability based on either the willingness or need of political parties to engage 
with one another to govern; however, open talk of a military coup in Brazil during 2017 
is unnerving.  Moreover, in late-2017 and early-2018 Brazil is barely pulling itself out of 
a deep recession; political tension may worsen if economic growth remains anemic. 
In the simplest terms, tension exists between state-capitalism and private sector 
development models.  There is an additional conflict that centers on how to use capitalist 
surplus to pay for development, and particularly who is to pay.  The decision of how, and 
who is, to pay for development vacillates between those in favor of accumulation and 
those pursuing a distributive logic.  Those who favor accumulation are the entrepreneurs 
and middle-class; those in favor of distribution are organized labor and the popular 
sectors. 
Government expenditures created the middle-class in Latin America.  Rentism (in 
the case of Bolivia and Brazil) generates the expectation of wealth among the lower and 
middle classes.  This expectation of wealth is particularly salient if resource nationalism 
is a theme government leaders incorporate into their discourse or overarching ideology.  
The state largely redistributes rents from royalties, such as natural gas.  Capturing the 
presidency offers the winners access to a vast patrimonial machine, which disperses 
wealth to colleagues, supporters, and political allies. 
Rent-based patronage systems in Bolivia and Brazil created the middle class.  Key 
figures from within political parties, particularly in Bolivia after the discovery of natural 
gas in the east, harnessed this patronage machine to reward the middle class who were 
dependent upon the state for their positions.  The existence and development of the 
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middle class is directly based on its ability to access the state as a source of jobs.  
However, to achieve long-term stability, there is a need to incorporate the popular sectors 
of a country into the economy and government.  Within this overarching competing logic 
fits the model of production, which across Latin America shifted among populism of the 
left and right, state-led capitalism, and open market capitalism.  Populism drives the 
authoritarian/democratic regime cycle, and wrought state capitalism, but the dilemma of 
accumulation versus distribution remains. 
 
Bolivia: 
That nationalization took place during a time of increasing commodity prices is 
not unexpected.  Nationalized firms during times of peak international commodities 
prices historically increased royalties and rents for the country.  Royalties and rents 
contributed to and fueled already established patronage systems.  Despite nationalizations 
in Bolivia, foreign interests have continued to invest under Morales.  Data demonstrates 
that the amount of FDI increased during the Morales administration, notably after 2005.  
Also, exports increased greatly after Morales took office, almost tripling in some years 
since the Sanchez de Lozada era.  Based on this dissertation, it is fair to conclude that had 
not Evo Morales inherited a country during an upswing in the commodity cycle, his 
patrimonial influence would have not garnered him the political longevity he is currently 
experiencing. 
Bolivian presidents from 1989 to 2005 maintained the open market approach 
initially emplaced under Paz Estenssoro in 1985.  Bolivian presidents continued to 
implement policies that ensured the Bolivian economy would continually integrate itself 
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into the world economy.  The final two presidencies prior to the Morales era show that 
Bolivian administrations continued with neoliberal economic policies, but were caught in 
a downward commodity cycle.  In Bolivia, Morales conspired to overthrow Sanchez de 
Lozada because of the potential of exporting natural gas to Chile.  In the Bolivia case, 
there is no greater example of resource nationalism than this. 
Under Morales, the Movement for Socialism (MAS) party emerged as a serious 
political force and remains in power today.  Of course, prior to the 2006 nationalization 
of Bolivia’s hydrocarbon sector, shifts in production and price were already in the 
ascendant.  Morales benefitted from a relationship with Brazil that was over two decades 
old, which was transversal across populists of the left and right, as well as neoliberal 
administrations.  The major shifts in natural gas production, post-2005 increase in 
royalties for Bolivia, and the increased price in natural gas in global and sub-regional 
markets ensured Morales’ economic success once at the helm.  President Morales took 
advantage of increased natural gas prices concomitant with laws enacted prior to his 
election.  Claiming credit for the natural gas resource boom in Bolivia, Morales has 
simultaneously criticized the behavior of Bolivia’s neoliberal governments. 
Clearly, Bolivia must sell commodities to generate revenue.  Presently, the lion’s 
share of Bolivia’s revenue derives from natural gas sales to Brazil.  Brazil remains a 
dedicated customer.  Bolivia as an exporter historically benefits from high commodity 
prices, whether silver, tin, or natural gas.  However, the historical lack of investment in 
productive sectors of the economy limits Bolivia’s potential as it is unable to achieve 
escape velocity through diversification as have other countries in the region.  Moreover, 
the volatility of rents requires fiscal discipline if Bolivia seeks to avoid the inevitable 
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downside of any commodity boom.  It is possible that because of natural gas discoveries 
off Brazil’s coast, the Bolivia-Brazil relationship may change. 
Historically, there is a relationship between protests in Bolivia and anticipated 
rents.  Prices in monopolies are established through a process in which an authority 
calculates price based on a cost structure inclusive of pre-established rents.  Once a 
commodity boom becomes the inevitable bust, this structure is thrown out of balance.  
The high volatility inherent in Bolivian commodity revenues during the twentieth 
century, whether tin or natural gas, as well as associated rents have historically plagued 
the country, challenged political stability, and undermined social cohesion.  Bolivian gas 
revenues and rents via sale to Brazil were a flash in the pan, finite, and unsustainable.  
Without calculated investment in the productive sectors of the economy during times of 
plenty Bolivia will be unable to weather the looming commodity bust without facing an 
institutional crisis. 
Bolivia needs to reform its system if it is to attract FDI as well as needed IOC 
experience and technology to develop its natural gas resources.  Presently, Bolivia 
inhibits IOC exploration because it is cost prohibitive, despite being beneficial for 
revenues and rents.  If the Bolivian economy is not diversified through investment and 
international engagement, the country will likely again face a painful lesson.  Moreover, 
it is possible that because Bolivia did not further develop its natural gas reserves, it may 
miss an opportunity to gain revenue should there be an uptick in oil price. 
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Brazil: 
As Brazil moved from a nationalist-industrialist economy to one of exports, it 
experienced an impressive economic reversal.  Post-1964, the balance of foreign to 
domestic capital in Brazil increased.  This increase led to an acceleration after 1985.  By 
the time Cardoso left office in 2002, inflation was largely under control.  Concomitantly, 
the election of initially leftist politicians like Cardoso affected the national economy 
when privatization accompanied some denationalization. 
Cardoso laid the neoliberal groundwork for a massive inflow of foreign capital 
investment, which grew under Lula.  President Rousseff continued with these policies; 
however, a lack of confidence in markets, a recession, and credit downgrade stalled or 
reversed many social programs.  These events fed into general negative atmosphere 
alongside corruption scandals and mass protests.  Brazil’s commodity-fueled growth 
during high demand provided unrealistic and unsustainable expectations.  Again, based 
on this dissertation, it is fair to conclude that had not Lula inherited a country during an 
upswing in the commodity cycle, his patrimonial influence and access to largesse would 
have not garnered him the political longevity he experienced. 
International and domestic forces also constrain Brazil’s actions.  The dizzying 
increase in oil prices allowed lawmakers to push through restrictions on Brazil’s pre-salt 
deposits to capture more rents for the country.  Offshore crude discoveries during the 
Lula administration were touted as a gift that would directly benefit the people.  Several 
years later, Petrobras’ revenue dropped because of reduced oil prices, and now the 
parastatal is one of the most indebted oil companies in the world.  The company is unable 
to increase production, has begun selling its assets to become leaner, is attempting to 
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reduce debt, and is compelled to seek outside investment.  Brazil also reversed legal 
restrictions on IOC operations regarding its pre-salt deposits.  Ideally, this decision will 
reduce the burden on Petrobras, increase foreign and domestic investment, and increase 
oil production moving forward. 
The combination of the PT’s policies and corruption sent Brazil into a deep and 
extended depression; however, the blame cannot solely be laid on the PT, as corruption in 
Brazil is legendary and has transcended administrations of the left, center, and right.  
President Michel Temer enacted an aggressive reform agenda that attempted to lift Brazil 
from depression and reduce state involvement in the economy.  Since 2016, Temer’s 
center-right administration shifted away from the populist, statist, and protectionist 
trajectory of Lula’s PT (2003-2016).  Despite four consecutive quarters of tepid growth in 
2017, Brazil’s economic position remains tenuous, and arguably may slip back into 
recession.  Of keen interest to energy analysts, economists, and political scientists alike is 
that many of Brazil’s actions parallel those of Mexico’s during its historic 2013 energy 
reform.158  The liberalization of both countries’ parastatals reversed decades of nationalist 
energy policy.  As the price of oil fluctuates, policy changes follow.  Amid a current 
economic, political, and corruption crisis, historical experience suggests Brazil will lean 
towards a centrist, or center-right, leader who will push ahead with current reforms. 
Brazilian industry demands Bolivian natural gas.  Natural gas trade with Bolivia 
endures and has transcended populist presidencies of the left and the right, as well as 
                                                          
158 Although preliminary data demonstrates a drop in oil exports from 2013 to the present, and a brief spike 
in FDI in 2013, it is too soon to determine the effects of Mexico’s reform (MIT, The Observatory of 
Economic Complexity: http://atlas.media.mit.edu/; The Global Economy: http://theglobaleconomy.com/; 
accessed 23 June 2018). 
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neoliberal administrations.  The pipeline relationship with Bolivia will endure, but with a 
likely decrease in gas purchases.  Brazil will continue to import Bolivian gas, while also 
focusing on developing its hydrocarbon sector. 
 
Applicability, Final Observations, and Beyond 
Applicability: 
There was a need to look at both Bolivia and Brazil because of the nature of 
natural gas as a commodity - essentially, a seller needs a buyer.  Market forces are an 
inescapable reality that compel or constrain countries in their ability to decide the 
direction of their country.  Some countries can weather pressures better than others, 
however.  Whether political leaders are economic nationalists, resource nationalists, 
populists of the left or right, or neoliberal in their outlook, market forces are political 
determinants, and integration into the world economy is inevitable.  It is possible that if 
Brazil develops its offshore resources, some of the conclusions from the Bolivia 
experience may apply. 
The intent of the dissertation case study was to explain the relationship between 
resource nationalism and energy integration.  This was a success.  However, it is unlikely 
the conclusions of this study are applicable to countries outside of Latin America, or 
possibly even outside the realm of natural gas exporters.  Despite these limitations, this 
dissertation identified similar patterns in Bolivia and Brazil relative to export dependency 
and links to the boom/bust cycle of international markets.  Without continued 
diversification away from an export-centric model, and simultaneous pursuit of regional 
221 
 
economic integration, both Bolivia and Brazil may remain in the situation that has 
historically plagued their development.  Moreover, both countries are on different 
political trajectories. 
Despite their likely divergent paths, a bilateral agreement on natural gas between 
Bolivia and Brazil can endure.  It is unclear if the integration of natural gas markets 
between Bolivia and Brazil will extend or deepen to other energy sectors such as 
electricity, or to countries in the Southern Cone.  Almost certain is that complete energy 
integration, particularly that of natural gas, is presently far too complex of an issue to 
extend across the entirety of South America, regardless of the political leadership in each 
country. 
Weaknesses in this study exist, but are limited.  To better examine rents, an ideal 
metric would be to determine government personnel expenditures as a percentage of GDP 
for both Bolivia and Brazil.  Looking at the relationship between this metric and political 
leadership over time could offer interesting results relative to how rents are distributed 
and under which regime.  However, the data available to make such an observation is 
spotty and unreliable. 
This study is limited in its direct applicability outside of Latin America; however, 
some lessons are clear.  First, investment is needed in the productive sectors of society if 
countries are to escape an export-dependent development model.  Second, if domestic 
capital is insufficient to fuel development, international capital is needed; however, the 
latter subjects a country to the whims of a commodity boom/bust cycle.  Third, rents 
weaken democratic governance as pursuit of state power degenerates into conflict 
between “haves” and “have nots” within a country.  Such factionalization erodes 
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institutions and makes political competition equivalent to the pursuit of the perks of 
power alone, not of governance. 
Equally challenging to this study’s applicability outside of Latin America and the 
regional natural gas sector, is the market price of natural gas.  The pricing of natural gas 
is deceiving and does not follow a reliable mechanism.  Historically, the price of natural 
gas was a function of the price of oil.  However, this pricing method does not follow a 
predictable logic and is subject to regional and sub-regional calculations and possible 
abuse.  The distortion between the price of oil and natural gas is considerable.159  
Moreover, there is an inverse relationship between consumption and price levels based on 
the sector using natural gas.160  If too costly, the consumer will not purchase natural gas.  
For a country that sells natural gas, this could be a serious concern. 
 
Final Observations: 
In Bolivia, Morales’ MAS has a solid hold on the Senate and Chamber of 
Deputies.  In Brazil there is a shift towards a centrist government with a coalition of the 
PSDB, MDB (historic PMDB), and elements of the Progressive Party in both the Federal 
Senate and Chamber of Deputies.  In Bolivia, the opposition is too weak to confront 
                                                          
159 For example, one barrel of oil is ~5.7 million Btu.  One thousand cubic feet of natural gas is ~1 million 
Btu (U.S. Energy Information Administration website calculator).  Using Btu as a metric, gas should be 
valued at roughly one sixth the price of oil.  Hence, if oil costs ~$60/barrel, natural gas should cost ~$10; 
however, at the time of writing it costs ~$3.  This discrepancy demonstrates there are additional variables 
involved in natural gas pricing, which presents a challenge for deeper evaluation or analysis. 
 
160 Thermoelectric pays the least, but consumes the most.  The industrial sector consumes less than 
thermoelectric, yet pays more.  The commercial sector consumes less than the industrial sector, yet also 
pays more.  Vehicles consume less, as does the residential sector, yet both sectors pay more for natural gas. 
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MAS.  In Brazil there is no unified coalition in congress to support all reforms 
concerning rule of law and economic stewardship.  Bolivia’s MAS is increasing its power 
within the executive, but also within some form of democratic framework.  Brazil does 
not seem to be experiencing executive branch power concentration, but instead appears to 
be governing through some form of coalition. 
Economic policies in either country, whether based on free/open market 
economics or state-capitalism, have not ended practices of clientelism, patronage, or 
rentism.  Democracy has also not ended such practices.  In both countries, external 
market forces may compel governments and elites to enact austerity programs.  Such 
austerity programs are often made to the detriment of the popular sectors.  Economics in 
Bolivia and Brazil remain central to political stability.   
Separate from the economic and political arguments within Bolivia and Brazil, 
natural gas in the Southern Cone still provides the best opportunity for regional energy 
integration in Latin America.  Outside of the region, the nature of the natural gas market 
is changing in several aspects, which may affect Latin American markets.  First, the 
emergence of LNG as a nascent internationally integrated market differs from the 
regional/sub-regional natural gas markets currently in operation.  Second, the price 
structure of natural gas, historically linked to oil, will potentially face delinkage.  Third, 
natural gas is a cleaner burning fuel than oil, can meet the needs of our energy-intensive 
society, and can presently do so with much more ease than renewables.  In fact, natural 
gas may be able to support the development of erratic and variable renewables such as 
solar and wind until which time a market-based renewable sector can emerge without 
costly government subsidies. 
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There is an expectation that Brazil's offshore oil deposits will provide wealth to 
the population.  However, because of political instability Petrobras is presently limited in 
its ability to immediately develop these fields.  If the fields are not developed, whether by 
Petrobras, an IOC, or through a joint venture, no rents or royalties can result.  The lack of 
rents will weaken the ability of the government to redistribute its wealth and leverage 
political capital towards the country’s economic development.  In both Bolivia and 
Brazil, without investment in the productive sectors of the economy, they will not be able 
to diversify away from this development model.  Remaining wedded to this model leaves 
Bolivia and Brazil subject to the external whims of the market, and simultaneously 
squeezed by the internal demands of the population. 
Resource nationalism is a powerful barrier to energy integration.  Proximity 
between Bolivia and Brazil drives their integration relationship.  Bolivia is a major gas 
producer lacking a developed domestic market, whereas Brazil is a major gas consumer 
with a strong industry.  Despite this relationship making near perfect market sense, 
political foundations and agreements on energy integration between Bolivia and Brazil 
were necessities prior to breaking any ground.  Though, since its inception, the 
integration relationship between the countries transcended nationalist, populist, and 
neoliberal governments.  Geopolitical realities indicative of the natural gas market drove 
energy integration between Bolivia and Brazil.  The market ensures this relationship 
continues, and now functions almost independently of politics.  But, nothing is 
guaranteed, and market shifts are afoot. 
Petrobras is presently the main buyer of natural gas in Bolivia.  The current 
contract relationship between Bolivia and Brazil expires in 2019.  Petrobras plans to 
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reduce its purchases of natural gas by half.  If Petrobras reduces its purchase of Bolivian 
gas, much of the largesse available to Morales through royalties, taxes, and rents will 
diminish.  For Bolivia, the golden age of high prices and limited competition in the 
natural gas market is over.  Aside from lost rents and the associated patronage that mostly 
benefit the middle class and elites, the entirety of the Bolivian economy will likely suffer.  
This pain will come as a direct result of Bolivia’s historical lack of economic diversity.  
Despite decades of warnings, Bolivia remains dependent upon commodity exports.  
Natural gas exports are the latest manifestation of such dependence. 
Should Petrobras reduce its gas purchases, Bolivia may be compelled to revisit its 
relationship with Argentina, become open to selling gas to Chile, enter the LNG market, 
combine these options, or possibly something else not yet conceived.  Engaging with 
Argentina is possible as there is a history of natural gas trade between countries.  
Contracts with Argentina took place during two of Bolivia’s three natural gas booms 
(1970-1999; 2011-2015).  As of 2017, Argentina remains the regional leader in natural 
gas consumption, and Bolivia should not ignore this market.  Selling gas to Chile will 
require a radical change in what has been nearly uninterrupted hostile Bolivian nationalist 
rhetoric since the late nineteenth century.  Entering the LNG market will be determined 
by the amount of natural gas Bolivia can produce, and if that amount is sufficient for 
expansion into that market.  Regardless of what Bolivia decides, the need to be flexible in 
the natural gas market is the starting point. 
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Future Research Opportunities: 
Upon completion of this dissertation, new questions have emerged.  Future 
studies on the natural gas relationship between Bolivia and Brazil should center on how 
this relationship will change if Brazil develops its hydrocarbon reserves, how it develops 
these reserves, and under what type of administration this transpires (populist of 
left/right, statist, or free-market). 
Additional research should focus on how Bolivia’s MAS endures amid what 
seems to be an inevitable decline in natural gas revenue, and what sectors of civil society 
will emerge in its wake?  An additional question is if Bolivia will again be thrust into a 
conflict that requires military or outside intervention. 
Additionally, how to incorporate varied sectors of civil society into a party or 
institution needs to be addressed.  If traditional institutions or political parties erode, will 
another charismatic leader emerge to reach the people outside of these institutions?  Will 
“the street” then become legitimate?  Bolivia and Brazil have seen much protest in recent 
years, and these protests are closely related to patronage and the expectation of rents.  If 
stability is dependent upon rents, how will democracy be consolidated when powerful 
market forces greatly burden a population? 
Finally, much information gathered during this dissertation, whether through 
reviewing academic and trade journal literature, analyzing statistical tables, or 
interviewing experts, did not find its way into the final draft.  Many issues of import fell 
outside the scope of this study, and are ideal places for future studies to begin.  These 
questions exist at the global and regional levels. 
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There are a few areas for future study that are global in scope.  For example, 
determining the price of natural gas is something that varies across geographies and is 
further subdivided into regional markets.  A lack of a clear, precise, and transparent 
mechanism to determine the price of natural gas confounds analysis.  Additionally, the 
emergence of an incipient international market for LNG is only briefly touched upon in 
this dissertation and demands future attention.  Essentially, can LNG emerge as an 
internationally integrated market?  If so, will there be attempts to create a natural gas 
cartel in the now faded image of OPEC?  Also related to LNG as a global commodity 
export is how much natural gas is required to benefit from this market and do Bolivia and 
Brazil have sufficient quantities towards realizing this end? 
Regional questions also remain unanswered.  First, how do governments calculate 
rents?  A subset of the rent calculation question is how do IOCs determine whether to 
remain in a country during nationalizations, and how are they able to function despite the 
associated reduction in revenue?  Next, what are the political or cultural calculations 
governments face when attempting to resolve pressing economic questions?  Third, 
studies examining why regional integration attempts, such as Petrolatín in Latin America, 
failed would add value through identifying and explaining associated integration 
challenges.  Historic explanations blame the debt and interest rate crises; however, after 
several decades a revived line of research could inquire if such a venture is now 
conceivable. 
These questions may have already been answered outside of academia, but the 
information possibly remains in the archives of IOCs, NOCs, or is closely-guarded within 
energy consulting firms.  
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